United States of America v. Eddie Tyrone Davis, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4610
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDDIE TYRONE DAVIS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cr-00178-CCE-1)
Submitted: September 18, 2025 Decided: September 22, 2025
Before THACKER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Aaron B. Wellman, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, SIEGMUND, BRUMBAUGH
& MCDONOUGH, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol
Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Eddie Tyrone Davis, Jr., admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release by
committing new criminal conduct, using or possessing a controlled substance, and failing
to report to his probation officer. Davis’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Davis’s
supervised release and if the 11-month sentence imposed by the district court was plainly
reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Davis has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
First, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction. The district court imposed
a two-year term of supervised release which commenced on February 7, 2020. Davis was
arrested on September 29, 2021, and he subsequently pled guilty to accessory after the fact
to murder. He was then sentenced to 67 to 93 months’ imprisonment. Davis’s pretrial
detention and imprisonment on these charges tolled the expiration of his term of supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 516 (2019).
Turning to the sentence imposed, “[a] district court has broad discretion when
imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738
F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d
202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, “we first must determine whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. In so doing, we are guided by “the

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same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of original
sentences,” but we take “a more deferential appellate posture than we do when reviewing
original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation
modified).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings). “A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We presume that a sentence within the applicable revocation policy statement
range is reasonable. See Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
Our review of the record reveals that Davis’s sentence is reasonable. The district
court received Davis’s counsel’s argument and listened to Davis’s allocution. The district
court further considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and explained why they supported
an 11-month sentence. The court explained that the sentence was necessary because Davis
had committed a crime while on supervised release; committed multiple violations; failed
to cooperate with terms that would be to his benefit; and disrespected the system. The
court also considered that Davis had violated his previous term of supervised release
shortly after being released from imprisonment. We conclude that Davis fails to rebut the

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presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his sentence within the policy
statement range.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Davis, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Davis requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Davis.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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