United States of America v. HARRY JAMES AUSTIN, III, a/k/a Trey

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4581
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HARRY JAMES AUSTIN, III, a/k/a Trey,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:14-cr-00604-JFA-1)
Submitted: August 7, 2026 Decided: August 17, 2026
Before GREGORY and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Emily Deck Harrill, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Bryan P.
Stirling, United States Attorney, Michael G. Shedd, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Harry James Austin, III, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
846. In 2018, the district court sentenced Austin to 60 months’ imprisonment, followed by
four years of supervised release. The district court subsequently revoked Austin’s
supervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment with no additional
term of supervised release. Austin now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Austin first argues on appeal that the district court erred in considering the recorded
statements made by a delivery driver to a police officer, captured on the officer’s body-
worn camera, without first conducting a balancing test pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.1(b)(1)(C). Here, however, Austin offered the body camera recording into evidence
without any restrictions on its use. “Under ordinary circumstances, this court will not
consider alleged errors that were invited by the appellant.” United States v. Hickman, 626
F.3d 756, 772 (4th Cir. 2010). Under the invited error doctrine, “a court can not be asked
by counsel to take a step in a case and later be convicted of error, because it has complied
with such request.” United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir.1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Austin invited any error in the district court’s admission of the
report as part of his trial strategy, and we therefore decline to consider this assignment of
error on appeal. See United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 451 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting
the only recognized exception to the invited error doctrine is where noticing error would
be necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process or prevent a miscarriage of

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justice; no such circumstances exist where defendant invited error as part of sound trial
strategy).
Austin next argues that, during his original sentencing, the district court erred under
United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), when it did not adequately announce
the standard conditions of supervised release. He contends that, following United States v.
McLaurin, 168 F.4th 693 (4th Cir. 2026), in which we extended the rule from Rogers to
cases where a defendant’s supervised release has been revoked based on discretionary
conditions of supervised release that were not orally announced at sentencing, his
revocation judgment is invalid.
Because Austin “did not object to the revocation of his supervised release under
Rogers at the underlying hearing,” we review for plain error. McLaurin,168 F.4th at 702.
To establish plain error, Austin “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was
plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” Id. (cleaned up). If Austin
establishes these three prongs, the court may exercise its discretion to correct the error “if
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id.
“[A] district court must orally pronounce all non-mandatory conditions of
supervised release at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341,
344 (4th Cir. 2021). “Discretionary conditions that appear for the first time in a subsequent
written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions,
and a remand for resentencing is required.” Id. (citing Rogers, 961 F.3d at 295, 300-01).
To “satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary conditions,” a district court may

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do so “through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all [Sentencing] Guidelines
‘standard’ conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing
those conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299.
Here, the district court ordered Austin to comply with the mandatory and standard
conditions of supervision set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Austin argues that, because
§ 3583(d) does not list the standard conditions, and instead only describes the criteria for
imposing discretionary conditions, the district court could not have imposed the standard
conditions listed in the judgment by reference to § 3583(d).
Austin’s claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185
(4th Cir. 2022). In Cisson, the district court stated at sentencing “that it would impose the
‘mandatory and standard conditions’ of supervised release.” Id. at 194. We observed that
the District of South Carolina has no standing order listing supervised release conditions
that differ from the standard conditions in the Guidelines. Id.; see U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c) (2024). “Thus, there [was] no other set of standard
conditions to which the [district] court could have been referring other than the Guidelines
standard conditions.” Cisson, 33 F.4th at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
there were no other standard conditions of supervision to which the district court could
have been referring in this case, the district court sufficiently pronounced through
incorporation the standard conditions in the Guidelines. See id. We therefore conclude
that Austin has not shown plain error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Austin’s motion to
expedite, and we direct that the mandate issue forthwith. We dispense with oral argument

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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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