Seiferth v. Atuneros, et al

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-60860
_______________
FREDERICK M. SEIFERTH,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF JAMES A. SEIFERTH, DECEASED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
HELICOPTEROS ATUNEROS, INC., AND MARK CAMOS,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
m 4:03-CV-463
______________________________
Before SMITH, GARZA, and CLEMENT,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Frederick Seiferth (“Seiferth”) appeals the
dismissal of his suit against Helicopteros Atun-
eros, Inc. (“HAI”), and Mark Camus for want
of personal jurisdiction. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand.
I.
HAI, a California corporation with principal
place of business there, buys, sells, leases, and
maintains helicopters. It leased a helicopter to
non-party Air 2, L.L.C. (“Air 2”), for one
year, with Air 2 assuming responsibility for all
maintenance, inspections, and operational ex-
penses. There were no geographic restrictions
on the helicopter’s operation, and Air 2 was
not required to inform HAI of the helicopter’s
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 11, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

-- 1 of 9 --

2
whereabouts. The lease expressly authorized
the use of an “externally attached cargo rack
to support an aerial lineman” for work on
power line structures.
Mark Camus1 designed and patented an ex-
ternal work platform for use with a helicopter.
Although he is a Tennessee domiciliary, all
work on the design was conducted in Florida,
where he was living at the time. He licensed
the design to Air 2, which had hired him as a
pilot. Air 2 had the platform manufactured,
and it installed the platform on the helicopter
leased from HAI. Camus transported the heli-
copter and work platform to Mississippi for
use by Air 2 in that state. In April 2000, be-
fore flying a mission for Air 2 in Mississippi,
he inspected the work platform.
In February 2001, James Seiferth, an Air 2
employee and New York resident, was stand-
ing on the work platform performing an aerial
inspection of power lines in Mississippi. The
base of the work platform broke, and he fell,
suffering injuries resulting in his death.
Seiferth, as the decedent’s personal repre-
sentative, sued HAI and Camus in federal
court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The
court, after denying Seiferth’s request for lim-
ited jurisdictional discovery as to HAI, granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss for a lack of
personal jurisdiction. Seiferth appeals the dis-
missal and, in the alternative, the denial of dis-
covery as to HAI.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s deter-
mination that it lacks personal jurisdiction.
Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d
863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing jurisdiction but is
required to present only prima facie evidence.
Luv n’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d
465, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2968 (2006). We resolve all relevant factual
disputes in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
District courts have “broad discretion in all
discovery matters.” Alpine View Co. Ltd. v.
Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir.
2000) (quoting Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)). On matters regard-
ing personal jurisdiction, discovery rulings are
reviewed for abuse of discretion and “will not
be disturbed ordinarilyunless there are unusual
circumstances showing a clear abuse.” Id.
(quoting Wyatt, 686 F.2d at 283).
A federal court sitting in diversity must sat-
isfy two requirements to exercise personal jur-
isdiction over a nonresident defendant. First,
the forum state’s long-arm statute must confer
personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of
jurisdiction must not exceed the boundaries of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190
F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
Mississippi’s long-arm statute confers per-
sonal jurisdiction over “[a]ny nonresident per-
son . . . who shall commit a tort in whole or in
part in this state against a resident or nonresi-
dent of this state . . . .” MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-3-57 (2002). Under Mississippi law, a
tort is not complete until an injury is suffered.
Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d
1162, 1168 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith v.
Temco, Inc., 252 So. 2d 212, 216 (Miss.
1971)). If the injury occurs in Mississippi, the
tort is committed, at least in part, in the state,
and the requirements of the long-arm statute
1 Camus’s name was misspelled “Camos” in the
initial filings and the district court’s opinion. We
use the proper spelling in the body of this opinion.

