Badar Khan Suri v. Donald Trump

FILED: July 1, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1560
BADAR KHAN SURI,
Petitioner – Appellee,
v.
DONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; RUSSELL
HOLT, in his official capacity as Field Office Director of Washington, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; TODD LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of Homeland Security; MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State; PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice,
Respondents – Appellants,
and
JEFFREY CRAWFORD, in his official capacity as Warden of Farmville Detention Center,
Respondent.
ORDER
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Dr. Badar Khan Suri, who opposed the war in Gaza on social media, was detained
by ICE after the government purportedly revoked his J-1 visa. The district court concluded
that the government detained Suri in retaliation for his First Amendment activity, so it

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ordered his release pending the disposition of his habeas petition. The government moves
us to stay the district court’s order pending appeal, and in the alternative, petitions for
mandamus.
We deny the government’s requests. 1
I.
A.
Suri is an Indian national who holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies. Mem.
Supp. Mot. to Compel Return, Ex. 1, Decl. of Mapheze Saleh (“Saleh Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 8, Suri
v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2025), ECF No. 6-1. In 2022, Suri came to
the United States on a J-1 exchange visa to study at Georgetown University, where he is
now a post-doctoral scholar and teaches a class on minority rights in South Asia. Id. ¶ 10.
He is married to Mapheze Saleh, a United States citizen. Id. ¶ 8.
Saleh consistently voiced opposition to the war in Gaza on social media; Suri did so
on only a “handful of occasions.” Id. ¶ 11; Am. Habeas Pet. ¶ 28, Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480
1 We are in full agreement with our distinguished colleague’s recognition that “Mr.
Suri has significant equitable factors in his favor,” and that the “district court found that he
presents neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight,” Dis. Op. at 27—both
undeniably relevant considerations in any ruling on pretrial liberty. But therein lies the rub
between us: our colleague would subordinate those weighty individual equities to what he
characterizes as the specter of “severe systemic damage” resulting from “parallel
adjudications” of a single removal question. Id.
We cannot so easily consign an individual’s liberty to the concerns of bureaucratic
tidiness. The Constitution does not yield to administrative convenience, and due process is
not suspended merely because two courts may be asked similar questions. Simply stated,
human rights do not cower before the speculative perils of duplicative litigation. So, our
courts should not become sanctuaries for efficiency at the expense of justice.

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(E.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2025), ECF No. 34. The government asserts that, on March 15, 2025,
Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a secret memorandum—which has yet to be
disclosed—purportedly finding that Suri’s presence in the United States compromises
American foreign policy interests. Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Decl. of Joseph
Simon (“First Simon Decl.”) ¶ 6, Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2025), ECF No.
26-1. The government later told Suri that it also revoked his visa, but it has not submitted
evidence to that effect. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Decl. of Badar Khan Suri (“Khan
Suri Decl.”) ¶ 4, Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. April 15, 2025), ECF No. 47-1.
At around 9:30 p.m. 2 on March 17, ICE arrested Suri outside of his apartment in
Rosslyn, Virginia. Id. ¶ 2. When Suri called Saleh downstairs, the officers told her and Suri
that Suri would be taken to Chantilly, Virginia. Id. ¶ 6. They transported him to the ICE
Field Office in Chantilly. Id. ¶ 9. At that location, officers presented Suri with a Notice to
Appear that incorrectly listed a Texas address as his current residence and listed a hearing
date of May 6 at an immigration court in Texas. Id. ¶ 19; First Simon Decl., Ex. 1, Notice
to Appear (“NTA”) at 6.
When Suri asked about the Texas address, an officer explained him that “it was just
computer generated, and it might be changed later on.” Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 9. An officer told
Suri he would be transferred to Farmville, Virginia, and permitted him to call his wife.
Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 12–13. Suri arrived at the Farmville Detention Center around 2:30 a.m.
on March 18. First Simon Decl. ¶ 10; Khan Suri Decl. ¶¶ 12–14. ICE soon transferred him
2 All times are provided in Eastern Daylight Time.

