United States v. Aguilar-Alvarez

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 4, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-50131
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
EDGAR BENJAMIN AGUILAR-ALVAREZ,
ALSO KNOWN AS EDGAR AGUILAR-ALVAREZ,
Defendant-Appellant
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
m 3:03-CR-1051-12
______________________________
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
A jury found Edgar Aguilar-Alvarez guilty
of knowinglypossessing marihuana with intent
to distribute. He appeals, arguing that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove he knew that
he possessed marihuana. Because the evi-
dence was sufficient, we affirm.
I.
Aguilar-Alvarez was driving a tractor-trail-
er rig that New Mexico Department of Trans-
portation inspectors searched in response to a
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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2
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
alert identifying the trailer as possibly trans-
porting drugs. The inspectors found mari-
huana hidden in cardboard boxes placed
among legitimate cargo.
The DEA sent the alert to other members
of law enforcement about the tractor-trailer
Aguilar-Alvarez was driving, because a DEA
agent observed the rig parked in front of a
warehouse the DEA had under surveillance.1
The tractor-trailer arrived at the warehouse
early in the afternoon of August 31, 2002, and
left about two hours later. No one testified at
trial that Aguilar-Alvarez was present at the
warehouse.
A transfer station inspector recognized the
tractor-trailer from the alert and informed Ag-
uilar-Alvarez that his vehicle would be in-
spected. Part of the inspection resulted in
normal, unsuspicious discoveries: The licence
for the trailer matched paperwork Aguilar-
Alvarez had provided; the cargo area was
sealed and undisturbed; and the manifest did
not suggest any criminal activity. Other as-
pects of the inspection, however, yielded sus-
picious results. Aguilar-Alvarez told the in-
spector he was coming from Los Angeles, but
in fact he was headed westbound. His log
books likely understated the time required to
travel different subsections of his trip to New
Mexico, and they did not contain the name of
the shipper. Further, Aguilar-Alvarez could
not provide the phone number of the company
for which he worked, 2 and he was not travel
ing the usual route from California to Wiscon-
sin.3 Finally, the tractor-trailer was very
cleanSSthe outside lacked the dirt, mud, and
bugs typical of a trip from Los Angeles to
New Mexico, and the inside lacked the usual
fast food trash, bedding, and maps.4
Aguilar-Alvarez consented to a search of
the trailer, where law enforcement officers
found plain cardboard boxes containing mari-
huana among other legitimate cargo listed in
the bill of lading. Aguilar-Alvarez stated he
did not know marihuana was there; he said he
was not present when the trailer was loaded;
he assumed it had been loaded before he began
his journey in California. Finally, he indicated
that he was at a truck station in the tractor-
trailer almost all day August 31, 2002SSthe
day DEA agents observed the trailer at the
warehouse they had under surveillance.
An indictment charged Aguilar-Alvarez
with conspiracy to possess marihuana with in-
tent to distribute it and knowingly possessing
marihuana with intent to distribute it. A jury
found him guilty of possession with intent to
distribute, but the district court declared a mis-
trial on the charge of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute. Aguilar-Alvarez ap-
peals, challenging the sufficiency of the evi-
dence that he had knowledge of the marihana.
II.
1 The agent identified Aguilar-Alvarez’s tractor-
trailer by the numbers on the front of the vehicle
and a design on the door.
2 Aguilar-Alvarez told law enforcement agents
(continued...)
2(...continued)
that he had just taken this job two days earlier.
3 Aguilar-Alvarez stated that his boss accompa-
nied him and instructed him to stop in El Paso so
his boss could pick up a vehicle to drive to McAl-
len, Texas.
4 Aguilar-Alvarez indicated he had not used the
truck stop’s car wash.

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3
We must decide whether any reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Ortega-Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir.
1998) (per curiam). Considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government,
we draw all reasonable inferences and credi-
bility choices in support of the verdict. Id.
The jury is free to choose among reasonable
constructions of the evidence, but if the evi-
dence tends to give equal or nearly equal cir-
cumstantial support to guilt and to innocence,
we must reverse, because a reasonable jury
would have reasonable doubt when the evi-
dence is essentially in balance. Id.
The government was required to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Aguilar-Al-
varez (1) knowingly (2) possessed marihuana
(3) with the intent to distribute it. United
States v. DeLeon, 247 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir
2001). Only the first element is at issue here.
Generally, a jury may infer knowledge of
the presence of drugs from the exercise of
control over a vehicle containing drugs. Unit-
ed States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911
(5th Cir. 1995). If the drugs are hidden in a
compartment, we normally require additional
circumstantial evidence that raises suspicion or
demonstrates guilty knowledge. Id. We rec-
ognize that in hidden compartment cases, there
“is at least a fair assumption that a third party
might have concealed the controlled substanc-
es in the vehicle with the intent to use the un-
witting defendant as the carrier in a smuggling
enterprise.” United States v. Diaz-Carreon,
915 F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1990). “This as-
sumption is heightened when . . . the vehicle is
a ‘loaner’ or has otherwise been in the posses-
sion of the suspect for only a short time.” Or-
tega-Reyna, 148 F.3d at 544.
We have held a various types of circum-
stantialevidence sufficient to prove knowledge
of contraband in cases involving drugs in hid-
den compartments, such as evidence of ner-
vousness, refusal to answer questions, and in-
consistent statements. See id. (summarizing
the various types of circumstantial evidence
sufficient to prove knowledge in hidden com-
partment cases). Specifically, a defendant of-
fering implausible explanations for the situa-
tion is sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support a conviction of knowingly possessing
drugs. E.g., United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d
600, 606 (5th Cir. 1994). A defendant’s de-
cision to lie to law enforcement officers can
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support an inference of guilty knowledge.
United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 465 (5th
Cir. 1999).
Aguilar-Alvarez offered implausible expla-
nations and lied to officers. This circumstantial
evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s infer-
ence that Aguilar-Alvarez knowingly pos-
sessed the drugs.
His claim that he was traveling from Los
Angeles is implausible under t he
circumstances. Not only was he headed in the
wrong direction, the tractor-trailer was clean,
lacking the characteristics of a long trip. More
importantly, he lied to officials about being in
his tractor-trailer on August 31, 2002; he said
he remained in the tractor-trailer all day Au-
gust 31, except for trips into the truck shop to
make purchases. DEA agents, however, iden-
tified the tractor-trailer as the rig that arrived
at the warehouse and spent several hours there
that afternoon.5 This circumstan
5 Unlike the situation in Ortega-Reyna, in which
we held the evidence of knowledge was insufficient
(continued...)

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4
tial evidence supports an inference of guilty
knowledge of drug possession.
AFFIRMED.
5(...continued)
because the circumstances permitted benign infer-
ences, here there is not “an equal and opposite
benign inference to be drawn” from Aguilar-Alvar-
ez’s lie. Ortega-Reyna, 148 F.3d at 545. Lying to
officials is not “at least as consistent with inno-
cence as guilt.” Id. at 546.

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