United States of America v. Robert Benton, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 26-6283
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT BENTON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (4:97-cr-00866-CMC-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2026 Decided: May 27, 2026
Before AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert Benton, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John C. Potterfield, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Robert Benton, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying his motions for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
“This Court reviews the denial of compassionate release motions . . . for an abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 127 (4th Cir. 2023). “Under this
standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.” United States
v. Washington, 161 F.4th 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2025) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, “we may only ensure that the district court has not acted arbitrarily or
irrationally, has followed the statutory requirements, and has conducted the necessary
analysis for exercising its discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, “an abuse of discretion is when the district judge is fundamentally wrong, not when
we disagree with the district court’s judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A district court analyzes a compassionate release motion in two steps.” United
States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2024). At the first step, the court “determines
whether the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. To be eligible, the court must
find that relief is warranted because of extraordinary and compelling reasons and consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). At the second step, “the court considers whether the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors support relief.” Id.
Here, the district court found that Benton had not demonstrated extraordinary and
compelling reasons for his early release, as those are defined in the applicable policy

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statement—U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13, p.s. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Benton had not met his burden of
demonstrating that his mother was incapacitated or that he was the sole available caregiver
for her, USSG § 1B1.13(b)(3), p.s.; that there was a gross disparity between his sentence
and the sentence likely to be imposed today, USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6), p.s.; or that there were
other reasons for his early release, USSG § 1B1.13(b)(5), p.s.
The district court also found that, even if Benton had established extraordinary and
compelling reasons for his early release, the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting
relief. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Benton’s commendable efforts at rehabilitation did not outweigh the seriousness of his
offense conduct, criminal history, and prison disciplinary record.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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