United States of America v. Daniel Eliazar Ramos Rosa, a/k/a Jay

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4619
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL ELIAZAR RAMOS ROSA, a/k/a Jay,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:24-cr-00002-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: July 24, 2025 Decided: July 28, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Barry P. Beck, POWER, BECK & MATZUREFF, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Kimberley DeAnne Crockett, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Daniel Eliazar Ramos Rosa appeals his conviction and the 327-month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to coercion and enticement, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), indicating that he has found no potentially meritorious
issues for appeal, but suggesting that Ramos Rosa’s plea was neither knowing nor
voluntary and that the imposed sentence is unreasonable. Ramos Rosa has not filed a pro
se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so. The Government has
moved to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate waiver in Ramos Rosa’s plea agreement
and as untimely. As explained below, we dismiss in part and affirm in part.
We conclude that Ramos Rosa has waived his right to appeal his conviction and
sentence. A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the right to appeal under 18
U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). “Where, as
here, the United States seeks enforcement of an appeal waiver, and there is no claim that
the United States breached its obligations under the plea agreement, we will enforce the
waiver” so long as “the record establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue being
appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th
Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to it.
Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive
his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s
experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea agreement and its

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terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023). “Generally, . . . if a
district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed.
R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full
significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that Ramos Rosa
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the waiver.
We further conclude that Ramos Rosa’s challenge to his sentence falls within the
scope of the waiver. According to the plea agreement, Ramos Rosa waived his right to
appeal his “conviction on any ground whatsoever” and “whatever sentence is imposed.”
United States v. Ramos Rosa, No. 3:24-cr-00002-GMG-RWT-1 (N.D. W. Va., PACER
No. 53 at 4). Accordingly, we conclude that the waiver bars appellate review of the
imposed sentence.
We therefore grant, in part, the Government’s motion and dismiss the appeal as to
all issues within the scope of the broad appeal waiver. In accordance with our obligations
under Anders, we have reviewed the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues
that fall outside the scope of the appellate waiver and have found none. Accordingly, we
deny the Government’s motion as to any issues beyond the scope of the appeal waiver and
affirm the criminal judgment, in part.* We deny Ramos Rosa’s motion to appoint new
counsel.
* Because we may decide Ramos Rosa’s appeal without considering its timeliness,
see United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the appeal
period in a criminal case is not a jurisdictional provision, but rather a claim-processing
(Continued)

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This court requires that counsel inform Ramos Rosa, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Ramos Rosa requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Ramos Rosa. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
rule), we need not resolve the Government’s argument that the notice of appeal was not
timely filed.

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