United States v. Quevedo

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
August 8, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-50490
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
EDUARDO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
_______________
m 05-50493
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JUAN CARLOS DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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_______________
m 05-50494
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JONATHAN SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
_______________
m 05-50495
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
GERARDO RESENDIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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_______________
m 05-50496
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CRISTIAN FELIPE QUEVEDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
m 2:03-CR-253-2
_____________________________________
Before SMITH, GARZA, and CLEMENT,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Eduardo Hernandez, Juan Diaz, Jonathan
Sanchez, Gerardo Resendiz, and Cristian Que-
vado appeal the partial denial of their motion
to suppress, on Fourth Amendment grounds,
evidence obtained pursuant to the Border Pa-
trol’s roving stop of their vehicles on suspicion
of illegal smuggling activity. We affirm.
I.
On the morning of March 5, 2003, each of
the appellants, as well as two other defendants,
Michael Santoyo and Luis Alvarez, were
driving on highways in the vicinity of Dryden,
Texas. The vehicles operated by the
defendants were pick-up trucks, extended-cab
trucks, and SUV’s.
Border Patrol and Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“BICE”) agents
stopped each of the vehicles within fifty miles
of the Mexican border based on suspicious ac-
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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tivity they had observed.1 Between about 4:20
and 5:20 a.m. the agents watched the vehicles,
apparently operating in tandem, drive first to-
ward and then away from the border. Because
(1) the number of vehicles was highly unusual
for the normally-deserted roads in the area, es-
pecially given the time of day, (2) the vehicles
followed one another (approximately one mile
apart), making all of the same turns, (3) each
of the vehicles had a CB radio antenna (a
known characteristic of smuggling convoys),
(4) some of the drivers appeared to be spying
on or attempting to distract the attention of
law enforcement, and (5) the roads on which
the vehicles were traveling were notorious
drug- and alien-smuggling routes, the agents
eventually pulled each vehicle over and ques-
tioned each driver regarding his travel plans.
After learning the defendants’ identities, lis-
tening to their imprecise descriptions of their
travel plans, detecting a pungent body odor in
one of the vehicles, and discovering CB radios,
multiple cell phones, a tarp, and water jugs in
two of the vehicles,2 the agents became
convinced that the defendants were part of the
Nolasco-Resendiz Organization, an
alien-smuggling operation based in Houston
and known for employing tactics similar to
what the agents had observed.
Because of this suspicion, the agents, who
already had placed Resendiz and Sanchez in
patrol cars, took the keys from the remaining
defendants and placed them on the hood of
each car while defendants remained in their ve-
hicles. The agents then decided to take Re-
sendiz and Sanchez to the Sanderson Border
Patrol Station and, returning their keys, told
the remaining defendants to follow them there.
At the station, defendants were handcuffed to
their steering wheels. The agents led them
inside the station one at a time for further
questioning.
During questioning, Santoyo told the
agents that he and the others were in the pro-
cess of smuggling aliens that morning. San-
toyo also gave the agents the possible location
of illegal aliens that he and the other defen-
dants had dropped off on the side of the high-
way to avoid being caught by law enforce-
ment. A large group of aliens was subsequent-
ly found in the area Santoyo had specified.
Defendants were indicted for transporting
illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324
and aiding and abetting the same in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Santoyo pleaded guilty of
the first count of the three-count indictment,
charging him with aiding and abetting the il-
legal transportation of aliens in violation of
§§ 1324(a)(1)(a)(ii) and(a)(2). The remaining
1 The officers who observed the relevant activi-
ties and were involved in stopping the vehicles were
BICE special agent Adam Wilson, BICE criminal
investigator Armando Montes, Jr., and Border
Patrol agents Kelly Helms and Santiago Gonzalez.
At the time, Wilson had five and one-half years of
experience as a BICE agent, preceded by three
years of experience as a Border Patrol agent.
Montes had been a criminal investigator with BICE
for seven years, and before that was a Border
Patrol agent for six years. Gonzalez had been
employed by Border Patrol for fifteen years.
Helms had three years of experience as a Border
Patrol agent.
2 The validity of the initial search of the two
relevant vehicles, separate from the larger question
(continued...)
2(...continued)
of whether the stop of each vehicle was supported
by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, is
not an issue in this case.