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to Richmond, Virginia, where he arrived at 7:50 a.m. 3 First Simon Decl. ¶ 11; Khan Suri
Decl. ¶ 15.
Later on March 18, without informing Suri of his destination and while denying his
request to call his wife, government agents transported him to the airport and placed him
on a flight departing for Louisiana at 2:47 p.m. First Simon Decl. ¶ 11; Khan Suri Decl. ¶
15–17. Suri arrived in Alexandria, Louisiana, at 5:03 p.m. that same day, where he was
booked into the detention facility at 6:42 p.m. First Simon Decl. ¶ 11; Reply to Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. 1, Second Declaration of Joseph Simon (“Second Simon Decl.”) ¶ 3, Suri,
No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2025), ECF No. 49-1. The government claims that it
moved Suri from Virginia due to “potential overcrowding in Virginia detention facilities.”
First Simon Decl. ¶ 8.
Meanwhile, at 10:42 p.m. on March 17, while Suri was being processed at the ICE
office in Chantilly, attorney Hassan Ahmad learned of his arrest. Mem. Supp. Mot. to
Release, Ex. 1, Decl. of Hassan Ahmad (“Ahmad Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 3, Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480
(E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2025), ECF No. 21-1. On March 18, Ahmad agreed with Saleh to
represent Suri, and immediately began drafting a habeas petition. Id. ¶ 8.
At that point, Suri’s last communication with the outside world had been the night
before, when he told his wife that he was being brought to Farmville. Ahmad checked
ICE’s online detainee locator on March 18, but Suri hadn’t yet appeared on that system.
3 Rosslyn, Chantilly, Richmond, and the Farmville Detention Center are located in
the Eastern District of Virginia.

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Id. ¶ 9. Based on that absence—and Suri’s final communication—Ahmad and Saleh
reasonably believed that he was still in Virginia.
That same afternoon, Ahmad entered his appearance in Suri’s immigration
proceeding and was permitted to view Suri’s Notice to Appear, which incorrectly listed a
Texas address as Suri’s current residence. Id. ¶ 7. Given the information relayed by Suri to
Saleh, Ahmad believed that Suri was still “detained in Virginia.” Id. ¶ 8. At 5:59 p.m. on
March 18—after Suri had landed in Louisiana, but before he was booked into the detention
facility there—Ahmad filed Suri’s habeas petition in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Habeas Pet., Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2025), ECF No. 1.
Suri was detained in Louisiana for three nights. First Simon Decl. ¶ 12; Khan Suri
Decl. ¶ 18–22. It was not until March 19 that Suri appeared on the ICE online detainee
locator and Ahmad learned his location. Ahmad Decl. ¶ 9.
On March 20, Suri was told he would be transferred to New York the following day,
which he believed meant that he would be deported. Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 21. On that day, the
district court ordered the government not to remove Suri from the United States. Suri v.
Trump (Suri I), No. 1:25-cv-480, 2025 WL 914757, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2025). On
March 21, Suri was told that he would instead be driven to Texas. Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 22.
ICE drove him to the Prairieland Detention Center in Texas, where he arrived on the
evening of March 21. Second Simon Decl. ¶ 3; Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 22. Suri was held there
until May 14 when the district court ordered him returned to his family and released. Suri
v. Trump (Suri III), No. 1:25-cv-480, 2025 WL 1392143, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2025);
Response Br. at 4.

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B.
Ahmad filed Suri’s habeas petition in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 18,
naming Attorney General Pamela Bondi and others as Suri’s custodians. See Habeas Pet.
The petition alleged that Suri’s detention was in retaliation for his protected First
Amendment activity, and it requested that the district court order his release. Id. at 1, 16.
On March 20, pursuant to the All Writs Act, the district court ordered “that [Suri] shall not
be removed from the United States unless and until the Court issues a contrary order.” Suri
I, 2025 WL 914757, at *1.
The government moved to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer venue, arguing
that the district court lacked habeas jurisdiction because Suri wasn’t physically present in
the Eastern District of Virginia when his petition was filed, and that the Northern District
of Texas was the proper venue because Suri was on his way there at the time of filing.
Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 11, Suri, No. 1:25-cv-480 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2025), ECF
No. 26. The district court held a hearing on the issue of habeas jurisdiction, and on May 6,
it denied the government’s motion. Suri v. Trump (Suri II), No. 1:25-cv-480, 2025 WL
1310745, at *14 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2025). Although it recognized that habeas petitions
generally must be filed in the district of confinement, it found persuasive a 2004
concurrence from Justice Kennedy in which he wrote that
if there is an indication that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner
were to make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition
should be filed, or where the Government was not forthcoming with respect
to the identity of the custodian and the place of detention . . . . habeas
jurisdiction would be in the district court from whose territory the petitioner
had been removed.