-- 2 of 9 --

3
are satisfied. Id. The tortfeasor’s presence in
Mississippi is not required; causing an injury
that occurs in the state is sufficient. Id. (quot-
ing Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d
328, 333 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The Due Process Clause “operates to limit
the power of a State to assert in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984). The “con-
stitutional touchstone” of the inquiry to deter-
mine if personal jurisdiction can be exercised is
whether the defendant “purposefully estab-
lished minimum contacts in the forum State.”
Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S.
102, 108-09 (1987) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985)).
Personal jurisdiction can be general or spe-
cific. If a defendant’s contacts with the forum
state are “continuous and systematic,” a court
may exercise general jurisdiction over any ac-
tion brought against that defendant, regardless
of whether the action is related to the forum
contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
If a defendant has relatively few contacts, a
court may still exercise specific jurisdiction “in
a suit arising out of or related to the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 414 &
n.8. It is not disputed that HAI and Camus
lack sufficient contacts to justify general jur-
isdiction; only specific jurisdiction is at issue.
We articulated a three-step analysis for the
specific jurisdiction inquiry in Nuovo Pignone,
SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374
(5th Cir. 2002):
(1) whether the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether
it purposely directed its activities toward
the forum state or purposefully availed it-
self of the privileges of conducting activi-
ties there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause
of action arises out of or results from the
defendant’s forum-related contacts; and
(3) whether the exercise of personal juris-
diction is fair and reasonable.
Id. at 378 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
474). If the plaintiff successfully satisfies the
first two prongs, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that
its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.
Id. at 382.
III.
The Mississippi long-arm statute permits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over both
defendants. It is not disputed that the injury,
James Seiferth’s death, occurred in Missis-
sippi. He fell from a platform that had been
transported to the state by Camus and inspect-
ed by him there, and the platform was attached
to HAI’s helicopter, which had been leased
with an express provision permitting the use of
a work platform. Thus, under Mississippi law,
at least part of the tort allegedly perpetrated by
HAI and Camus was committed in Mississippi.
That fact authorizes the exercise of personal
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
Although Camus admitted to the district
court that the “general allegations of the plain-
tiff’s complaint satisfy the long arm statute,”
he now claims that, because all of his Missis-
sippi contacts were in the context of his Air 2
employment, the court cannot exercise person-
al jurisdiction. This argument misstates the
law.
Camus relies on Cole v. Alton, 567 F.
Supp. 1081 (N.D. Miss. 1983), an opinion not
binding on this court, as authority for his

-- 3 of 9 --

4
claim. This reliance is misplaced. Cole in-
volved an automobile accident in which the
defendants were Atlas, the company that
leased and operated the truck involved in the
accident; the Atlas employee who was driving
the truck; the owner of the truck; and several
executives and shareholders of Atlas. Neither
Atlas nor the driver, who had acted in the
scope of his employment, contested jurisdic-
tion, which was challenged only by the re-
maining defendants, none of whom had a sin-
gle direct contact with Mississippi. The court
held that jurisdiction “over the corporate entity
cannot, without more, confer jurisdiction over
the officers and shareholders individually.” Id.
at 1083 (citing Webb v. Culberson, Heller &
Norton, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D.
Miss. 1973)).
Unlike the Cole defendants, Camus had dir-
ect contacts with Mississippi. He transported
the helicopter and work platform to the state
and inspected the platform there less than a
year before the accident. Under Mississippi
law, when a corporate officer “directly partici-
pates in or authorizes the commission of a tort,
even on the behalf of the corporation, he may
be held personally liable.” Mozingo v. Correct
Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing First Mobile Home Corp. v. Little, 298
So. 2d 676, 679 (Miss. 1974)).
In short, Camus is alleged to have directly
participated in the commission of a tort in Mis-
sissippi. It is immaterial whether he did so
within the scope of his Air 2 employment. The
district court correctly held that Seiferth’s
“allegations fall within the aegis of the [long-
arm] statute.”
IV.
Thus, Mississippi’s long-arm statute reach-
es both defendants. We now consider whether
the exercise of personaljurisdiction offends the
Due Process Clause.
A.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over
HAI is inconsistent with the limitations of the
Due Process Clause, because HAI did not es-
tablish minimum contacts with Mississippi.
The stream-of-commerce theory does not con-
fer jurisdiction because, even if the theory ex-
tended to leased products, HAI did not expect,
nor should it have expected, that the helicopter
would be used in Mississippi. We affirm the
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction as to
HAI.
1.
The first step of the Nuovo Pignone analy-
sis asks whether a defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state. HAI’s owner-
ship of the helicopter, which was leased and
operated by Air 2, is considered under the
stream-of-commerce theory in the following
section. The district court found that HAI did
not have any other contacts with Mississippi.
We agree.
HAI did not have a physical presence in
Mississippi. It did not conduct business in the
state. Its contract with Air 2 was not signed in
Mississippi, nor did the contract call for per-
formance in that state. Despite this dearth of
contacts, Seiferth relies on two cases to argue
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
HAI is consistent with the Due Process
Clause: Elkhart Eng’g Corp. v. Dornier
Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965), and
Brown v. Astron Enters., Inc., 989 F. Supp.
1399 (N.D. Ala. 1997). This argument is
unavailing.
After selling an airplane to Elkhart, Dornier
requested permission to use the plane in dem-

