Miller v. Barnhart

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 27, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-10664
Summary Calendar
_______________
CATHERINE J. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
m 4:04-CV-789
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Catherine Miller applied for disability insur-
ance and supplemental security income bene-
fits, but the Commissioner of Social Security
determined that Miller was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. Be-
cause the Commissioner’s decision is in accor-
dance with law, we affirm.
I.
Miller filed applications for disability insur-
ance and supplemental security income bene-
fits in 2000, alleging pain in her neck, shoul-
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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ders, and left hip; carpal tunnel syndrome; ma-
jor depression; panic disorder; and anxiety.
The Commissioner denied her applications.
A hearing was held before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) at which Miller, her hus-
band, a medical expert witness, and a voca-
tional expert witness testified. The ALJ re-
viewed the Commissioner’s decision and de-
termined Miller was not disabled, and the dis-
trict court affirmed.
As part of his determination, the ALJ gave
little weight to the opinion of Miller’s treating
physician, Charles Marable, that Miller was
disabled and could not work. The ALJ stated:
In reaching my conclusions, I have consid-
ered the opinions of Ms. Miller’s treating
physicians, including Dr. Marable, that the
claimant is disabled. I am familiar with Dr.
Marable in particular, and I know him to be
a constant advocate for his patients. Ac-
cordingly, I therefore carefully examine his
opinions and the remaining evidence in each
case. While I decide each case based on
the evidence before me, I am mindful that I
need to look closely at any opinion ren-
dered by Dr. Marable. In this case, I did
not find his opinions convincing or sup-
ported, to the degree he has found that the
claimant is unable to engage in any work
activity. Hence, I gave his opinions little
weight.
II.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to
deny social security benefits only to determine
whether the final decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and whether the proper legal
standards were used to evaluate the evidence.
Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir.
1999); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232,
236 (5th Cir. 1994). Miller argues the ALJ
erred by according little weight to Marable’s
opinion, claiming it should have been given
great weight because it was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Additionally, she urges that
the ALJ erred by using information outside the
record in determining the weight to accord
Marable’s opinion. Miller does not contend
that substantial evidence does not support the
Commissioner’s decision, so we review the de-
cision to determine whether it is in accordance
with law.
The ALJ did not err by according little
weight to Marable’s opinion; the ALJ’s deci-
sion was in accordance with law. Miller is
correct that treating physician’s opinions
should be given great weight. Martinez v.
Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (cit-
ing Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237
(5th Cir. 1994)). Also, “[a] treating physi-
cian’s opinion on the nature and severity of a
patient’s impairment will be given controlling
weight if it is ‘well-supported by medically ac-
ceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with other
substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2)).
We have distinguished, however, between
the weight given to a treating physician’s med-
ical opinion on the nature and severity of an
impairment and his opinion on whether the pa-
tient is disabled and cannot work. We do not
require that an ALJ justify a decision to give
little weight to a physician’s opinion that a pa-
tient is disabled or unable to work, because
such decisions are reserved for the Commis-
sioner. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620
(5th Cir. 2003). An ALJ need not give special
weight to treating physicians’ opinions if they
have no special significance. “Among the
opinions by treating doctors that have no

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special significance are determinations that an
applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work.’ 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). These determina-
tions are legal conclusions that the regulation
describes as ‘reserved to the Commissioner.’”
Id.
The ALJ gave little weight to Marable’s
opinions that Miller was disabled and unable to
workSSthe two opinions that Frank states
have no special significance and need not be
given any weight. The ALJ specifically ex-
plained that he gave little weight to Marable’s
opinion “that the claimant is disabled” and that
“the claimant is unable to engage in any work
activity.” Because Frank makes plain that an
ALJ need not give special weight to conclu-
sions about disability or ability to work, the
ALJ did not err. Even if Marable’s opinions
were supported by substantial evidence, as
Miller stresses, the ALJ was not required to
give them special weight.
Miller’s argument that she was prejudiced
because the ALJ looked to evidence outside
the record to reject Marable’s opinion on dis-
ability also fails. Even if the ALJ considered
an extrajudicial source, the consideration did
not result in a decision on the merits on that
basis, because the ALJ was not required to
give Marable’s opinion about Miller’s disabil-
ity any special weight and because disability is
an issue reserved for the Commissioner to de-
cide.1 Whether Miller was disabled was never
Marable’s question to answer.2
AFFIRMED.
1 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 583 (1966) (“The alleged bias and prejudice
to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case.”).
2 Miller cites Oshkeshequoam v. Barnhart, 274
F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (C.D. Ill. 2003), to support
her contention that she was improperly prejudiced
as a result of the ALJ’s bias. That court, however,
did not hold that an ALJ’s bias improperly preju-
dices an applicant. The court rejected the ALJ’s
finding that a treating physician was biasedSSit did
not even involve an ALJ’s being biased. See id.
(“ALJ Welsch reiterates ALJ Lipe’s statement that
Dr. Mack should not be found to be credible be-
cause he ‘tries to give his patients a break.’ How-
ever, there is no evidence in the record that Dr.
Mack is biased in favor of Plaintiff, other than the
fact that Dr. Mack has concluded upon his exten-
sive, long-care treatment of Plaintiff that she is
disabled.”).

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