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Id. at *5 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 454 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
The district court found that the government’s purported reason for spiriting Suri
away—overcrowding in the Virginia facilities—was “riddled with inconsistencies” and
“undermined by the fact that Prairieland Detention Center, where petitioner is currently
held, is overcrowded. . . . It is uncontroverted that Dr. Khan Suri was placed in a dormitory
that has a 36-person capacity but has been filled with at least 50 people since he arrived.”
Id. at *11. Therefore, “it appears that Respondents’ goal in moving Petitioner was to make
it difficult for Petitioner’s counsel to file the petition and to transfer him to the
Government’s chosen forum.” Id.
On May 14, after another hearing, the court granted Suri’s motion to return him to
Virginia and to release him, concluding that Suri was detained in retaliation for protected
speech and association. Suri III, 2025 WL 1392143, at *1. It rejected the government’s
argument that several provisions of the immigration code preclude habeas relief. Mot. Ex.
H at 24–26 (Transcript of Bond Hearing). And it found that Suri was entitled to bail because
there was “no credible evidence supporting that he is a danger to the community” and that
his release was necessary to “disrupt the chilling effect of retaliation.” Id. at 35. The
government moved the district court to stay its order pending appeal, id. at 36, and the
district court denied the motion, id. at 37.
The government appealed the March 20 order not to remove Suri and the May 14
order to release him. It now moves this Court for a stay of the release order pending appeal
and petitions for mandamus. Mot. at 6, 20.

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II.
We consider four factors when weighing a motion to stay: “(1) whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). “The party requesting a
stay”—here, the government—“bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify
an exercise of [the Court’s] discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009).
The government doesn’t contest the district court’s finding that it detained Suri in
retaliation for his First Amendment activity. Instead, it makes two jurisdictional arguments:
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Suri was physically present in Louisiana
when his habeas petition was filed, and that various provisions of the immigration code
prohibit the district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas
petition. The government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of either argument.
Furthermore, the equities lie firmly in Suri’s favor.
We therefore deny the government’s motion.
A.
First, the government contends that the district court, sitting in the Eastern District
of Virginia, lacked habeas jurisdiction because Suri wasn’t physically present in that

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district at the time of filing. 4 Mot. at 7. (He had landed in Louisiana less than an hour
earlier.) The government has not shown a strong likelihood of success on this argument.
Certainly, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides district courts authority to grant writs of
habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” The Supreme Court has held that
“[t]he plain language of the habeas statute thus confirms the general rule that for core
habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one
district: the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443. And because “[b]y
definition, the immediate custodian and the prisoner reside in the same district,” the Court
generally requires petitioners to name “some person who has the immediate custody of the
party detained” rather than “the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official.” Id. at 435, 444 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)).
However, these “default” rules are not absolute. Id. at 435. When a detainee is held
in a secret location, their attorneys “cannot be expected to file in the jurisdiction where
[they are] held” as it “is impracticable to require the attorneys to file in every jurisdiction.”
Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., in chambers)
4 The government is unclear where Suri should have filed instead. It argued to the
district court that if it did not dismiss the case, it should transfer it to the Northern District
of Texas. Mot. to Dismiss at 14. But transfers are only permissible to “a district where [a
case] could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). There is absolutely no reason to
think, and the government points to no case indicating, that a habeas petition challenging
present confinement could be filed in a district to which a petitioner had not yet been. Only
begrudgingly, and in the alternative, did the government argue that a transfer to the Western
District of Louisiana might be permissible under “out-of-circuit” precedent. Mot. to
Dismiss at 14. On appeal, the government reiterates that Suri should have filed in “either
the Northern District of Texas . . . or the Western District of Louisiana.” Mot. at 7.

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(allowing suspected war criminal held in confidential location to file a habeas petition in
the D.C. Circuit). Yet “it is essential that [the] petitioner not be denied the right to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. The Supreme Court thus recognized an exception in
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, writing that when “a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an
unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and district of
confinement rules.” 542 U.S. at 450 n.18 (citing Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1116).
Although it also encompasses a “district of confinement” exception, id. at 450 n. 18,
courts refer to this as the “unknown custodian exception,” see, e.g., Khalil v. Joyce, No. 25-
cv-01963, 2025 WL 972959, at *28 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2025), mot. to certify appeal granted,
No. 25-cv-01963, 2025 WL 1019658 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2025). We applied that exception in
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), albeit not in a challenge to
present confinement. When a suspected terrorist filed a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum to require the testimony of several “enemy combatant witnesses” who were
in U.S. military custody, we held that “the writ is properly served on the prisoner’s ultimate
custodian” because “the immediate custodian is unknown.” Id. at 465 (first citing
Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1116; and then citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 n.18).
The unknown-custodian exception is critical because a detainee must always have
an available forum for a habeas petition, even if the government doesn’t disclose their
location. As Blackstone put it, “the king is at all times [e]ntitled to have an account, why
the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be inflicted.” 3
William Blackstone, Commentaries *131. Put another way, “there is no gap in the fabric
of habeas—no place, no moment, where a person held in custody in the United States