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defendants, Hernandez, Diaz, Sanchez, Resen-
diz, Quevado, and Alvarez, filed a motion to
suppress all evidence against them, arguing
that the initial investigatory stops of their ve-
hicles were not supported by a reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity and that their con-
tinued detention constituted unlawful arrests
without probable cause. The motion sought to
suppress even the statements of Santoyo, who
neither joined the motion nor otherwise chal-
lenged his stop or arrest.
The district court granted in part and de-
nied in part the motion to suppress. The court
ruled that each initial stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion and that all information
discovered during those stops was therefore
admissible. The court also held that the sub-
sequent detentions of the defendants, starting
when Resendiz and Sanchez were placed in
patrol cars and the agents confiscated the car
keys of the remaining defendants, were unlaw-
ful arrests unsupported by probable cause.
The court ruled, however, that the movants
did not have standing to contest the admissi-
bility of Santoyo’s post-arrest statements be-
cause his arrest did not violate their Fourth
Amendment rights.
Hernandez, Diaz, Sanchez, Resendiz, and
Quevado subsequently entered conditional
guilty pleas, pending the outcome of their ap-
peal of any suppression issues. These defen-
dants now appeal the court’s ruling on the val-
idity of the initial investigatory stops and on
their standing to challenge the admissibility of
Santoyo’s statements. The government does
not appeal the court’s ruling regarding the un-
lawfulness of the continued detentions.
II.
“We use a two-tiered standard of review
for appeals from the denial of a motion to sup-
press: Factual findings are accepted unless
clearly erroneous, and the district court’s ulti-
mate conclusion as to the constitutionality of
law enforcement action is reviewed de novo.”
United States v. Jackson, 390 F.3d 393, 396
(5th Cir. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 917 (vacat-
ing judgment in light of Booker), judgment
reinstated, 138 F. App’x 632 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 317 (2005).
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unrea-
sonable searches and seizures’ by the Govern-
ment, and its protections extend to brief inves-
tigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall
short of traditional arrest.” United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “A United
States Border Patrol agent’s temporary deten-
tion of an occupant of a vehicle for investiga-
tory purposes while on roving patrol is consti-
tutional if, at a minimum, the agent reasonably
suspects that an occupant of the vehicles is in-
volved in illegal activity.” United States v.
Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th
Cir. 2001).
We agree with the district court that the ini-
tial stop of each defendant was supported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 884-85 (1975), the Court explained that
[a]ny number of factors may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is rea-
sonable suspicion to stop a car in the bor-
der area. Officers may consider the charac-
teristics of the area in which they encounter
a vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the
usual patterns of traffic on the particular
road, and previous experience with alien
traffic are all relevant. They also may con-
sider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver’s behavior
may be relevant, as erratic driving or

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obvious attempts to evade officers can
support a reasonable suspicion. Aspects of
the vehicle itself may justify suspicion . . . .
In all situations the officer is entitled to as-
sess the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
Given the wealth of factors that Border Pa-
trol and BICE agents are allowed to consider,
we would be hard-pressed to determine that
the actions of the agents in this case were un-
reasonable. The number, behavior, and char-
acteristics of the defendants’ vehicles, particu-
larly considering that the area in which they
were traveling was a notorious alien-smugg-
ling route, led the experienced agents to sus-
pect foul play. The agents in fact spent an
hour observing the defendants’ actions before
pulling the vehicles over, gathering enough in-
formation to allow what initially may have
been a mere hunch to grow into reasonable
suspicion.
We likewise agree with the district court
that the appellants lack standing to challenge
the admissibility of Santoyo’s statements on
Fourth Amendment grounds. As the district
court held, appellants cannot establish that
Santoyo’s statements were the fruits of their
own illegal arrests; rather, they were the fruits
of Santoyo’s separate arrest, which he has not
challenged. “Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights,” and “suppression of the prod-
uct of a Fourth Amendment violation can be
successfully urged only by those whose rights
were violated by the search itself, not by those
who are aggrieved solely by the introduction
of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and
codefendants have been accorded no special
standing.” Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 171-72, 174 (1969) (emphasis
added).
Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning and
conclusions of the district court’s thorough
order of June 4, 2004, and we AFFIRM the
partial denial of the motion to suppress.

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