United States v. Jackson

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 17, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-31012
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAURICE JACKSON; JUANITA ANN BROWN EVANS;
JACOBY DWAYNE BROWN,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(03-CR-50006-2)
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Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendants-Appellants Maurice Jackson, Juanita Ann Brown
Evans, and Jacoby Dwayne Brown were convicted by a jury of
conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 by
engaging in a scheme to obtain money from State Farm Insurance
Companies. The overt acts of the conspiracy included a staged
automobile accident and the arson of Evans's home. They were also
convicted of substantive mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1341.

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All defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Evans and Brown did not renew their motions for judgment of
acquittal at the close of all evidence, and we conclude from the
record that their convictions did not result in a miscarriage of
justice. See United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir.
2001). With respect to Jackson, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient because a rational trier of fact could find that he
participated in the conspiracy. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979).
Evans contends that the district court erroneously admitted
evidence of her bankruptcy and her asset listings in the bankruptcy
proceedings. We conclude that the evidence was relevant and that
the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States
v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1993); FED. R. EVID. 403.
We conclude alternatively that if any error occurred, it was
harmless. See Pace, 10 F.3d at 1116; United States v. Howell, 664
F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1981).
Evans also contends that the district court erred by applying
a two-point enhancement to her offense level for being a leader or
organizer of the arson scheme and another two-point enhancement for
the use of a minor in the staged car accident. Evans's minor son
was present in one of the automobiles in the accident, and Evans
collected payment from State Farm on his behalf. Evans also
recruited Vidal Wilson to set fire to her house. The district

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court's enhancements were not clearly erroneous. See United States
v. Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1(c),
3B1.4.
Jackson advances that the district court was required to find
him guilty of arson beyond a reasonable doubt before applying
U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4 because he was charged in a multiple object
conspiracy. We disagree. See United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d
760, 741 (5th Cir. 1996). Although Jackson argues further that the
district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for losses
incurred in connection with the arson, the restitution order was
proper. See United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437-38 (5th
Cir. 1998). Jackson also insists that the district court's use of
relevant conduct to determine his sentence violates the principles
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and that the
dramatic increase in his guideline range required a heightened
burden of proof. Apprendi is inapplicable because Jackson's
sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. See United States
v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 786-87 (5th Cir. 2000). The increase in
his sentencing range was not sufficiently dramatic to require the
heightened level of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Carreon, 11
F.3d 1225, 1240 (5th Cir. 1994). Finally, Jackson's argument that
his sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004), is foreclosed. See United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464,
473 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 14,
2004)(No. 03-30437).

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The convictions and sentences of all Defendants-Appellants are
AFFIRMED.

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