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cannot call on a court to hear his case and decide it.” Khalil, 2025 WL 972959, at *37.
Challenges to present confinement, such as Suri’s, “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of
habeas corpus.” Trump v. J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005 (2025) (quoting Nance v. Ward,
597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). And “absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains
available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
This case is a prime example for why the unknown-custodian exception exists. After
detaining Suri, ICE officers told him that he would be taken to Farmville, Virginia, and
allowed him to inform his wife of that fact. Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 12–13. But ICE took Suri to
Farmville for only a few hours before driving him to Richmond, Virginia, and then flying
him to Louisiana—while denying his request to tell his wife of these developments. See
First Simon Decl. ¶ 11; Khan Suri Decl. ¶ 15–17.
The government does not contest the district court’s finding that it used these tactics
to shop for a forum it perceived as more favorable and to make it difficult for Suri’s
attorney to file a habeas petition on his behalf. 5 Suri II, 2025 WL 1310745, at *11. Further,
the ICE online detainee tracker did not show Suri’s location until the day after his petition
was filed. Ahmad Decl. ¶ 9. Under those circumstances, no “diligent attorney could have
5 The government argued to the district court that it moved Suri due to overcrowding
concerns, but, as the district court noted, it transferred him from a facility with available
beds to an overcrowded facility where he was forced to sleep on a plastic cot on the floor.
Suri II, 2025 WL 1310745, at *11.

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known that [Suri] was in Louisiana at the time [his attorney] filed the petition.” Suri II,
2025 WL 1310745, at *8.
The government also doesn’t contest the district court’s finding that it apparently
intended to deport Suri on March 21—meaning that the district court’s order forbidding
the government from doing so came with just hours to spare. See id. at *4. Without that
order, Suri may well have been deported without the reasonable notice and opportunity for
judicial review that “all nine Justices agree[]” is due. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364,
1368 (2025) (citing J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. at 1006). If there is little case law applying the
unknown-custodian exception, that is because the government has rarely resorted to such
tactics in the past.
Furthermore, even had Suri’s attorney known that Suri was in Louisiana, it still
wouldn’t have been possible to file there. Given the government’s repeated failure to
identify Suri’s immediate custodian at the time of filing—despite multiple entreaties—the
district court found that Suri had no immediate custodian at that time. Suri II, 2025 WL
1310745, at *8. We agree with the district court. For the first time in its reply brief on
appeal, the government lamely contends that Suri was “awaiting check-in” at the
Alexandria Staging Facility in Louisiana when his petition was filed, so his immediate
custodian was the director of that facility. Reply Br. at 6–7. But the government’s only
evidence for this assertion is a declaration claiming that Suri was “recorded as booked into
the Alexandria Staging Facility shortly after at 6:42 p.m.”—forty-three minutes after his
petition was filed. Id. at 6 (citing Reply Br. Ex. A, at ¶¶ 15–16). This reinforces the

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conclusion that if Suri wasn’t allowed to file in the Eastern District of Virginia, he couldn’t
have filed anywhere.
We thus cannot agree that the district court lacked habeas jurisdiction to intervene.
“The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969). So, if the government moves a
detainee from a district and their attorney cannot discover their location with reasonable
inquiry, that attorney must be able to file a habeas petition in the detainee’s last-known
location against their ultimate custodian. Otherwise, that detainee would lack the ability to
seek habeas relief as long as the government kept their location and custodian a secret, thus
granting “the political branches . . . the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will,”
“leading to a regime in which . . . the President, not th[e Supreme] Court, say[s] ‘what the
law is.’” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (quoting Marbury v Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
The government protests that the unknown-custodian exception applies only “where
one’s detention is a prolonged secret.” Mot. at 10 (emphasis added). The only authority it
cites for this proposition is Demjanjuk, which says no such thing. Id. (citing 784 F.2d at
1116). Neither does Padilla. 542 U.S. at 450 n.18. Nor Moussaoui. 382 F.3d at 465.
Here, had the Eastern District of Virginia not intervened, the government apparently
would have deported Suri long before a “prolonged” period elapsed. See Suri II, 2025 WL
1310745, at *4. Indeed, recently, the government has provided some detainees just hours
of notice before attempting to deport them. See A. A. R. P., 145 S. Ct. at 1368. It has also

