Campbell v. Novartis Phrm, et al

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60348

Margaret Campbell,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Novartis Pharmaceutical Company; Cherin M. Hall;
Kirt Talamo; Jacqueline S. Marinac; Kristin M.
Williamson,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 2:18-CV-116-KS-MTP

Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Margaret Campbell sued her former employer, Novartis
Pharmaceutical Company, and several Novartis employees (collectively,
“Defendants”), alleging state law claims arising out of the circumstances

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 25, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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that led to her resignation. The district court granted summary judgment
dismissing all claims, some of which Campbell appeals. We AFFIRM.
I.
Campbell worked for Novartis from 2013 to 2017 as a medical science
liaison (“MSL”), providing technical advice to medical professionals. She
claims that in early 2017, shortly after Novartis realigned its MSL territories
and assigned Campbell to a new team, co-workers began falsely accusing her
of bullying, intimidation, and failure to collaborate well with team members.
Supervisors put her on a “coaching plan” in June based on these complaints,
which she claims adversely affected her prospects for advancement within
the company. She resigned in August 2017, citing an “unresolved hostile
work environment.” She maintains that false and unsubstantiated allegations
of misconduct ruined her reputation and forced her out of the company.
Campbell sued Novartis and individual Defendants in Mississippi
state court, alleging numerous violations of state law. Novartis removed the
case to federal district court. Defendants later moved for summary judgment,
which the district court granted. Campbell timely appealed as to four of her
claims.
II.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Salinas v. R.A. Rogers, Inc.,
952 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper if the
movant shows he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is
no genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Such a dispute
“exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.’” Salinas, 952 F.3d at 682 (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). We may “affirm summary
judgment on any grounds supported by the record and presented to the
district court.” Id. (citation omitted).
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III.
Campbell appeals four claims: intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference
with employment, and breach of contract. We address each in turn.
A.
Campbell claims a triable fact dispute exists on her claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. We disagree. This tort requires conduct “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.” Bowden v. Young, 120 So. 3d 971, 980 (Miss. 2013)
(citation omitted). Relief depends on “the nature of the act itself—as
opposed to the seriousness of the consequences.” Id. (citation omitted). “A
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not ordinarily lie for
mere employment disputes.” Lee v. Golden Triangle Planning & Dev. Dist.,
Inc., 797 So. 2d 845, 851 (Miss. 2001) (citation omitted).
Campbell has not shown any evidence of conduct flagrant enough to
meet this high standard. On appeal, she points only to evidence that Novartis
team members (without identifying any individual Defendants) unfairly
reported her to the company’s H.R. department and used these allegations
to ruin her reputation within the company.
1
Even viewing this evidence in the
light most favorable to Campbell—and even assuming any alleged conduct
can be attributed to any Defendant—it does not reveal conduct sufficiently
“outrageous” and “extreme” to support an intentional infliction claim.
Summary judgment was therefore proper.

1
Campbell also pressed a defamation claim in the district court, but the court
granted summary judgment for lack of any specific evidence of defamatory statements.
Campbell does not appeal dismissal of that claim.
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B.
We likewise find no triable dispute on Campbell’s claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The district court correctly held that this
claim is barred against Novartis by the exclusive-remedy provision of the
Mississippi Worker’s Compensation Act (“MWCA”). “[F]or a tort claim
against an employer to fall outside the MWCA . . . the actions of the employer
[must go] beyond negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness.” Bowden,
120 So. 3d at 976. The MWCA’s remedy is exclusive unless “the employer
acted with an actual intent to injure the employee, with full knowledge that
the employee would be injured and with the purpose of the action being to
cause injury to the employee.” Id.; see also Petty v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care
Corp., 190 So. 3d 17, 25 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (applying Bowden to bar claim
of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Crawford v. Bannum Place of
Tupelo, 556 F. App’x 279, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2014).
As for the individual Defendants, Campbell has not identified
evidence of negligent acts by any of them.
2
Defendants argued in the district
court and on appeal that Campbell had produced no such evidence, and
Campbell has not pointed to any on appeal. Even viewing all evidence of
alleged false statements and human resource failures at Novartis in the light
most favorable to Campbell, this evidence does not connect her alleged
injuries to any of the individual Defendants’ conduct, negligent or otherwise.
Summary judgment was therefore proper as to those Defendants as well.

2
The district court granted summary judgment because Campbell had failed to
show physical manifestations of injury in connection with her emotional harm, but we may
affirm summary judgment “on any grounds supported by the record and presented to the
district court.” Salinas, 952 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted).
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C.
We also conclude summary judgment was properly granted on
Campbell’s claim of intentional interference with employment. To make out
that claim, Campbell must show: “(1) that the acts were intentional and
willful; (2) that they were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their
lawful business; (3) that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the
defendant (which constitutes malice); and (4) that actual damage and loss
resulted.” McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 976 (Miss.
2001) (citation omitted). In the first place, Campbell cannot maintain this
tort claim against Novartis, as a party to her employment contract, but only
the individual Defendants who are “strangers” to that contract. Cenac v.
Murry, 609 So.2d 1257, 1269 (Miss. 1992).
Against the individual Defendants, Campbell has failed to show
enough evidence of intentional tortious acts to create a genuine fact dispute.
3

On appeal, Campbell points only to a witness’s deposition testimony that
unspecified people “made . . . decisions to punish [Campbell] and wreck
[her] career opportunities at Novartis.” That witness also described
Campbell’s situation as “a colossal failure of human resources” but did not
name any of the Defendants in connection with her allegations.
4
This
evidence fails to create a fact dispute on whether any individual Defendants
committed “intentional and willful” acts “calculated to cause damage” to
Campbell’s employment. Summary judgment was therefore proper.

3
The district court ordered summary judgment because it found no dispute
whether Campbell had suffered actual damages, or whether she had alleged any specific
tortious acts. We find this second ground was sufficient and need not consider the first.
4
The witness did criticize the management decisions of Kathleen Murphy, who
was originally named as a defendant but dismissed before summary judgment.
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D.
Finally, we conclude summary judgment was proper on Campbell’s
breach of contract claim. Campbell alleges Novartis breached contractual
obligations by failing to follow policies set forth in an employee handbook.
5

Specifically, she claims Novartis allowed other employees to “harass and
defame her” and flouted its policies concerning investigation, conflict
resolution, and information privacy, all of which deprived Campbell of a
“safe working environment.” Even assuming Novartis acted contrary to
these policies, however, Campbell has failed to point to evidence that
Novartis agreed to be bound by them. To the contrary, these documents
themselves state that they apply only to “to all [Novartis] associates.”
Furthermore, implying that Novartis was contractually obligated to abide by
these policies would also contradict its express disclaimer that “[n]o . . .
statements, materials, or policies provided by Novartis are intended to, or
shall, alter the at-will nature of any employee’s employment with the
Company.” See, e.g., S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 299 So. 3d 752,
756–57 (Miss. 2020) (employee handbook did not create enforceable
employment contract). Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment of
Campbell’s breach of contract claim.
6

AFFIRMED.

5
Rather than a single handbook, Campbell has produced excerpts of several
different Novartis policy statements.
6
Campbell also claims that Novartis breached the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, but Mississippi law does not recognize such a duty in at-will employment
contracts. See, e.g., Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So. 2d 106, 110 (Miss. 1993).
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