Sheffield v. Trevino, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 28, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-40498
Summary Calendar
IAN DAVID SHEFFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROSE M. TREVINO; LT. DUNBAR;
CAPT. OWENS; TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; JANIE COCKRELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:03-CV-256
Before GARWOOD, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ian David Sheffield (Sheffield), Texas prisoner # 1130389,
appeals the summary judgment in favor of Rose Trevino (Trevino) on
his claim that Trevino violated various constitutional rights in
connection with classifying Sheffield as qualifying for DNA

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1 The district court granted Trevino’s motion for summary
judgment in its Order of Dismissal dated march 16, 2005. The court
entered final judgment of dismissal with prejudice on the same day.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “Limitation on recovery,” states: “No
federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury.”
2
collection.1 Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the trial court’s granting of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
See Mississippi River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174
(5th Cir. 2000).
As a threshold matter, any claims for monetary damages are
without merit as Sheffield has not alleged more than a de minimis
physical injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e);2 Harper v. Showers, 174
F.3d 716, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1999). However, as Sheffield seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, we consider his underlying
constitutional claims. See Harper, 174 F.3d at 718-19.
With respect to Sheffield’s “class of one” equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, the summary judgment
evidence shows that Trevino’s decision to register Sheffield for
DNA collection was motivated by a belief that Sheffield had been
convicted of compelling prostitution. Sheffield admits telling
Trevino that he had been in jail for compelling prostitution.
Accordingly, Sheffield has not shown that “an illegitimate animus

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or ill-will motivated [] intentionally different treatment from
others similarly situated and that no rational basis existed for
such treatment.” Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir.
2000), overruled on other grounds by McClendon v. City of Columbia,
305 F.3d 314, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2002). The district court did not
err in granting summary judgment on this point.
Sheffield also contends that Trevino was motivated by his
Muslim faith. Contrary to Trevino’s assertion, Sheffield asserted
this claim in the district court, albeit not until he filed his
objections to the magistrate judge’s report, and the district court
addressed it. Nevertheless, Sheffield failed to submit any
competent summary judgment evidence that Trevino ordered the DNA
collection based on any unconstitutional religious bias.
Sheffield’s conclusory and unsworn assertions that Trevino became
upset when he informed her that he was Muslim were insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, particularly given that they
conflicted with Sheffield’s prior accounts of his conversation with
Trevino, in which he failed to mention any religious motivation.
See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim.
Sheffield next contends that the DNA extraction violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. This claim is without merit in light of
our holding in Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir.
2003). See also Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411

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(5th Cir. 2004).
Sheffield also asserts that his Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment was violated. Sheffield’s vague
Eighth Amendment claims in the district court did not put the issue
sufficiently before the court. See Vela v. City of Houston, 276
F.3d 659, 678-79 (5th Cir. 2001). Further, he failed to allege or
demonstrate any injury or use of force sufficient to support an
Eighth Amendment claim. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193
(5th Cir. 1997).
Finally, Sheffield complains that the district court did not
address his claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1965. These claims
were first raised in a supplement to Sheffield’s objections to the
magistrate judge’s report. As the district court did not address
them, we assume that the district court exercised its discretion
not to allow Sheffield to amend his complaint to add these claims.
See United states v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).
Given the undue delay in bringing these claims, the fact that a
summary judgment motion was pending, and Sheffield’s failure to
show why he could not have brought the claims earlier, the district
court did not abuse its discretion. See Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 1992).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is

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AFFIRMED.

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