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argued that, once a detainee is deported, it is powerless to secure their return—even if they
never received the ability to defend themselves, and even if their deportation was in error.
Id. (citing Decl. of Joseph N. Mazzara, Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 8:25–cv–951 (D. Md.
Apr. 15, 2015), ECF No. 77). Amid these circumstances, even temporary lapses in the
protections of habeas corpus could result in a detainee’s deportation without judicial
review. Yet, “[t]he test for determining the scope of [the writ of habeas corpus] must not
be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.” Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 765–66. We will not require attorneys to wait to file a habeas petition until a
“prolonged” period has elapsed or the government sees fit to reveal their client’s location.
At that point, it might be too late.
In sum, the unknown-custodian exception squarely applies here. At the time of
filing, Suri was undisputedly held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian.
Despite his best efforts, Suri’s attorney had no way of knowing where Suri was or who
held immediate custody over him. Suri II, 2025 WL 1310745, at *8. Jurisdiction is
therefore proper in Suri’s last-known location, and the only place his attorney reasonably
could have filed a petition: the Eastern District of Virginia. 6
6 As an alternative basis for our conclusion, we adopt Justice Kennedy’s reasoning
from his concurrence in Padilla, which the First Circuit anticipated in its 2000 decision in
Vasquez v. Reno. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (where “there is an
indication that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult
for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or where the Government
was not forthcoming with respect to the identity of the custodian and the place of detention
. . . habeas jurisdiction would be in the district court from whose territory the petitioner had

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B.
Next, the government contends that the immigration code deprived the district court
of jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas petition. The government has not made a strong showing
that this argument is likely to succeed.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court instructs that we should “take account . . . of the
presumption favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review . . . absent clear
statement.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We see no indication at all that Congress intended to strip district courts of
jurisdiction over habeas challenges to unconstitutional immigration detention.
As an initial matter, the government moves to stay only the district court’s May 14
order to release Suri. Mot. at 6 (“This Court Should Stay the District Court’s Order
Releasing Suri.”). The district court’s other orders, and Suri’s other prayers for relief, are
not at issue here. “So long as part of [Suri’s] challenge to his detention falls outside of [the
immigration code’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions], his petition survives, as does the
district court’s authority to order his release.” Mahdawi v. Trump, 136 F.4th 443, 450 n.3
(2d Cir. 2025). Therefore, all we must determine is whether the district court had authority
to order Suri’s release from detention.
been removed”); see Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 696 (1st Cir. 2000) (the default habeas
rules do not apply if the government “spirited an alien from one site to another in an attempt
to manipulate jurisdiction”). That is precisely the situation here: the government doesn’t
contest the district court’s finding that it removed Suri from the Eastern District of Virginia
in part “to make it difficult for Petitioner’s counsel to file the petition.” Suri II, 2025 WL
1310745, at *11. Jurisdiction is therefore proper in that district.

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The first provision the government points to is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which provides
that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” The
government argues that Suri’s challenge arises from a decision “to commence removal
proceedings,” so he must bring his challenges in the normal course of immigration
proceedings. Mot. at 11. Our dissenting colleague agrees. Dis. Op. at 25–26.
This argument stretches § 1252(g) beyond its text in direct contravention of
Supreme Court precedent. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the idea that § 1252(g) stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over
habeas challenges to present immigration confinement. Id. at 688. The Supreme Court has
elsewhere described § 1252(g) as “narrow[]” and directed “against a particular evil:
attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.” Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 482, 485 n.9 (1999). This bar on
judicial review is thus cabined “to three discrete actions”: a decision “to ‘commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Id. at 482 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g)). The Supreme Court has accordingly “rejected as ‘implausible’ the
Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising from deportation
proceedings’ or imposes ‘a general jurisdictional limitation.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 482).
Because § 1252(g) simply doesn’t extend to habeas challenges to present
immigration confinement, courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over such challenges. For