-- 4 of 9 --

5
onstrations to potential buyers throughout the
United States. Elkhart agreed, and a Dornier
pilot flew the plane to Alabama for the sole
purpose of showing it to potential clients; a
Dornier sales manager and mechanic were also
present. The plane crashed during the dem-
onstration, and Elkhart sued in federal court in
Alabama. Elkhart, 343 F.2d at 863. This
court held that the district court could properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over Dornier.
Id. at 868.
Elkhart is plainly distinguishable from the
present case. Dornier transported the plane to
the forum for a sales demonstration. At the
time of the crash, Dornier possessed the plane;
a Dornier mechanic was inspecting and main-
taining it, and its pilot was flying it. HAI, con-
versely, did not transport the helicopter to
Mississippi; indeed, it did not even know the
helicopter had been transported there. HAI
did not possess the helicopter at the time of
the crash; it was neither maintaining nor op-
erating it. The rationale for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in Elkhart, that the de-
fendant brought the aircraft to the forum and
was operating it at the time of the accident,
does not provide a basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over HAI, which never
entered Mississippi.
Brown, a district court opinion not binding
on this court, similarly does not support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over HAI.
The defendant, North American Flight Train-
ing Academy (“NAFTA”), rented one of its
airplanes for a training flight from Georgia to
Alabama. Brown, 989 F. Supp. at 1401-02.
The student pilot declared his intention to trav-
el to Alabama in a pre-filed flight plan, and
during the flight the plane crashed in Alabama.
Id. at 1405. After plaintiff sued in federal
court in Alabama, NAFTA moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court found that the exercise of juris-
diction was proper because NAFTA’s rental
was an act “directed at Alabama because the
pilot stated his intention to come to Alabama
in a pre-filed flight plan.” Id. This distinguish-
es NAFTA’s situation from HAI’s; unlike the
student pilot, Air 2 did not state an intention to
operate the helicopter in Mississippi.
Dornier in Elkhart, and the student pilot in
Brown, declared their intentions to use the air-
craft in the forum. Air 2 did not, and HAI had
no reason to expect that its helicopter would
be used in Mississippi. Thus, contrary to Sei-
ferth’s assertion, these cases do not support
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over HAI.
2.
Seiferth alleges that, by placing the heli-
copter into the stream of commerce, HAI pur-
posefully directed its activities at Mississippi
and thus subjected itself to the jurisdiction of
Mississippi courts. We disagree.
The stream-of-commerce theory permits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant that “delivers its prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that they will be purchased by con-
sumers in the forum State.” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
298 (1980). The foreseeability required in the
products liability context is “not the mere like-
lihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s
conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.” Id. at 297.
Once a product has reached the end of the
stream and is purchased, a consumer’s unilat-
eral decision to take a product to a distant

-- 5 of 9 --

6
state, without more, is insufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer or
distributor. Id. at 298.
We have not extended this theory to leased
products, and we need not and do not decide
whether to make such an extension.2 The ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction would not be
proper even if the stream-of-commerce theory
applied to leased products, because HAI did
not expect the lessee to take the helicopter to
Mississippi.3 See supra Part IV.A.1. The
lease imposed no geographical limitations, and
Seiferth does not show any reason for HAI to
have expected Air 2 to use the helicopter in
Mississippi.4 The transportation of the heli-
copter to Mississippi was a unilateral act of
Air 2, which under World Wide Volkswagen is
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over
HAI.
B.
Seiferth brings four claims against Camus:
defective design, failure to warn, negligence,
and negligence per se. The first claim arises
out of Camus’s design of the work platform
from which Seiferth fell, and the remaining
three from Camus’s contacts with Mississippi.
We initially consider what appears to be an
issue of first impression for our court: Is spe-
cific personal jurisdiction a claim-specific in-
quiry? We conclude that it is. A plaintiff
bringing multiple claims that arise out of dif-
ferent forum contacts of the defendant must
establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.
This result flows logically from the distinc-
tion between general and specific jurisdiction
and is confirmed by the decisions of our sister
circuits.5 If a defendant does not have enough
2 The other circuit to consider this question like-
wise refused to extend the stream-of-commerce
theory to leased products. See Bell Helicopter
Textron v. HeliQwest Int’l., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291
(10th Cir. 2004). The facts are remarkably similar
to those before us: A company leased a helicopter
in Canada and took it to Utah, where it crashed.
The lessor was sued in Utah, and the Tenth Circuit
held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction of-
fended the Due Process Clause because the lessor
had no reason to expect the lessee to take the heli-
copter to Utah. The court found that even if the
lessee had operated a physical facility in Utah
when the lease was signed, that would be insuffi-
cient to establish personal jurisdiction over the
lessor. Id. at 1297.
3 See, e.g. Luv n’ care, 438 F.3d at 470-71
(finding jurisdiction over defendant that expected
its products to be purchased in the forum state, as
evinced by its filling sixty-five purchase orders for
items bound for the forum and sending invoices to
the retailer confirming the same); Nuovo Pignone,
310 F.3d at 379-80 (finding jurisdiction over de-
fendant that shipped a reactor to the forum state on
a defective vessel); Bean Dredging Corp. v.
Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th
Cir. 1984) (finding jurisdiction over defendant that
sold castings to distributor with the expectation
that distributor would retail the castings to a na-
tionwide market).
4 Seiferth’s allegation that HAI should have
known that Air 2 generally operated in the south-
east region of the United States is insufficient to es-
tablish that HAI expected the helicopter to be used
in Mississippi. See Bell Helicopter, 385 F.3d at
1298 (holding that although the lessor could poten-
tially have foreseen that the helicopter would be
used in western states with national forests, “[a]
general hope that a party will use a product in a
general region is too remote an aspiration to qualify
as purposeful availment in a specific state”).
5 Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips
Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999)
(continued...)

