Wells v. Williams, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 31, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-30796
Summary Calendar
KELVIN WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANN S. WILLIAMS; GINA LIDBERG; JESSICA GRIFFIN; GERLEENE YOUNG;
DEWITT; CHEYRL HAWKINS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:06-CV-247
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Before KING, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kelvin Wells is appealing the district court’s judgment
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, pursuant to FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) & (6), Wells’s pro se complaint raising civil
rights and state law claims. Wells does not contest the district
court’s dismissal of the claims against the defendants in their
official capacities pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, he
has abandoned that claim. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222,
224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

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No. 06-30796
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** Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
***District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983).
However, Wells argues that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint against the defendants in their
individual capacities based on qualified immunity. In dismissing
a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all
well-pleaded facts as true and review the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Willard v. Human Health Plan of
Texas, 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
“To determine whether the district court's grant of
qualified immunity to the individual officers was proper, we must
decide whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings, if accepted as true,
(1) conceivably state violations of clearly established
[constitutional] rights, and (2) allege conduct that is
objectively unreasonable.” Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161
F.3d 834, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1998).
If Wells’s allegations are accepted as true, they raise
possible constitutional claims of due process violations,
retaliation, and racial and sexual discrimination. It can not be
determined from the record whether the defendants’ actions were
objectively reasonable. The district court erred in dismissing
the complaint based on qualified immunity at this stage of the
proceeding.
Wells has not challenged the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint pursuant to the Rooker**-Feldman*** doctrine. Thus,

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No. 06-30796
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he has abandoned any challenge to the dispositive finding in the
case. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25. Nevertheless, the district
court correctly dismissed the complaint on that basis. See
Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th 1994).
Wells also has not challenged the district court’s decision
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claims. Thus, he has abandoned those claims on appeal. See
Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25.
AFFIRMED.

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