United States of America v. Carrington Allen Scotland

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4444
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARRINGTON ALLEN SCOTLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:23-cr-00111-M-RJ-1)
Submitted: June 17, 2025 Decided: June 20, 2025
Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel P. Bubar, Acting United States Attorney, David A.
Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Carrington Allen Scotland pled guilty without a plea agreement to three counts of
distributing a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),
851, and he was sentenced to 132 months in prison. On appeal, Scotland asserts that the
imposed sentence is substantively unreasonable given his troubled background and the fact
that his Sentencing Guidelines range was enhanced under § 851 and due to his career
offender status. Finding no error, we affirm.
We “‘review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’”∗ United States v.
Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007)) (alteration omitted). To this end, we first assess whether the sentencing
court committed any “significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors,” choosing “a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Fowler, 948
F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If the sentence is procedurally sound, [we] should then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.”
∗ The Government argues that we should review Scotland’s assignment of error
under the more stringent plain error standard of review. Because we find no error under
the less deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we apply that standard here.

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United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to accomplish
the § 3553(a) sentencing goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “That said, district courts have
extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, “any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934,
945 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). That “presumption can only be
rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gutierrez, 963 F.3d 320, 344 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although Scotland points to no procedural sentencing error by the district court, our
“first responsibility in a sentencing challenge is to review the procedural reasonableness of
the challenged sentence.” United States v. Elboghdady, 117 F.4th 224, 234-35 (4th Cir.
2024). Our review of the record confirms that the Guidelines range in Scotland’s
presentence report was correctly calculated and therefore appropriately adopted by the
district court. The record also confirms that the district court acknowledged that the
sentencing range was advisory and thoroughly explained its rationale for the downward
variant sentence, tethering that rationale to the § 3553(a) factors it deemed relevant.
Fowler, 948 F.3d at 668.
As Scotland’s sentence is 56 months below his Guidelines range, we presume that
the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gillespie, 27 F.4th at 945. It is thus

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incumbent upon Scotland to rebut the presumption of reasonableness by showing that the
132-month sentence “is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.”
Gutierrez, 963 F.3d at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Scotland has not met this burden. While Scotland concedes that the district court
considered the arguments he presented in mitigation, he asserts only that the imposed
sentence is greater than necessary considering his specific extraordinary circumstances.
However, Scotland’s argument is little more than an expression of disagreement with the
weight the district court afforded the § 3553(a) factors. Scotland therefore fails to rebut
the presumption of reasonableness we afford his below-Guidelines sentence, which we thus
decline to disturb. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (holding that mere disagreement with the
sentence imposed “is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court”); cf. United States
v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 382 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that a district court does “not abuse its
discretion by placing significant weight on the seriousness of defendant’s offense,” and
refusing to “reverse a sentence . . . , even if the sentence would not have been the choice
of [this c]ourt” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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