Shelter Insurance Co, et al v. Ford Motor Co

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 18, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-60295
Summary Calendar
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SHELTER INSURANCE COMPANIES; RICKIE CHADWICK; SANDRA CHADWICK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
m 2:03-CV-150
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Shelter Insurance Company and
Rickie and Sandra Chadwick appeal the exclu-
sion of the expert testimony of Stephen Miller
based on FED. R. EVID. 702 and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), and the district court’s decision to ex-
clude the testimony without conducting an in
limine hearing. Finding no abuse of discretion,
we affirm.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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I.
A fire destroyed much of the Chadwicks’
house and their cars, including a 1993 Lincoln
Town Car. Plaintiffs claim the fire originated
in the engine compartment of the Town Car,
which was manufactured by defendant Ford
Motor Company (“Ford”). The fire was start-
ed, plaintiffs allege, by a malfunction in the
Town Car’s speed control deactivation switch.
Plaintiffs cite Ford’s recall of all Town Cars
produced between November 4, 1991, and
November 30, 1992, at the Wixon assembly
plant for a probable defect in the speed control
deactivation switch that could cause fires while
the vehicle was not being used. The Chad-
wicks’ Town Car was built ten days after the
recall period, but plaintiffs contend that the re-
call dates were chosen at random by Ford.
Five claims are asserted: product liability, res
ipsa loquitur, negligence, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, and breach of the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.
The plaintiffs designated a fire cause and
origin expert who opined that the fire started
in the general vicinity of the Town Car. They
then designated Miller as an expert regarding
the specific cause and origin of the fire and the
allegedly defective nature of the speed control
deactivation switch; Miller stated that the fire
started at the Town Car’s switch and that the
switch was defective.
The court found that Miller based his opin-
ion on only two premises. First, Ford recalled
some Town Cars with defective switches.
Second, Ford and others have designed speed
control deactivation switches that do not cause
fires. The court found that Miller was quali-
fied to provide expert testimony on whether
the switch was defectively designed but that,
under rule 702 and Daubert, Miller was not
qualified to render an expert opinion on
whether the Town Car’s switch caused the
fire.
Miller had a great deal of experience as an
automotive technician, inspector, and instruc-
tor and had investigated approximately 190
fires. But the court found that such training
and experience qualified him to opine only
about potential causes of automobile fires
based on the mechanical and electrical systems
of the car. He did not have sufficient knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education
in fire science to render an expert opinion on
the actual causes of automobile fires. The
holding was based on Miller’s admissions that
he had no training or experience in fire science.
After Miller’s testimony concerning the
fire’s origin was excluded, the court granted
summary judgment for Ford. It found that the
plaintiffs’ case required a showing that, with a
reasonable scientific certainty, the Town Car’s
speed control deactivation switch caused the
fire and that without Miller’s testimony they
could not establish that fact. The plaintiffs
raise two issues on appeal: first, whether Mil-
ler’s testimony was improperly excluded; and
second, whether the court should have held an
in limine hearing before excluding the evi-
dence.
II.
The admissibility of expert testimony is
governed by rule 702, which requires courts to
ensure that expert testimony “rests on a reli-
able foundation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
Admissibility “is governed by the same rules,
whether at trial or on summary judgment.”
First United Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 96 F.3d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir.1996). Un-
der Daubert, district courts act as gatekeepers

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and ensure that expert testimony is sufficiently
reliable before it is admitted. In this role, the
court “must make a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology under-
lying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Bur-
leson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 393 F.3d
577, 583-84 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
We review the exclusion of expert testi-
mony under Daubert for abuse of discretion.
Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 243
(5th Cir. 2002). “Because a district court has
broad discretion in deciding the admissibility
vel non of expert testimony, we will not find
error unless the ruling is manifestly errone-
ous.” Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d
320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997)).
III.
The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion. To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs
had to demonstrate that the fire was caused by
the Town Car’s defective switch and, corre-
spondingly, that the fire originated at the
switch. The only testimony offered to prove
this fact was Miller’s expert opinion.
The court correctly found that Miller pos-
sesses impressive credentials and experience in
automotive mechanics and electrical systems.
But it also correctly found that he was not
qualified to opine about the precise cause of
the fire and the area of the car in which it or-
iginated. The court’s finding did not require
complex reasoning, because Miller, in deposi-
tion, repeatedly testified to his lack of experi-
ence in fire science.
When asked about the interpretation of
burn patterns, Miller replied that if one wanted
a “professional opinion,” he would want to
consult the plaintiffs’ fire origin expert, be-
cause “I’m not really qualified to do it,
butSSunfortunately, sometimes, we have to do
things we’re not qualified to do, and that’sSSif
this vehicle wasn’t inside a structure, oh, it
would be so much simpler.” Miller stated that
“I don’t have any fire science or anything like
that.” When asked whether his analysis on the
burn patterns and origin of the fire was sup-
ported by professional literature, he replied,
No. Just basically what I’ve seen when you
light a fire in the fireplace and things. I
justSSfire moves to oxygen. And, again,
that’s my opinion. I don’t have any exper-
tise in this. That’s just the way my lay-
man’sSSI was just trying to explain what I
thought I saw here. But, no, that may not
even be accurate as far as I know. You’ll
have to ask a fire person about that.
When an expert witness honestly and forth-
rightly testifies that he is not qualified in a par-
ticular area, it is not an abuse of discretion for
the court to find that the witness is unqualified,
under Daubert, to provide an expert opinion in
that area and to exclude such testimony.
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in deciding to exclude Miller’s testimony
about the fire’s origin.
IV.
In regard to their contention that an in lim-
ine hearing was necessary, plaintiffs do not
direct us to a single precedent from this court,
and none of the opinions they cite from other
courts is persuasive. One of those opinions
succinctly states the law: “An in limine hearing
will obviously not be required whenever a
Daubert objection is raised to a proffer of ex-
pert evidence. Whether to hold one rests in

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the sound discretion of the district court.” Pa-
dillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418
(3d Cir. 1999). Here the issue was thoroughly
briefed by both parties, and it was not an abuse
of court’s discretion to exclude the testimony
without first holding an in limine hearing.
AFFIRMED.

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