Ibarra, et al v. Harris County Texas, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 28, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 05-20404
_____________________
IN RE: HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; TOMMY THOMAS, Sheriff, Individually
and in his official capacity; PRESTON FOOSE, Deputy, Individually
and in his official capacity; DAN SHATTUCK, Deputy, Individually
and in his official capacity; MANUEL MORENO, Deputy, Individually
and in his official capacity; ALEXANDER ROCHA, Sergeant,
Individually and in his official capacity; JOHN PALERMO, Deputy,
Individually and in his official capacity; MARY BAKER; FRANK E.
SANDERS, MICHAEL A. STAFFORD, Harris County Attorney, In his
official capacity,
Petitioners.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CV-186
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, Chief Judge and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
We have before us a petition for mandamus requesting that we
vacate the district court’s order disqualifying Harris County
Attorneys Mary Baker and Frank E. Sanders, and the rest of the
Harris County Attorney’s office from representing the county and
its officers in the underlying lawsuit against Harris County.
Because we agree with the petitioners that they lack adequate
alternative means to seek relief, we consider whether their

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disqualification was erroneous. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972
F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1992).
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the
district court did not err in disqualifying Attorneys Sanders and
Baker. Id. The record provides ample basis to support the
district court’s finding that the conduct of Sanders and Baker in
the discovery proceedings would prevent the parties from receiving
a fair trial, were these attorneys permitted to continue to
represent the defendants in a trial before a judge who has lost
confidence in their integrity and in which their own conduct could
become a focal point.
We do find, however, that the court’s disqualification of the
entire Harris County Attorney’s Office was unjustified.
“[A]ttorney disqualification, particularly the disqualification of
an entire [office], is a sanction that must not be imposed
cavalierly.” FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1316 (5th
Cir. 1995). The district court’s order focused entirely on the
conduct of the two named attorneys. The court made no findings of
impropriety as to the rest of the office, noting only in passing
that “the conduct of [Baker and Sanders] negatively influenced
others in this suit.” This is insufficient to support such a
drastic remedy. See United States v. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870, 879
(10th Cir. 2003) (reversing disqualification order where district
court failed to detail either misconduct or alleged conflicts of

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interest on the part of the entire U.S. Attorney’s office). We
therefore affirm the disqualification of Attorneys Baker and
Sanders and reverse the disqualification of all other attorneys in
the Harris County Attorney’s Office.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of mandamus
is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

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