United States of America v. Oluwadamilare Kolaogunbule, a/k/a Dare

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-6821
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OLUWADAMILARE KOLAOGUNBULE, a/k/a Dare,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:21-cr-00027-BO-2)
Submitted: June 5, 2026 Decided: June 30, 2026
Before THACKER, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Oluwadamilare Kolaogunbule, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Oluwadamilare Kolaogunbule appeals the district court’s order denying his motion
for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have reviewed the record and
Kolaogunbule’s arguments on appeal, and we find no reversible error. We thus affirm.
“Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, a court generally may not modify a sentence ‘once
it has been imposed.’” United States v. Melvin, 105 F.4th 620, 623 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). But, a district court may “reduce a defendant’s sentence where the original ‘term
of imprisonment [was] based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Spruhan, 989 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted).
“Section 3582(c)(2)’s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that Congress
intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a
plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). In
this court, “when evaluating the sufficiency of a sentencing court’s explanation, there is a
presumption that the district court sufficiently considered relevant factors in deciding a
section 3582(c)(2) motion,” but “the presumption is not irrebuttable.” United States v.
Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2019). A more detailed explanation may be required
when a defendant provides significant evidence of mitigating factors not available at
sentencing. Id. at 396-98; see also Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 119
(2018).
We review the district court’s denial of a Section 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of
discretion. Spruhan, 989 F.3d at 269. We limit our review to issues raised in the informal

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brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014). On
appeal, Kolaogunbule contends the district court erred in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion
without providing a reason for the denial in its written order. But the district court
explained its reasons for denying the motion at the hearing attended by his counsel.
Moreover, to the extent he contends that its explanation was insufficient, we conclude that
he has not rebutted the presumption that the court considered relevant factors when denying
the motion. See Martin, 916 F.3d at 396.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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