United States of America v. David Lamar Andrews

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4068
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID LAMAR ANDREWS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, Senior District Judge. (4:12-cr-00024-RAJ-DEM-
1)
Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023
Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate
Attorney, Wilfredo Bonilla, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber,
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Dee M. Sterling, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia;
Anthony L. Pappas, Second Year Law Student, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL,
Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
David Lamar Andrews appeals the 28-month sentence imposed following the
revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the sentence is plainly
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately
explain the sentence and imposed a term greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing
goals articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we
first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,
evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of
original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do when
reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings).
“A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant

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should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Contrary to Andrews’ arguments on appeal, the record reflects that the district court
adequately explained the sentence and stated an appropriate basis for the conclusion that
Andrews should receive the sentence it imposed. The court considered Andrews’ mental
health issues and the policy statement range of 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment, but it
ultimately found that the maximum available sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment was
warranted given Andrews’ history and characteristics. Specifically, the court explained
that, despite a substantial reduction to his original sentence and two prior releases on
supervision—both of which were revoked shortly after their commencement—Andrews
refused to follow the probation officer’s instructions, accept responsibility for his actions,
or take advantage of the mental health treatment opportunities presented to him. Therefore,
we conclude that Andrews’ sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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