United States of America v. Samuel Clint Blancher

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-6563
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL CLINT BLANCHER,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 23-6576
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL CLINT BLANCHER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
at Statesville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (5:02-cr-00004-MOC-1; 5:03-cr-
00007-MOC-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2025 Decided: April 3, 2025

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Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Megan C. Hoffman, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Samuel Clint Blancher appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Upon review, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Blancher had not established
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.1 Accordingly, we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of compassionate
release. United States v. Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2024). “A district
court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to follow statutory
requirements, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of
discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, this [c]ourt may not substitute
its judgment for that of the district court.” United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 832 (4th
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In analyzing a motion for compassionate release, district courts must determine:
(1) whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; and (2) that
such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2023). If these factors
are met, then “the district court [may] grant the motion if (3) the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, to the extent they are applicable, favor release.” Id. “The factors
1 We therefore decline to address the district court’s additional finding that the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against relief.

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applicable to the determination of what circumstances can constitute an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release from prison are complex and not easily summarized.” United
States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 197 (4th Cir. 2022). And when the district court ruled
on Blancher’s motion, there was not a policy statement applicable to defendant-filed
compassionate release motions. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir.
2020). Accordingly, the district court could “consider any extraordinary and compelling
reason for release” that Blancher raised. Id. (emphasis omitted).
Here, Blancher primarily argued that he had established extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release in light of the substantial disparity between his 188-month
sentence and the sentence he would receive if he were resentenced today. This argument
was premised on nonretroactive changes to the law that, among other things, meant
Blancher would no longer be classified as a career offender. The district court opined that
a non-retroactive change to the Sentencing Guidelines could not constitute an extraordinary
and compelling reason to grant compassionate release. At the time the district court ruled
on Blancher’s motion, this was erroneous.2 See United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304,
312-13 (4th Cir. 2024).
2 The policy statement that governs compassionate release motions has since been
amended to apply to defendant-filed motions. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.13(a), p.s. (2024). The policy statement now specifies that “a change in the law
(including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive)
shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and
compelling reason exists under this policy statement.” Id. § 1B1.13(c), p.s.; see also id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6).

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Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court did not reversibly err. The district
court also considered whether a sentencing disparity would exist if Blancher were not
classified as a career offender. The district court explained that even if Blancher had not
formally been classified as a career offender, in light of Blancher’s substantial criminal
history, it would have varied or departed upwardly to the career offender range. This
analysis was an appropriate approach to resolving a compassionate release motion
premised on such an argument. See Moody, 115 F.4th at 312-13. Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the district court adequately explained its reasoning and did not
abuse its discretion in finding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, Blancher
had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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