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example, the Supreme Court granted a habeas petition challenging present immigration
confinement in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386–87 (2005). In Castaneda v. Perry, 95
F.4th 750 (4th Cir. 2024), we exercised jurisdiction over a habeas challenge to present
immigration confinement, though we denied it on the merits. Id. at 762. In a scenario
materially identical to Suri’s, the Second Circuit rejected the government’s argument that
§ 1252(g) precluded a district court’s jurisdiction because the habeas petitioner’s “claims
of unlawful and retaliatory detention are independent of, and collateral to, the removal
process,” so the petitioner’s “detention does not arise from the government’s
‘commence[ment of] proceedings.’” Öztürk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 397–98 (2d Cir. 2025)
(quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 482). And, were there any remaining doubt, the Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that challenges to present immigration confinement “fall within the
‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.” J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. at 1005 (quoting Nance, 597 U.S.
at 167).
Under the government’s (and the dissent’s) sweeping interpretation of § 1252(g),
each of those courts lacked jurisdiction over habeas challenges to present confinement.
That view contravenes Zadvydas and reads into § 1252(g) precisely the kind of “general
jurisdictional limitation” that the Supreme Court “rejected as ‘implausible.’” Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 19 (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 482). And in contrast to this
uniform body of case law, neither the government nor the dissent points to a single case
holding that § 1252(g) strips jurisdiction over habeas challenges to present confinement.
The government contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. AADC “barred
claims strikingly similar to those brought here.” Mot. at 14 (citing 525 U.S. at 487–92).

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But unlike Suri, the AADC petitioners sought “to prevent the initiation of deportation
proceedings,” and therefore fell squarely within the statute’s scope. AADC, 525 U.S. at
474. “The habeas claims in that case did not sound in unlawful detention at all, and it is
therefore of no help to the government.” Öztürk, 136 F.4th at 398. For the same reason, the
dissent’s citation to Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2011), is unavailing.
That case involved a habeas petitioner’s attempt to “have [the Department of Homeland
Security] forever precluded from seeking his removal,” rather than a challenge to present
confinement. Id. at 123.
Here, the district court’s May 14 order—which is the only order that the government
moves to stay—required the government to release Suri from detention. Suri v. Trump,
No. 1:25-cv-480, 2025 WL 1392143, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2025). It did not interfere
with the decision to commence removal proceedings against him; in fact, the district court
specifically required Suri to “participate in his removal proceedings” as a condition of his
release. Id. The May 14 order therefore falls outside § 1252(g)’s scope.
Nor are the normal course of immigration proceedings sufficient for Suri to obtain
his requested habeas relief. Contra Dis. Op. at 23–24. The district court concluded—and
the government does not contest—that ICE unconstitutionally detained Suri in retaliation
for posting on social media in opposition to the war in Gaza and for his familial
associations, so it ordered his immediate release. Mot. Ex. H, at 35. Absent habeas relief,
an immigration detainee can generally seek judicial review of a final order of removal—
but the court would be powerless to remedy any unconstitutional detention that had already
occurred. That is why we have habeas proceedings in the first place. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241

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(granting federal courts habeas jurisdiction for challenges to “custody in violation of the
Constitution”); see Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[W]rits of
habeas corpus are intended to afford a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint or confinement.”). We thus cannot “sanction the abrogation of habeas corpus . . .
in the manner attempted here.” Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404, 2025 WL 1135112,
at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025).
Beyond its lack of statutory basis, the dissent’s concern over “unsustainable
litigiousness” is overblown. Dis. Op. at 23. As discussed, there is nothing novel about
immigration detainees filing habeas petitions challenging their present confinement. We
expect that in the ordinary course, the government will have no difficulty justifying a
noncitizen’s confinement pending removal proceedings and answering any allegations of
unconstitutional detention. Here, the government has done neither. In any event, the
alternative—permitting the government to unconstitutionally detain noncitizens on
trumped-up charges with little or no evidence and leaving them to await the outcome of
removal proceedings—presents a far greater risk of “severe systemic damage.” Id. at 27.
The government next points to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) and (b). 7 Mot. at 15. Section
1252(b) provides that, “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal,” any question
“arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under
7 The government cites (b)(9) in particular, Mot. at 15, but we cannot analyze (b)(9)
without reference to the limiting language in (b).

