Connor v. Sonoco Products Co

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 13, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-41324
Summary Calendar
CHELSEA L. CONNOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:04-CV-280
--------------------
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Chelsea L. Connor, proceeding pro se, moves to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s grant of
Sonoco Products Company’s (Sonoco) summary judgment motion and
the dismissal of her civil complaint. Connor raised claims
against Sonoco under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Texas Labor Code, alleging that Sonoco terminated her
employment in retaliation for her filing a sexual harassment
claim and for exercising her rights under the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act.

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No. 05-41324
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A movant for leave to proceed IFP on appeal must show that
she is a pauper and that the appeal is taken in good faith, i.e.,
the appeal presents nonfrivolous issues. Carson v. Polley,
689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
After a de novo review, we conclude that the summary judgment
evidence indicated that Connor was terminated for failing to tell
her supervisor that she was leaving the plant and that said
failure was considered by Sonoco to be the last straw in a string
of incidents in which Connor had exhibited poor performance on
the job and had ignored her supervisors’ instructions. See
Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1994). Although
Connor may have been under the perception that she either did not
need to tell her supervisor that she was leaving the plant or
that she could tell any supervisor at the plant that she was
leaving, and not her immediate supervisor, Connor signed the
employee conduct policy that stated she could be terminated
without warning for leaving the plant without authorization, and
she was verbally advised to tell her supervisor if she left her
work area.
Moreover, the summary judgment evidence indicated that
Sonoco’s perception was that Connor was supposed to tell her
supervisor that she was leaving the plant and that Sonoco
considered such action important because it allowed the
supervisor a chance to find a replacement for the line.
Connor did not carry her burden of showing that she would not

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No. 05-41324
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have been fired but for her filing sexual harassment and workers’
compensation claims. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche,
190 F.3d 398, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1999); Haggar Clothing Co. v.
Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 386 (Tex. 2005).
Connor’s complaint also raised a claim of negligence;
however, as she has failed to address that claim on appeal, it
has been abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy
Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). As Connor also fails
to assert any error by the district court with respect to its
denial of the motions pending when Sonoco’s summary judgment
motion was denied and its denial of her August 15, 2005, motion
for new trial, her appeals from those rulings have also been
abandoned. Id.
Connor has failed to demonstrate that her appeal involves
nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the motion
for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED AS
FRIVOLOUS. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.
1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

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