United States v. Endsley

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 29, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-41197
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TODD GLEN ENDSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CR-123
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Todd Glen Endsley appeals his convictions, following a jury
trial, of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of a listed chemical with intent
to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)(1); carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and two
counts of being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

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No. 05-41197
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The district court sentenced him to a total prison term of 120
months and a total supervised-release term of five years.
Endsley argues that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to suppress the results of a search and
seizure that followed a traffic stop of the pickup truck he was
driving on February 10, 2004. Specifically, he maintains that
whatever consent he gave to the search of his person was
“coerced” and was beyond the scope of the stop’s purpose, which
was allegedly only to investigate him for having “roll[ed]” his
truck through a stop sign. The suppression-hearing testimony
showed that an investigating officer received information from a
convenience store employee that on a weekly basis three men in a
white pickup truck were buying large quantities of
pseudoephedrine pills from the store. Surveillance of the store
on the morning of February 10, 2004, reflected that men later
identified as Endsley and his codefendant, Jason White, made a
purchase of pills. After Endsley took apparently evasive
maneuvers and exceeded the speed limit in his truck, the officer
finally stopped him for running a stop sign. After the officer
asked Endsley whether he was carrying any drugs or weapons, to
which Endsley answered in the negative, Endsley granted his
consent to a search of his person and of the pickup truck. The
pat-down search revealed a small cylinder containing
methamphetamine. The ensuing search of the truck revealed loaded
firearms, pseudoephedrine pills, and more methamphetamine.
We review a motion to suppress based on live testimony at a
suppression hearing by “accept[ing] the trial court’s factual

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No. 05-41197
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findings unless clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect
view of the law.” United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 704
(5th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
that prevailed below. United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293,
1314 (5th Cir. 1993). It is not disputed that the traffic stop
of Endsley’s truck was justified under the “reasonable suspicion”
prong of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under the second
prong of Terry, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that the scope of the search was
reasonably related to the reasons for the stop. See United
States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506-07 (5th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). That the officer asked questions unrelated to the traffic
stop itself did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 508.
The information provided by the convenience store employee, the
officer’s own surveillance on the morning of the stop, and
Endsley’s driving actions, his nervousness, and his evasive
answers made the officer’s request for consent to search a
reasonable one. See id. at 509 (questioning during a valid stop
may involved a “graduated response to emerging facts”). There is
also no evidence to suggest that Endsley’s consent was
involuntarily obtained. See United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d
609, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2905 (2005). We
affirm the denial of Endsley’s motion to suppress.
Endsley contends that the district court abused its
discretion in permitting the Government to present prejudicial
extrinsic-offense evidence, in violation of FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

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No. 05-41197
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See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc). Endsley refers specifically to two incidents to which
his codefendant White testified at trial: (1) an occasion when
Endsley allegedly pulled a gun on a man who he thought was
breaking into his house in order to steal something; and (2) an
incident in which Endsley pulled a gun on two brothers who were
methamphetamine customers. Endsley objected to White’s testimony
about the first incident, prompting the court to warn the
Government about the relevance of the evidence it was using.
Because the Government then abandoned its questioning regarding
this incident, the court’s handling of this testimony was not an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Walker, 410 F.3d 754,
759 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 633 (2005). The court
also did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence regarding
the second gun-pulling incident, which was relevant to show
intent and knowledge with respect to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
firearm charge and was intrinsic evidence to prove that Endsley
was attempting protect a conspiracy. See id.; United States v.
Peters, 283 F.3d 300, 313 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Endsley, 264 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2001), opinion modified on
other grounds, 309 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2002).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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