United States of America v. Demetrie Massey, a/k/a Meek

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4678
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMETRIE MASSEY, a/k/a Meek,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:10-cr-00208-JAG-1)
Submitted: June 9, 2026 Decided: June 26, 2026
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Lauren P. Whitley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Todd W.
Blanche, Acting Attorney General, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C.; James Reed Sawyers, Assistant United States Attorney, Angela
Mastandrea, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Demetrie Massey appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the district court plainly erred by considering
the severity of his breach of the court’s trust in deciding to impose a new term of supervised
release and that the revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
We affirm.
Massey did not raise his primary argument before the district court. Accordingly,
our review of that issue is for plain error. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th
Cir. 2013). To prevail under this standard, Massey “must show that an error occurred, it
was plain, it affected his substantial rights, and it seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olson, 114 F.4th 269,
273 (4th Cir. 2024).
Massey cannot meet this standard. The Supreme Court recently held that a district
court imposing a revocation sentence may not “account for the need to exact retribution for
the defendant’s underlying crime (per [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(A)).” Esteras v. United
States, 606 U.S. 185, 194-95 (2025). But the Court expressly declined to address whether
district courts may consider the need to exact retribution for the defendant’s supervision
violation. Id. at 194 n.5. And we have not revisited this question since Esteras. Indeed,
we have instead noted that “the very purpose of a revocation hearing is to determine the
gravity of the defendant’s breach of trust.” United States v. Celedon, 165 F.4th 873, 881
(4th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). So, even if we agreed with Massey that the district
court erred in this regard, we could not find the error plain. And considering the district

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court’s entire explanation for the revocation sentence, we conclude that any potential error
did not affect Massey’s substantial rights. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S.
129, 134-35 (2018) (explaining defendant can establish error affected his substantial rights
by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As for Massey’s remaining arguments, “a revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering
the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Celedon, 165 F.4th at 879 (citation modified). And “a
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th
Cir. 2020) (citation modified). “Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we
consider whether it is plainly unreasonable—meaning the unreasonableness is clear or
obvious.” Celedon, 165 F.4th at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of
the record leads us to conclude that Massey’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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