Sharon Enaill, and other similarly situated females; JOHN EDWARD JONES v. Cesar Benavides

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-41539
SHARON E NAILL, and other similarly situated females; JOHN EDWARD
JONES
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
CESAR BENAVIDES; RODRIGO RUIZ; MAYOR BETTY FLORES,
Individually and in her Official Capacity as Mayor for the City of Laredo; III
AGUSTIN DOVALINA, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chief for
the Laredo Police Department; GILBERT NAVARRO, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Assistant Deputy Chief for the Laredo Police
Department; THE CITY OF LAREDO
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:04-CV-00013
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Sharon Naill and John Jones appeal the jury verdict rendered
in favor of defendants Officer Cesar Benavides and Officer Rodrigo Ruiz.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 7, 2008
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

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No. 06-41539
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Plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims against the
City of Laredo. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
1. The plaintiffs argue that the jury’s verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence, entitling them to a new trial. Deloach v.
Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs claim that the jury erred by finding that they were
not seized when the officers pulled up in their cars in response to
the plaintiffs’ phone call for help. Individuals are “seized” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.” Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs testified that
they did not feel free to leave when the police officers pulled up.
Ruiz also wrote in his police report that he had parked his car next
to the plaintiffs’ car in such a way as to reduce the risk of flight.
But both officers also testified that the plaintiffs were free to leave
and that the plaintiffs could have by simply backing up. Moreover,
when the officers arrived, they were there at the plaintiffs’ request.
Given all of this, the jury could properly conclude that the plaintiffs
were not seized when the officers showed up.
Naills also complains that Ruiz had no reasonable suspicion
that she had committed a crime and thus had no basis to ask her
whether she had a gun when he approached her car. But Ruiz did
testify that when he approached Naills in her car—an action he took
because Naills had called and asked the police to come to
help—Naills appeared very nervous. Because of Naills’s nervous
appearance, he reasonably asked, for his own safety, if she had a

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No. 06-41539
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gun. Naills does not explain why a police officer is not entitled to
ask a citizen if she is armed after the citizen requests his assistance
and appears very nervous. Naills also complains that Ruiz did not
have probable cause to search the car. But Naills (who does not
have a concealed hand gun license) admitted to Ruiz that she had
a concealed hand gun, at which point Ruiz had probable cause to
believe that she had committed a crime—i.e., unlawful possession
of a hand gun.
Jones also complains that the jury’s finding that Benavides
justifiably detained him was against the great weight of the
evidence. Benavides did not detain Jones until after his partner
shouted out that Naills had a gun. Benavides was perfectly entitled
to temporarily detain Jones to preserve the status quo for safety
reasons until the intentions of the plaintiffs could be sorted out. See
Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1094–95 (5th Cir. 1997)
(noting that a search or arrest will not violate the Fourth
Amendment if it is justified by exigent circumstances, which include
situations where the officer reasonably believed that his safety, or
the safety of the general public, was at risk).
2. The plaintiffs complain that the district court used erroneous jury
instructions requiring reversal. “The district court has broad
discretion in formulating the jury charge, and we therefore review
the instructions with deference.” Deines v. Texas Dep’t of Protective
& Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in
submitting the “automobile exception” instruction to the jury
because the facts of the case did not support its inclusion. The
automobile exception allows police officers to conduct a warrantless

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No. 06-41539
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search of a car if the search is supported by probable cause.
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014 (1999).
The jury was properly instructed that if it found the plaintiffs were
not seized (which the jury did), the automobile exception could
apply.
Plaintiffs next argue that the jury was improperly instructed
on whether Benavides could temporarily detain Jones. Plaintiffs’
complaint seems to be that the jury should have been required to
find that Benavides could not detain Jones after Ruiz yelled the
police code word for gun unless Benavides had a reasonable belief
that Jones had committed a crime. The jury found instead that, in
the context of this case, Benavides had a reasonable belief that
Jones was a threat to his safety or the safety of someone else. That
is a correct statement of the law and under those circumstances,
Benavides was entitled to temporarily detain Jones. See Tamez, 118
F.3d at 1094–95. The jury instruction was therefore correct.
3. Plaintiffs also contend that the district court should not have
granted the City of Laredo’s motion to dismiss. In their initial
complaint, the plaintiffs attempted to hold the City liable for the
officers’ actions in violating their Fourth Amendment rights under
a theory of municipal liability. But to succeed on their theory of
liability, they had to prove that the officers violated their rights.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). Since the jury found that the
officers did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights, the plaintiffs would
have necessarily lost on their theory of municipal liability as well.
AFFIRMED.

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