-- 6 of 9 --

7
contacts to justify the exercise of general juris-
diction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the
exercise of jurisdiction over any claim that
does not arise out of or result from the defen-
dant’s forum contacts.
Permitting the legitimate exercise of specif-
ic jurisdiction over one claim to justify the ex-
ercise of specific jurisdiction over a different
claim that does not arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s forum contacts would violate the
Due Process Clause. Thus, if a plaintiff’s
claims relate to different forum contacts of the
defendant, specific jurisdiction must be estab-
lished for each claim.6 We therefore consider
separately Seiferth’s defective design claim,
which does not arise out of the same forum
contacts as do his other three claims.
1.
The Due Process Clause precludes the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction over Camus for
Seiferth’s claim based on Camus’s alleged de-
fective design of the work platform. By trans-
porting the helicopter and work platform to
Mississippi and inspecting the platform there,
Camus directed his activity toward the state
and purposefully availed himself of its laws,
which satisfies the first prong of the Nuovo
Pignone analysis.7 The inquiry fails, however,
at the second step, because the defective de-
sign claim does not arise out of or result from
Camus’s Mississippi contacts.
None of Camus’s Mississippi contacts re-
lates to his design of the platform. Camus de-
signed the rack in Florida, not Mississippi; he
did not manufacture it in Mississippi. Indeed,
he did not manufacture it at allSSAir 2 had it
manufactured. The stream-of-commerce theo-
ry does not provide a basis for jurisdiction, be-
cause Camus did not place a product into the
stream, but merely licensed a design to Air 2.
The dismissal of Seiferth’s defective design
5(...continued)
(“Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied
to the particular claims asserted.”); Remick v.
Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the personal jurisdiction inquiry “is
claim specific because a conclusion that the Dis-
trict Court has personal jurisdiction over one of the
defendants as to a particular claim asserted by
Remick does not necessarily mean that it has per-
sonal jurisdiction over that same defendant as to
Remick’s other claims”); Zumbro, Inc. v. Cal. Nat-
ural Prods., 861 F. Supp. 773, 779 (D. Minn.
1994) (“Because specific jurisdiction requires a
nexus between the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state and the subject matter of Zumbro’s
claims in this litigation, it is necessary to address
each of Zumbro’s claims individually.” (citing
Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281-
82 (8th Cir.1991))); Resnick v. Rowe, 283 F.
Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003) (“[A] plain-
tiff must establish personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant with respect to each claim.” (citing Data
Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs. Inc., 557 F.2d
1280, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977))).
6 See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 3d § 1351, at 299 n.30 (2004) (“There is no
(continued...)
6(...continued)
such thing as supplemental specific personal juris-
diction; if separate claims are pled, specific person-
al jurisdiction must independently exist for each
claim and the existence of personal jurisdiction for
one claim will not provide the basis for another
claim.”).
7 That prong asks “whether the defendant has
minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., wheth-
er it purposely directed its activities toward the
forum state or purposefully availed itself of the
privileges of conducting activities there.” Nuovo
Pignone, 310 F.3d at 378.

