United States of America v. Darrius Rashard Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRIUS RASHARD JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:16-cr-00309-D-1)
Submitted: May 8, 2024 Decided: August 7, 2024
Before RICHARDSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
After serving a prison term of 12 months and 1 day—a sentence resulting from a
downward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines’ advisory imprisonment range of 21
to 27 months—following his conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924, Darrius Rashard Jones began
service of a 3-year term of supervised release. Before expiration of that term, Jones tested
positive following urinalysis for methamphetamine and marijuana but was continued on
supervision to allow him to engage in drug treatment. Jones’ probation officer later
petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, alleging he had violated the
conditions of his supervision by: (1) absconding from supervision; (2) failing to participate
in urinalysis testing on 14 occasions; and (3) failing to participate in a substance abuse
treatment program due to his lack of attendance. Jones admitted all three violations, and
the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to the statutory
maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jones argues that this sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020).
We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not
plainly unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable.” Id.

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“A [supervised release] revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’
nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, the [district] court states an appropriate basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether it
is plainly so, relying on the definition of plain used in our plain error analysis—that is,
clear or obvious.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
“If a revocation sentence—even an unreasonable one—is not plainly unreasonable, we will
affirm it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).*
We conclude that Jones’ revocation sentence is substantively reasonable. Although
the district court imposed a sentence at the statutory maximum, it expressly noted Jones’
many breaches of trust while on release, the egregiousness and seriousness of those
breaches, Jones’ unwillingness to take advantage of the leniency he had received and to be
deterred in his behavior, and his blatant disregard for the law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),
(2)(B), 3583(e); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b)
* Although Jones does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence,
we must “review the sentence for procedural reasonableness before addressing whether it
is substantively reasonable,” even if the parties do not address the matter in their briefs.
United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). We have reviewed the
record and found no plain procedural error.

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(“[A]t revocation the [district] court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of
trust.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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