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this section.” Section 1252(a)(5) provides that procedure, granting courts of appeals
exclusive jurisdiction over “judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under
any provision of this chapter.” The government argues that these provisions work together
to strip district courts of habeas jurisdiction over “decisions to detain for purposes of
removal or for removal proceedings” because they are “inextricably intertwined with the
final order of removal that precedes issuance of any removal order.” Mot. at 19.
On their face, these provisions apply only to challenges to an “order of removal.”
There is no such order here, so these provisions don’t apply. See Öztürk, 136 F.4th at 399
(rejecting the government’s argument because “[n]o such order of removal is at issue
here”).
We therefore conclude that the government has not shown a strong likelihood of
success on either of the arguments in its stay motion.
C.
The other stay factors also weigh strongly against our intervention at this
preliminary stage.
The government argues that it “suffers a form of irreparable injury” “[a]ny time [it]
is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people.”
Mot. at 19 (quoting Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in
chambers)). But it fails to explain why releasing Suri prevents it from enforcing the
immigration statutes. It is still free to pursue an order of removal through the normal
process—indeed, the district court required Suri to “participate in his removal proceedings”
as a condition of his release. Suri III, 2025 WL 1392143, at *2.

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Furthermore, the equities and the public interest lie firmly in Suri’s favor. The
government doesn’t contest the district court’s finding that it detained Suri in retaliation
for his First Amendment activity. Motion Ex. H, at 30. “The loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). A stay here would allow the government to
immediately re-detain Suri, which would further chill speech protected by the First
Amendment.
Finally, the government’s apparent “goal in moving [Suri] was to make it difficult
for [his] counsel to file the petition and to transfer him to the Government’s chosen forum.”
Suri II, 2025 WL 1310745, at *11. “[A] stay of a lower-court decision is an equitable
remedy. It should not be given if the moving party has not acted equitably, and that is the
situation here.” Danco Lab’ys, LLC v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 143 S. Ct. 1075, 1076
(2023) (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of application for stays).
III.
The government alternatively requests that we issue a writ of mandamus “because
the district court’s order amounts to a judicial usurpation of the Executive’s exclusive
statutory powers and preeminent constitutional powers over immigration.” Mot. at 21. But,
aside from this heated rhetoric, the government’s only substantive argument is that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas petition. In considering a petition for
mandamus, “appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with the decision of a lower court on
jurisdictional questions which it was competent to decide and which are reviewable in the
regular course of appeal.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). And

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regardless, we conclude that the district court did possess habeas jurisdiction. We therefore
decline to order the “drastic and extraordinary remed[y]” of mandamus. Ex parte Fahey,
332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).
IV.
In sum, the sequence of events here underscores a critical point: jurisdiction in this
matter was neither speculative nor opportunistic. Instead, it was based on the only
information available to the petitioner and his counsel, because the government chose to
move Suri without informing his wife or attorney of his location or custodian. If not for
our conclusion that jurisdiction lies in the Eastern District of Virginia, that deliberate
choice would have deprived the petitioner of any meaningful opportunity to contest his
detention prior to removal to a distant jurisdiction.
Such conduct raises serious concerns. To allow the government to undermine
habeas jurisdiction by moving detainees without notice or accountability reduces the writ
of habeas corpus to a game of jurisdictional hide-and-seek.
Because the government has not demonstrated that it is entitled to preliminary relief,
we deny its motion for stay pending appeal and its petition for mandamus.
Entered at the direction of Judge Wynn with the concurrence of Judge Benjamin.
Judge Wilkinson filed a dissenting opinion.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
As the majority opinion reveals, this case has a perfectly confusing core. Questions
abound: Who was where, and why? Who knew what, and when? When the fog lifts,
however, a crystal clear inquiry emerges: Are federal habeas proceedings, valued as they
are, intended as a means of circumventing the usual immigration process?
I do not believe they were meant to serve this function. If they were, the parties
would face largely duplicative proceedings over the same issues, one before an
immigration judge and another before a federal district court judge. I am reluctant to take
this first step towards such unsustainable litigiousness. While I do not make light of the
difficulties that have led my good colleagues to a different answer, I would grant the
government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. Anything else would presage a perennial
clash of rulings and orders between two different sets of federal tribunals.
I.
Mr. Suri has filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of Virginia challenging
his detention during the pendency of deportation proceedings in Texas. Stripped to their
essentials, both proceedings seek to determine the same underlying question of Mr. Suri’s
removability. Indeed, his arguments against detention are substantially the same as his
arguments against his attempted removal. As the majority notes, he asserts that both are
acts of “retaliation for his protected First Amendment activity.” Maj. Op. at 6.
This would be a different case if the procedures afforded to Mr. Suri in his
deportation proceedings were constitutionally insufficient. I am not persuaded, however,
that factfinding by an Immigration Judge and review by the Board of Immigration Appeals,

