United States of America v. Ryan Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4217
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RYAN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:11-cr-00231-HEH-RCY-1)
Submitted: November 21, 2023 Decided: December 28, 2023
Before WYNN, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D.
Aber, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Ryan Jones appeals the 240-month sentence imposed on resentencing following his
guilty plea to attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). On appeal,
Jones asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing due to inconsistencies
between several discretionary conditions of supervised release that the district court
pronounced at sentencing and those contained in the written judgment. The Government
concedes the conditions are inconsistent but argues that, for various reasons, a full
resentencing is unnecessary.
“[W]e review the consistency of the defendant’s oral sentence and the written
judgment de novo.” See United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned
up). A district court is required to orally pronounce at sentencing all discretionary
conditions of supervised release. United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296
(4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021).
This requirement “is a critical part of the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing,”
Rogers, 961 F.3d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted), and ensures the defendant has
an opportunity to challenge unwarranted conditions before they are imposed, id. at 298.
An unexplained inconsistency between the orally pronounced and written versions of a
discretionary supervised release condition can amount to Rogers error. See Cisson, 33
F.4th at 193-94.
The usual remedy for a Rogers error is to vacate the sentence and remand for a full
resentencing. See Singletary, 984 F.3d at 346 & n.4. As the Government emphasizes, in
some recent unpublished cases we have determined the appropriate remedy for an

-- 2 of 3 --

3
inconsistency was to remand for the limited purpose of conforming the written judgment
to the oral pronouncement of the relevant condition. See, e.g., United States v. Locklear,
No. 21-4161, 2023 WL 2300394, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023). However, those have been
cases where the district court’s intention was “clear[]” from the record. Id. In contrast, we
have remanded for a full resentencing when “the record [was] ambiguous as to the district
court’s true intention” regarding an inconsistent discretionary condition. United States v.
Upchurch, No. 21-4674, 2023 WL 4948011, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court’s intention as to the challenged conditions is unclear from
the record. And we find unpersuasive the Government’s other arguments as to why
resentencing is unnecessary. See Singletary, 984 F.3d at 345-47 & 346 n.4. Accordingly,
the usual remedy for a Rogers error is appropriate in this case. We therefore vacate Jones’
sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

-- 3 of 3 --