United States of America v. Rodricus Denard Carpenter

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4660
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODRICUS DENARD CARPENTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-4661
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODRICUS DENARD CARPENTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:23-cr-00012-LCB-1; 1:12-cr-00040-
LCB-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2024 Decided: May 23, 2024

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Before WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
No. 23-4660, dismissed in part and affirmed in part; No. 23-4661, affirmed by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Charles L. White, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, Rodricus Denard Carpenter appeals his conviction and
the 188-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty to distributing 40 grams or more of
fentanyl, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 18
U.S.C. § 2 (“criminal case”), as well as the revocation of Carpenter’s supervised release
and the resulting 24-month revocation sentence (“revocation case”). Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal because, in relevant part (1) Carpenter knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal in the criminal case; and (2) the sentence imposed in
the revocation case is not plainly unreasonable. The Government moves to dismiss Appeal
No. 23-4660 based on the appellate waiver in Carpenter’s plea agreement but declined to
file a response brief in the appeals. Despite having received notice of his right to do so,
Carpenter has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. After conducting our review in
accordance with Anders, we dismiss in part and affirm in part in Appeal No. 23-4660, and
affirm in Appeal No. 23-4661.
We first conclude that Carpenter has waived his right to appeal in the criminal case.
As we have explained, a defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the right to appeal
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990).
This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and will enforce the waiver
if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope thereof. United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the
waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed
to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the
defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea
agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).
“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate
rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant
understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that Carpenter
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the waiver. We therefore
grant the Government’s motion and dismiss Appeal No. 23-4660 in part as to all issues
within the scope of the appellate waiver. And, in accordance with our obligations under
Anders, we have reviewed the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues that do
not fall within the scope of the appellate waiver and have found none. We therefore affirm
in part the district court’s judgment in the criminal case.
Regarding the revocation case, we have held that “[a] district court has broad
discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation sentence that is both within the
applicable statutory maximum and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, this court

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assesses it for reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations”
employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court has considered
both the policy statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it is permitted to consider in the revocation context. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. The district court must also provide an
explanation for the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not be as detailed or
specific” as is required for an original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we find a sentence unreasonable must we decide whether
it is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the records in these cases and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss in Appeal No. 23-4660 as to any issues falling with the scope of Carpenter’s
appellate waiver and affirm the remainder of the criminal judgment. As to Appeal No. 23-
4661, we affirm the district court’s judgment revoking Carpenter’s supervised release and
imposing a 24-month sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Carpenter, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Carpenter requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would

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be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Carpenter.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
No. 23-4660, DISMISSED IN PART & AFFIRMED IN PART;
No. 23-4661, AFFIRMED

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