United States of America v. Sandra Tyler

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1064n.06
No. 11-2436
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SANDRA TYLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: SUTTON and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; WELLS, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Sandra Tyler, a federal prisoner, appeals the sentence imposed by the district
court following her guilty plea to charges of making false entries and reports, misappropriation of
postal funds, and mail fraud.
Tyler was an employee of the postal service for twenty-five years. Over a ten month period,
on approximately fifty occasions, she filled out false refund forms, forged the signatures of some
regular customers, and took the money for her own use. This resulted in a loss to the postal service
of approximately $20,000.00. After she was fired, approximately $9,000.00 more in losses was
caused by Tyler’s filing of a false claim for unemployment benefits, in which she denied that she had
stolen the original amount and maintained that she did not know why she had been discharged.
The Honorable Lesley Wells, United States District Judge for the Northern District of*
Ohio, sitting by designation.

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No. 11-2436
United States v. Tyler
After accepting Tyler’s guilty plea, the district court held a sentencing hearing, at which it
determined that the guidelines sentencing range was eight to fourteen months. However, the district
court found that the other sentencing factors, particularly those of promoting respect for the law and
deterrence, justified an upward variance to twenty-four months. On appeal, Tyler argues that her
sentence is unreasonably long because of the percentage increase over the guidelines range.
We review criminal sentences for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). There is no presumption that a sentence outside the
guidelines range is unreasonable. Id.; United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.
2010). Nor do we apply a rigid mathematical formula using the percentage of departure from the
guidelines range. See United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 550 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2726 (2012).
Review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the district court correctly calculated the
guidelines range and then discussed the other sentencing factors, particularly the seriousness of the
offense, Tyler’s apparent lack of respect for the law, and the need for deterrence. The district court
also noted Tyler’s history, including her dysfunctional childhood, mental health issues, and lack of
criminal history. Where the court clearly considered the parties’ arguments and the relevant
sentencing factors, no abuse of discretion is apparent. See United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459, 470-
71 (6th Cir. 2008). No argument has been presented that would justify substituting our judgment
for the judgment of the sentencing court. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d
805, 811 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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