1:22-cv-00899-CDA) STATE OF MARYLAND v. Jamien Palmer

FILED: June 8, 2026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 26-147
(1:22-cv-00899-CDA)
___________________
STATE OF MARYLAND; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; DIVISION OF PRETRIAL & DETENTION
SERVICES (DPDS); FREDRICK T. ABELLO, Warden
Petitioners
v.
JAMIEN PALMER; BEATRICE ELMORE; DESHAWN WILSON, for himself
and all others similarly situated; CLAYTON ROGERS
Respondents
___________________
O R D E R
___________________
Upon review of submissions relative to the petition for permission to appeal,
the court denies the petition.
Judge King and Judge Benjamin voted to deny the petition. Judge Rushing

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voted to grant the petition. Judge Rushing wrote an opinion dissenting from the
denial of the petition.
For the Court
/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

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RUSHING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The State of Maryland has filed a petition for interlocutory appeal from an
order partially granting class-action certification. I would grant the petition.
The district court’s order reads, in full:
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Class
Certification. ECF 84. For the reasons to be stated in the
forthcoming memorandum opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion for Class Certification is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Details on the
class definitions, class representation, and further
scheduling will be set forth at the time of the
memorandum opinion.
Palmer v. Maryland, No. 1:22-cv-0899-CDA, Dkt. 100 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2026).
No memorandum opinion has yet been filed.
The Rules of Civil Procedure require that “[a]n order that certifies a class
action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must
appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). These
requirements are “not optional.” Bell v. Brockett, 922 F.3d 502, 512 (4th Cir.
2019). The district court’s order does not comply with any of these requirements.
It therefore “is manifestly erroneous,” making interlocutory appellate
review “appropriate without regard to the other factors” we typically consider
when deciding whether to grant permission to appeal. Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc.,
255 F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir. 2001).

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Respondents argue that the district court’s order is so deficient that it does
not qualify as an appealable order under Rule 23(f). Notwithstanding its
deficiencies under Rule 23(c)(1), however, it is “an order granting [and] denying
class-action certification.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Therefore we may exercise
jurisdiction, and Maryland correctly petitioned for permission to appeal “within 14
days after the order [was] entered.” Id.; see Laudato v. EQT Corp., 23 F.4th 256,
259 (3d Cir. 2022) (“[I]f the order granted class-action certification, we will not
shield it from review just because it falls well short of the requirements of such an
order.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). I would grant Maryland’s petition to
review this deficient class-certification order.

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