Sycamore Management, Ltd. v. Unidentified Parties

* Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 27, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 05-30271
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SYCAMORE MANAGEMENT, LTD.,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTIES
Defendants,
INTERNATIONAL MARINE TERMINALS PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 2:04-cv-00162-KDE)
Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES AND PRADO, Circuit Judges.
EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:*
Appellee Sycamore Management, Ltd. (“Sycamore”) sued
appellant International Marine Terminals Partnership (“IMT”) for
damages resulting from the collision of Sycamore’s ship, the M/V
GLOBAL SPIRIT I (the “ship”), into several barges in the
Mississippi River. After conducting a bench trial, the district

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court ruled for Sycamore. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.
I.
On October 23, 2003, between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., the ship, a
16,000-ton ocean-going vessel, was proceeding up the Mississippi
near Myrtle Grove, Louisiana. Around 2:00 a.m., a chain securing
several barges at IMT’s bulk cargo storage and transfer terminal
(“the terminal”) parted, allowing eight barges from the terminal
(“the barges”) to drift out into the river. The ship’s pilot
reported colliding into some unidentified barges, resulting in
the damage at issue here. This damage was consistent with
collision with a barge. There is no affirmative evidence that
any barges other than those unmoored from the terminal were on
the river in the vicinity of the ship.
Later, marine surveyors for Sycamore and IMT inspected the
barges. Before Sycamore’s had a chance to inspect, however, the
owner of three of the barges moved them to Kentucky. Sycamore’s
surveyor examined the five remaining breakaway barges on October
25, 2003, along with three barges IMT presented that were not
part of the breakaway. On November 4, the expert examined the
three breakaway barges that had been moved to Kentucky. Based on
the lack of apparent damage to the barges, he concluded there was
a “very remote possibility” one of the eight caused the damage to
the ship. Sycamore and IMT’s marine surveyors disagreed as to
whether the barges could have caused the damage.
Sycamore sued for damages, and prevailed in a bench trial

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before the district court. Issuing its ruling orally, the court
made a number of factual and legal findings. Critically for
present purposes, it said the following:
The Court is thus confronted with two unlikely
scenarios: (1) whether the GLOBAL SPIRIT I collided
with an unknown phantom object in the river instead of
the drifting IMT barges, as IMT contends; or (2) the
existence of a collision between IMT’s barges and the
vessel wherein no or very little apparent recent damage
occurred to any of IMT’s barges. The Court finds that
although both scenarios are seemingly unlikely, as a
matter of practicality, the latter is less unlikely
than the former, and thus probably occurred.
Arguing this remark demonstrates the application of an incorrect
legal standard to an admiralty tort, IMT appeals.
II.
Our review of admiralty actions tried without a jury is for
clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to questions of
law. Avondale Indus. v. Int’l Marine Carriers, 15 F.3d 489, 492
(5th Cir. 1994).
IMT argues that the district court applied the incorrect
legal standard, specifically substituting a “less unlikely”
standard for a more likely than not (i.e., preponderance) one.
In admiralty law, as a general matter, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the defendant’s negligence by a preponderance
of the evidence. Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1021
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court’s judgment that leaving
valve taped from inside did not create foreseeable risk of injury
to those attempting to open valve). IMT claims that the district

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1 It said “[t]his evidence clearly places the IMT barges and
the GLOBAL SPIRIT I at the same place and time that Captain Short
reported the collision. It is more likely than not that one of
IMT's fleet of drifting barges struck the ship” (emphasis added).
Later, the court reasoned that, “[b]ecause IMT produced no
evidence of any barge other than a rake-end barge that could have
caused the damage, the circumstantial evidence makes it more
likely than not that one of IMT’s rake barges that was drifting
in the river scraped the ship when it passed”(emphasis added).
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court’s remark–“The Court finds that although both scenarios are
seemingly unlikely, as a matter of practicality, the latter is
less unlikely than the former, and thus probably
occurred”–demonstrates the application of a standard less than
preponderance, specifically a “less unlikely” one. We disagree.
The district court applied the correct standard of proof,
preponderance. First, in at least two places, its order invokes
the standard directly.1
Second, the quotation on which IMT relies is not
inconsistent with the application of a preponderance standard.
The district court was in the process of responding to IMT’s
argument that it could not be held liable because its barges were
not damaged. Recognizing the validity of IMT’s premise that a
maritime accident with a 16,000-ton ship is unlikely not to cause
visible damage to a barge, it rejected the argument based on the
proximity of the barges to the ship, the absence of evidence of
other barges and the fact that Sycamore’s inspection was limited
by removal of three breakaway barges and replacement of them with
three ones that were not involved. The court recognized it was

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unlikely as a general matter that such a collision would not
cause visible damage, but concluded that the likelihood in this
particular case was that the ship collided with the IMT terminal
barges. This reading is consistent with its comment that
“although both scenarios are seemingly unlikely, as a matter of
practicality, the latter is less unlikely than the former, and
thus probably occurred.” IMT confuses a comment about the
general with a finding as to the particular.
Because the district court applied the proper legal
standard, its judgment is AFFIRMED.

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