Mahan v. City of Lubbock, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 28, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-11475
Summary Calendar
MICHAEL LEE MAHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF LUBBOCK, LUBBOCK TEXAS POLICE DEPARTMENT;
JOHNNY HUTSON, Investigator, Lubbock Police Department Task
Force; JIMMY PACHALL, Investigator, Lubbock Police Department
Task Force; EDDIE METZIG; RICK BEDWELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:02-CV-251-C
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Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Michael Mahan, Texas prisoner # 1163642, appeals from the
grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the
dismissal with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint. We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir.
2003).
Notice of Appeal

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2
Mahan did not file a notice of appeal from the district
court’s dismissal of his claims against the following defendants:
(1) City of Lubbock; (2) Lubbock Police Department; (3) Rick
Bedwell; and (4) Eddie Metzig. The time to file a notice of appeal
as to these defendants has expired. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
Accordingly, the appeal of these claims is dismissed.
Warrantless searches
Mahan argues that Jimmy Pachall and Johnny Hutson, officers
with the Lubbock police department, conducted warrantless searches
at a motel room and at a residence. He argues that these searches
violated the Fourth Amendment.
With respect to the search of the motel room, Mahan
acknowledges that he was not present at the motel room when the
officers conducted their search. Mahan could not express a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Ibarra, 948 F.2d at 906.
Accordingly, Mahan lacks standing to challenge the issue. See id.
Similarly, with respect to the officers’ entry at the
residence, the record reflects that one of the residents consented
to allow the officers to enter. See United States v. Jones,
239 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 2001). Mahan had no standing to
contest the warrantless entry. See Ibarra, 948 F.2d at 906.
Excessive use of force and unreasonable detention
Mahan argues that the officers exercised excessive use of
force and unreasonably detained him during their search of the

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residence. He argues that the officers’ actions violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Mahan does not dispute that he was holding a Bowie knife when
Hutson and Pachall entered the bedroom where Mahan was staying.
The officers’ response in immediately using force against him was
objectively reasonable considering the threat to the officers’
safety. See United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir.
1992)(en banc). Likewise, Mahan cannot establish a genuine issue
of fact over his unreasonable detention claim. The officers were
reasonably justified in restraining him in light of the threat to
their safety. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
Discovery rulings
Mahan argues that the district court abused its discretion by
closing discovery and by denying several of his discovery requests.
The record reflects that the district court allowed some discovery
as evidenced by the officers’ disclosures and responses to Mahan’s
interrogatories. Further, the court gave Mahan ample opportunity
to conduct discovery from June 8, 2004, the date of the discovery
scheduling order, to August 23, 2004, the closing date for
discovery. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Mahan has not shown how
additional discovery would have produced further evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning his Fourth
Amendment claims. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting discovery and granting summary judgment
for the officers. See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d

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1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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