United States of America v. Marion Lamont Flowers

25-4222Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitMar 31, 2026

Full text

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4222
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARION LAMONT FLOWERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:22-cr-00135-D-BM-1)
Submitted: March 26, 2026 Decided: March 31, 2026
Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Eugene E. Lester, III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United
States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Marion Lamont Flowers pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, a quantity of cocaine, a quantity of cocaine base, and a quantity of
fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846; and possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, a quantity of cocaine, a quantity of
cocaine base, and a quantity of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
The district court sentenced him to 276 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Flowers
contends that his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary and that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.
“We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is
enforceable,” and “we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed
falls within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608
(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate waiver is valid if the
defendant enters it “knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by
considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.]
11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of
the waiver, the waiver is valid.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record, including the plea agreement and the transcript of the Rule
11 hearing, confirms that Flowers knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. In addition,

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Flowers knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence,
with limited exceptions. We therefore conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable.
The appeal waiver does not preclude our review of Flowers’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. However, “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears
on the face of the record, [ineffective assistance] claims are not addressed on direct appeal.”
United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir. 2016). The record before us does
not conclusively establish that plea and sentencing counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Accordingly, Flowers’s “ineffective assistance claim[s] should be raised, if at all, in a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” United States v. Kemp, 88 F.4th 539, 546 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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