United States v. Angeles

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-10937

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Natalie Angeles, also known as Natalie Deschamps,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CR-14-A

Before Smith, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
Natalie Angeles appeals the sentence she received after pleading guilty
of drug trafficking. Her sole argument is that the district court coerced her
into withdrawing objections to her presentence report by threatening to deny
an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We affirm.
I.
Angeles pleaded guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). She admitted to coordinating delivery of liquid
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 24, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 19-10937
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meth from sources in Mexico to distributors in California, Georgia, and
Texas from 2016 to 2018. Given the volume of meth involved (a converted
weight of 749,800 kilograms), the presentence report (“PSR”) calculated
Angeles’s base offense level as 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1(c)(1). It added three
two-level enhancements because the meth was imported from Mexico,
because Angeles distributed meth from her garage, and because she recruited
and supervised drug couriers. See id. §§ 2D1.1(b)(5), 2D1.1(b)(12), 3B1.1(c).
Deducting three points for accepting responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a), (b), her
total offense level was 41. Her criminal history category of I resulted in a
guidelines range of 324 to 405 months.
Angeles raised numerous objections to the PSR. Relevant here, she
contested the drug quantity attributed to her, the three enhancements, and
the lack of a reduction for her allegedly minor role in the conspiracy. An
addendum to the PSR rejected Angeles’s objections and concluded she was
frivolously denying relevant conduct such that she should forfeit any
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Angeles withdrew her objection to
the importation enhancement but filed supplemental objections regarding
drug quantity. In response, the probation officer reduced some of the meth
attributed to Angeles, but this did not change her base offense level.
The day before the sentencing hearing, the district court issued this
order:
After having considered the presentence report pertaining to
defendant, Natalie Angeles, and the other sentencing items, the
court tentatively has concluded that the objections made by
defendant to the presentence report are without merit. Also, the
court tentatively has concluded that defendant should not receive
any reduction in her offense level based on acceptance of
responsibility. . . . The parties should take such tentative
conclusions into account in making decisions as to the
presentations to be made at the sentencing hearing.
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At the hearing, the court began by asking whether Angeles intended to pursue
any objections to the PSR besides those already withdrawn. Angeles’s
counsel answered that she would pursue her objection to the drug-premises
enhancement but would otherwise defer to the court’s ruling. The court
responded that it had reached only “tentative” conclusions and urged
counsel to specify which objections Angeles wished to pursue. After briefly
consulting with Angeles, counsel stated that Angeles would withdraw all
objections.
The court proceeded to the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. It
noted its “tentative conclusion” that the reduction was unmerited, but
invited counsel to present evidence. Counsel argued that Angeles accepted
responsibility, asked that she not be “penalized for zealous representation,”
and pointed out that she had withdrawn all objections to the PSR.
Unconvinced, the court expressed “misgivings” that Angeles had met her
burden under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 to “clearly demonstrate acceptance of
responsibility.” The court pointed to her PSR objections which, although
withdrawn, appeared to be “frivolous . . . and false denials of relevant
conduct.” In response, Angeles’s counsel argued that—notwithstanding her
specific objections to the PSR—Angeles had “never denied what her
behaviors were with regard” to the basic facts of the crime. At that point the
court relented, stating “I’m not going to deny her acceptance of
responsibility.”
The court then accepted the PSR’s calculations with the resulting
guideline range of 324 to 405 months. After hearing statements from one of
Angeles’s children and from Angeles herself, however, the court imposed a
below-guidelines sentence of 280 months, combined with a five-year term of
supervised release.
Angeles timely appealed.
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II.
Because Angeles’s coercion argument was not raised in the district
court, we review for plain error. United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d
293, 296 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Sykes, 559 F. App’x 331, 331
(5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (reviewing similar unpreserved coercion
argument for plain error). “To prevail on plain error review, a defendant
must show (1) an error that has not been affirmatively waived, (2) that is clear
or obvious, and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” United States v.
Lindsey, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 4497205, at *2 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Puckett
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). “If a defendant satisfies these
three conditions, we have the discretion to correct the error but should do so
only if it ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, --- U.S. -
--, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1905 (2018)).
1