-- 7 of 9 --

8
claim for lack of personal jurisdiction was
proper.
2.
Camus’s Mississippi contacts are relevant
to Seiferth’s claims of failure to warn, negli-
gence, and negligence per se. As discussed
above, these contacts demonstrate activities
directed toward Mississippi and a purposeful
availment of its laws. Camus again claims that
these contacts cannot be considered in our due
process analysis because they were made in his
capacity as an Air 2 employee and thus cannot
expose him to personal jurisdiction. We have
rejected this argument with respect to Missis-
sippi’s long-arm statute in Part III, supra, and
we do the same here.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The
defendants were employees of a newspaper
and challenged jurisdiction by asserting, inter
alia, that their only contacts with the forum
state were in the context of their employment.
The Court held that the defendants’ “status as
employees does not somehow insulate them
from jurisdiction. Each defendant’s contacts
with the forum State must be assessed individ-
ually.” Id. at 790. The Court found that juris-
diction was proper because the defendants
were “primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a Califor-
nia resident.” Id.
Accordingly, we do not exclude Camus’s
Mississippi contacts from the jurisdictional an-
alysis, because they were in the context of his
Air 2 employment. He directed his activities at
Mississippi, which satisfies step one of the Nu-
ovo Pignone analysis.
Step two asks whether the cause of action
“arises out of or results from [Camus’s] for-
um-related contacts.” Nuovo Pignone, 310
F.3d at 378. Camus transported the work
platform to Mississippi and inspected it there.
Viewing allfacts favorablytoward jurisdiction,
as we must, this is sufficient to find that the
claims of failure to warn, negligence, and neg-
ligence per se arise out of Camus’s Mississippi
contacts.
The district court found that “Camos’ April
2000 inspection of the work platform is too far
removed in time to have played any role in Sei-
ferth’s death nearly a year later.” Though this
statement may be true, it does not bear on the
jurisdictional question, but rather goes to the
merits of Seiferth’s claims. A defendant with
the required minimum contacts “cannot avoid
personal jurisdiction by speculating as to
whether another partywas actuallyresponsible
for the accident.” Id. at 380. Thus, because
Seiferth’s claims of failure to warn, negligence,
and negligence per se arise out of Camus’s
forum contacts, the second step of the Nuovo
Pignone analysis is satisfied.
The third and final step asks “whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and rea-
sonable.” Id. at 378. The burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to show that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction is unfair or unrea-
sonable based on five factors: “(1) the burden
on the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests
of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial sys-
tem’s interest in the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and (5) the shared interests
of the several states in furthering fundamental
social policies.” Id. at 382 (citing Felch v.
Transportes Lar-Mex SA de CV, 92 F.3d 320,
324 (5th Cir. 1996)). Because the district
court determined that Camus did not have suf-
ficient contacts with Mississippi to permit the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, it did not

-- 8 of 9 --

9
reach the third step.
We conclude that Camus directed his ac-
tivities at Mississippi and purposefully availed
himself of the privileges of conducting activi-
ties there and that Seiferth’s claims of failure
to warn, negligence, and negligence per se
arise out of Camus’s Mississippi contacts. We
thus vacate the dismissal of these claims and
remand to the district court to determine
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Camus by a Mississippi court is fair and
reasonable.
V.
Seiferth appeals the denial of limited juris-
dictional discovery as to HAI. The standard of
review poses a high bar; a district court’s dis-
cretion in discovery matters “will not be dis-
turbed ordinarily unless there are unusual cir-
cumstances showing a clear abuse.” Alpine
View, 205 F.3d at 220. Seiferth had access to
the lease of the helicopter and the affidavit of
HAI’s president and failed to make even a pri-
ma facie showing of jurisdiction. Seiferth al-
leges that further discovery may disclose addi-
tional contacts HAI had with Mississippi such
as advertisements, phone calls, or e-mail in-
quiries. Such contacts, however, would sup-
port the exercise of general, not specific, juris-
diction, something Seiferth has not alleged in
this case. The district court did not abuse its
discretion.8
VI.
In summary, because HAI did not have suf-
ficient contacts with Mississippi, we AFFIRM
the dismissal, for want of personal jurisdiction,
of all claims against HAI. Because Seiferth’s
claim against Camus for defective design did
not arise out of or relate to a forum contact,
we AFFIRM the dismissal of that claim for
want of personal jurisdiction. Because the re-
maining claims against Camus arise out of his
Mississippi contacts, we VACATE the dis-
missal of those claims and REMAND for the
district court to determine whether the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reason-
able. Finally, we AFFIRM the denial of jur-
isdictional discovery as to HAI.
8 See Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc.,
415 F.3d 419, 429 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Because
they failed to argue that the district court
would have general jurisdiction over [defen-
dant], appellants cannot show that they were
prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to al-
low them to pursue the discovery.”).

-- 9 of 9 --