United States of America v. Alonso Cantu-Cantu, a/k/a Primo, a/k/a Alonzo Cantu-Cantu

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4526
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALONSO CANTU-CANTU, a/k/a Primo, a/k/a Alonzo Cantu-Cantu,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Abingdon. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cr-00037-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: July 30, 2024 Decided: August 6, 2024
Before AGEE and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Matthew L. Felty, FELTY LAW FIRM, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, S. Cagle Juhan, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alonso Cantu-Cantu appeals from the 300-month sentence imposed after a jury
convicted him of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more, but less than five kilograms, of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), (B)(ii). On appeal, Cantu-
Cantu challenges his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, arguing that
the court did not sufficiently address his argument that a sentence within the calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range would result in a sentencing disparity with similarly situated
defendants. He argues that his 300-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because
it resulted in a disparity among similarly situated defendants on a national basis. Finding
no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a “deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007). We first consider
whether the sentencing court committed “significant procedural error,” including
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and inadequate explanation of
the sentence imposed. Id. at 51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir.
2010). If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we also consider its substantive
reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575. The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on appeal that a within-
Guidelines-range sentence is substantively reasonable; the defendant bears the burden to
“rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured

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against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes–Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon review, we find Cantu-Cantu’s sentence both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Procedurally, the district court “provide[d] an individualized assessment” and
“explain[ed] adequately the sentence imposed.” See United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240,
243 (4th Cir. 2020). The court acknowledged and sufficiently addressed Cantu-Cantu’s
request for a downward variance sentence based on the range of sentences of a small
number of similarly situated defendants. Regarding substantive reasonableness, Cantu-
Cantu has not rebutted the presumption that his within-Guidelines-range sentence is
reasonable under the § 3553(a) factors.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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