III.
Angeles’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court “effectively
coerc[ed]” her into withdrawing her objections to the PSR by threatening to
withhold an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We disagree. We have
before rejected similar coercion arguments in unpublished opinions, and we
follow the same course now. See United States v. Schenck, 697 F. App’x 422,
423 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); United States v. Medina, 432 F. App’x 349,
352 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).
“The spectre of judicial coercion . . . [may] arise where the court tells
the defendant that he must withdraw the objection or lose the possibility of

1
Angeles claims it is immaterial whether her coercion claim was preserved because
it involves “structural error” that “require[s] automatic reversal.” She cites no authority
for that proposition, however. The two cases she does cite involve, like this one, plain-error
review of unpreserved claims of sentencing error. See United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d
281, 289–91 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying “plain error review” to unpreserved objection to
sentencing enhancements); Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d at 296–99 (same).
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gaining a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.” Medina, 432 F. App’x
at 352. We see no such strong-arming here, however. Rather, the court
treated withdrawal separately from acceptance. The court first explained that
Angeles could persist in her objections if she wished. See, e.g., id. (noting the
court “allowed Medina the opportunity to persist in the objection or
withdraw it”). Only after Angeles withdrew her objections did the court
analyze acceptance of responsibility. While recognizing that Angeles had
dropped her objections, the court nonetheless examined whether the
objections showed she had “frivolously contest[ed] or falsely denie[d]
relevant conduct.” This was directly relevant to whether Angeles had
“clearly demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility for [her] offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); see id. comment. (n.1(A)) (an “appropriate
consideration[] include[s]” whether defendant “falsely denies, or frivolously
contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true”).
2
Indeed,
the fact that the court deemed withdrawal irrelevant to Angeles’s acceptance
reduction, “[i]f anything, . . . demonstrates the absence of coercion.” Medina,
432 F. App’x at 352 (emphasis added).
Finally, the court did not pressure Angeles into abandoning her
objections by conveying before the hearing its “tentative conclusion” that
her objections were “without merit.” “[I]t would be absurd for a detrimental
legal ruling on an objection to be construed as the court’s coercing a
defendant to withdraw that objection.” Id. To the contrary, it is appropriate
for a district court to “express concern that a defendant is frivolously denying
relevant conduct and explain this could be a reason to deny an acceptance
reduction.” Schenck, 697 F. App’x at 423 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., United

2
See Schenck, 697 F. App’x at 422–23 (affirming denial of acceptance reduction
where, “despite pleading guilty and truthfully admitting to some relevant conduct,”
defendant “acted in a manner not consistent with acceptance of responsibility by
attempting to falsely deny material relevant conduct”) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment.
(n.1(A)).
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States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 2016) (court did not
“improperly coerce defendant into withdrawing his objections to the PSR’s
drug quantity findings” by “accurately warning defendant of the
consequence of pursuing frivolous guidelines objections”) (cleaned up).
3

Here, the district court did no more than that and so did not cross the line
into coercing Angeles to withdraw her objections.
4

We therefore find no error, much less the “clear or obvious” mistake
necessary to overcome plain-error review. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
AFFIRMED.

3
Notably, Angeles does not argue that her objections to the PSR had any merit.
Nor does she contradict her probation officer’s assessment that her objections amounted
to “falsely denying and frivolously contesting . . . relevant conduct.” Thus, this appeal
does not address the situation where a district court allegedly coerces a defendant into
withdrawing potentially meritorious objections to a PSR.
4
Instead of addressing our precedent, Angeles relies on cases finding “judicial
coercion” where judges improperly pressure defendants to plead guilty by threatening a
harsher sentence if they go to trial. See, e.g., Longval v. Meachum, 693 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir.
1982) (finding judicial coercion where court stated that it “might be disposed to impose a
substantial prison sentence” if defendant did not plead guilty). Such authorities are off-
point. Aside from the fact that no similarly coercive tactics appear in the record, Angeles
admits that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure strictly prohibit courts from
participating in plea negotiations. See also, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 197 F.3d 156, 158
(5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “Rule 11(e)(1) is clear in its prohibition against all forms of
judicial participation in or interference with the plea negotiation process”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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