United States of America v. Heliberto Figueroa Gomez, a/k/a Greivin Armindo Juares Mazariegos

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4329
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HELIBERTO FIGUEROA GOMEZ, a/k/a Greivin Armindo Juares Mazariegos,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (3:25-cr-00031-RCY-1)
Submitted: February 27, 2026 Decided: April 24, 2026
Before HARRIS and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Joseph S. Camden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Lindsey
Halligan, United States Attorney and Special Attorney, Todd W. Blanche, Deputy Attorney
General, Robert K. McBride, First Assistant United States Attorney, James Reed Sawyers,
Assistant United States Attorney, Carla Jordan-Detamore, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 4 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Heliberto Figueroa Gomez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He was sentenced to time served and one year of
supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the imposition of a term of supervised release
without adequate explanation rendered his sentence procedurally unreasonable. The
Government contends that any shortcoming in the district court’s explanation was
harmless. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,
or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212
(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In evaluating the
procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we “determin[e] whether the district court
committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient
if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and
characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the [18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 2017)
(citation modified). In other words, the court “must conduct an individualized assessment”
by applying the § 3353(a) factors “to the particular defendant” being sentenced. Nance,
957 F.3d at 212-13 (citation modified).

-- 2 of 4 --

3
In determining whether there has been an adequate explanation, “we do not evaluate
a [district] court’s sentencing statements in a vacuum.” United States v. Gaspar, 123 F.4th
178, 183 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Rather, we “may discern the court’s rationale
from the context surrounding its explanation.” Id. (citation modified). Moreover, a
“district court[] need not spell out [its] responses to [the] defendant[’s] arguments”
provided that the context “make[s] it patently obvious that the district court found the
defendant’s arguments to be unpersuasive.” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d at 773, 782
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). “Engaging counsel in a discussion about the merits of
an argument in favor of a particular sentence, for example, may be sufficient to permit a
reviewing court to infer that a sentencing court gave specific attention to a defendant’s
argument.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation
modified).
A district court “ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case
in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable
alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” USSG § 5D1.1(c). However, the
district court should “consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant
if the court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Id. cmt. n.5.
In United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 2015), we held that our
review for procedural reasonableness of the imposition of supervised release in an illegal
reentry case should include consideration of whether the sentencing court “(1) is aware of
Guidelines section 5D1.1(c); (2) considers a defendant’s specific circumstances and the

-- 3 of 4 --

4
§ 3553(a) factors; and (3) determines that additional deterrence is needed.” Id. at 424
(citing United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Here, the record shows that the district court was aware of USSG § 5D1.1(c), as the
provision was referenced in the presentence report—which the court adopted—and
because the court engaged in a discussion about the provision at Gomez’s sentencing
hearing when Gomez objected to the imposition of a term of supervised release. The
district court recognized USSG § 5D1.1(c) provides that supervised release ordinarily
should not be imposed on a removable alien but, in accord with USSG § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5,
the court noted that Gomez had entered the country illegally more than once and was a
recidivist returnee. We have reviewed the court’s exchange with counsel concerning the
imposition of a term of supervised release and its statements in imposing Gomez’s
sentence. We conclude that the court sufficiently stated that it was imposing a term of
supervised release as a deterrent. See USSG § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5; Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d
at 423-25.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --