Rebecca Thornock v. Internal Revenue Service, (irs)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1518
REBECCA THORNOCK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (IRS); DANIEL I. WERFEL, IRS
Commissioner, in his official capacity; JOHN DOE, IRS Officials,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:25-cv-00134-JAG)
Submitted: July 29, 2025 Decided: August 1, 2025
Before KING, WYNN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rebecca Thornock, Appellant Pro Se. Robert P. McIntosh, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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2
PER CURIAM:
Rebecca Thornock seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion to
recuse the presiding district judge in her pending civil action.1 This court may exercise
jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and
collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The order Thornock seeks to appeal is neither a final
order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See In re Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
539 F.2d 357, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1976); accord Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271, 271 (6th
Cir. 2018) (“[A]n order denying recusal is not immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine.”). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.2 We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
1 Thornock’s informal brief might also be construed to appeal the district court’s
order denying her motion to appoint counsel and its order denying reconsideration of that
order. But those orders too are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral
orders. Insofar as Thornock’s informal brief presents arguments on the merits of her case,
the district court has not entered a final order resolving the merits.
2 “A district judge’s refusal to disqualify himself can be reviewed in this circuit by
way of a petition for a writ of mandamus.” In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987).
But even if we were to construe Thornock’s notice of appeal and informal brief as a petition
for a writ of mandamus seeking the district judge’s recusal, we would conclude that
Thornock is not entitled to mandamus relief because she has not shown “a clear and
indisputable right” to the district judge’s recusal. In re Moore, 955 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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