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with possible judicial review of an order of removal, render the process so deficient in
fairness that it should be displaced by habeas proceedings.
This would also be a different case if the deportation proceedings did not afford Mr.
Suri the opportunity to be heard on his constitutional claims. But neither Mr. Suri nor the
majority appear to contest that judicial review of an order of removal, if one is entered, will
extend to the essential constitutional questions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (providing that
judicial review of a final removal order shall encompass “all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien”). Although the factual
record may be more limited than it would be in the district court, due process does not
require that all constitutional claims be entertained in identical circumstances. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“Due process is flexible, and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”).
Allowing both proceedings to move forward thus presents the government with the
prospect of having to defend against the same constitutional arguments in two different
forums. It will face, in essence, a double burden of proof here and in many a removal case.
This is a prescription for “the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of
removal proceedings” at odds with the express wishes of Congress and the Supreme Court
to achieve at least a modest measure of clarity and expedition in immigration enforcement.
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).

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II.
It is no answer to say that, when there is a conflict of this sort, the habeas proceeding
should invariably take precedence. I fear that it will be too easy a matter to extract from
the majority’s rhetoric such an open habeas availability rule. Habeas is a hallowed vehicle
for challenging confinement and “an integral part of our common law heritage.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). The habeas rules, however, were not developed over
the centuries with an eye toward immigration proceedings, whereas the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) was drafted with such proceedings solely in mind. In other words,
the INA is more specific and on point. And a specific, on point statute may divest courts
of jurisdiction even over claims at the “core” of the Great Writ. Maj. Op. at 17; Armstrong
v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (“The power of federal courts to
enjoin unlawful executive action is subject to . . . statutory limitations.”); Johnson v.
Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Congress has specifically prohibited the
use of habeas corpus petitions as a way of obtaining review of questions arising in removal
proceedings.”).
Indeed, the INA divests courts of habeas jurisdiction over claims “arising from” the
government’s decision to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The clarity and force of this provision limits the hair-breadth
distinctions that the majority would have us draw. See Maj. Op. at 16–17. In my view,
when the government detains an alien under § 1226(a)—which authorizes detention
“pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed”—the detention arises from the
commencement of proceedings or adjudication of cases. As a result, the government’s

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decision to detain is one of the “discretionary determinations” that the INA provides “some
measure of protection” from judicial intervention. AADC, 525 U.S. at 485. Although the
majority writes that a different outcome is dictated by Zadvydas, that case is inapposite
because it concerned a challenge to the government’s authority to indefinitely detain, not
the government’s discretionary decision to detain under the circumstances here. See Maj.
Op. at 16; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
The government is thus not wrong to suggest that the habeas proceeding here should
step aside. The opposite result will convert the habeas proceeding into a vehicle for
collateral attacks on the deportation proceeding, requiring the courts to resolve a host of
complex, fact-bound jurisdictional questions. The majority’s lengthy discussions in this
case concerning the district of confinement rule, the immediate custodian rule, and the
unknown custodian exception offer but a foretaste of the confusion lying in wait for the
majority’s decision. See Maj. Op. at 8–14. Direct appeals are often thought a more desirable
route to justice than collateral attacks, and lengthy collateral attacks on ongoing rather than
completed proceedings seem less desirable still.
III.
The parties are far apart in their general perceptions. The government would have
too little litigation while those resisting deportation wish to have too much. Each position
in its absolute form has serious infirmities. Too little litigation strips those facing vast
dislocations in their lives and personal relationships of their basic right to due process of
law. But too much litigation brings no end to legal entanglements and delays, undermining

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the prosecutorial discretion that is core to the government’s legitimate claims of
sovereignty.
I do respect and acknowledge the fact that Mr. Suri has significant equitable factors
in his favor. The district court found that he presents neither a danger to the community
nor a risk of flight, which are both important considerations in rulings on pretrial release
and bond pending appeal. Hr’g Tr., May 14, 2025, at 34–35. Yet the government’s
jurisdictional arguments with regard to the INA are not without considerable force, and
they weigh against Mr. Suri’s likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal. See Nken
v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (describing the likelihood of success inquiry as more
important than the balancing of the equities).
Ultimately, the severe systemic damage that would result from allowing parallel
adjudications upon the same essential question of Mr. Suri’s removability persuades me,
with all respect to my fine colleagues, that we should grant the government’s motion for a
stay pending this appeal.

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