M.a.r. v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 14-3801
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
M.A.R.,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
FROM THE UNITED STATES
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. M.A.R., a citizen of Uzbekistan, petitions through counsel for review of
an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from an immigration
judge’s (IJ) decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
M.A.R. was born in Uzbekistan in 1984. She first entered this country in 2006 and returned
four times between then and 2009; she has remained here since that time. She applied for the
above relief and appeared before an IJ for a series of hearings on the merits of her application.
Members of her family also testified on her behalf. M.A.R. related that she had been employed
for a few months at a bank in Uzbekistan as a Korean translator when she noticed that the bank
and some local officials were embezzling money from Korean investors. She took her concerns
to management, which resulted in her firing. She then went to the authorities, but she had no proof
of her claim. She testified that those involved in the embezzlement then took a number of actions

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against her and her family, including vandalizing her father’s car, making threatening phone calls,
and causing problems for her parents at their jobs. The authorities eventually prosecuted many of
those involved in the embezzlement. M.A.R.’s cousin, who also worked at the bank, was detained
for approximately one month before being cleared of involvement.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the IJ found that M.A.R. was not credible and that her
application was frivolous. Moreover, he concluded that, even if her testimony could be credited,
she was not entitled to relief. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief but vacated the IJ’s finding
that the application was frivolous. In her brief before this court, M.A.R. takes issue with the
adverse credibility finding and reasserts the merits of her claims. This court granted her a stay of
removal pending the appeal.
M.A.R. first challenges the finding that her testimony was not credible. We review a
credibility determination to discern whether it is supported by substantial evidence, and we will
not reverse unless the evidence compels a contrary determination. Hachem v. Holder, 656 F.3d
430, 434 (6th Cir. 2011). There is substantial evidence in support of the negative finding in this
case. The most glaring example concerns the claim of the vandalism to her father’s car. At her
first hearing, M.A.R. testified that the car was vandalized after she left Uzbekistan for the United
States, and that she did not see the car after it was vandalized. At the end of that first hearing, the
IJ pointed out that this was contrary to her written application, which stated that the car was
vandalized the night that she went to the authorities with her story of embezzlement at the bank.
The IJ granted a continuance to allow M.A.R. to explain this discrepancy, among others. At the
second hearing, M.A.R.’s mother testified that M.A.R. was still in Uzbekistan when the vandalism
occurred. And at the third hearing, M.A.R. testified that she was there and saw the car after it was

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vandalized. This did nothing to explain her contrary testimony at the first hearing. The record
does not compel a finding that M.A.R.’s testimony was credible.
Moreover, even if her testimony could be credited, the evidence submitted by M.A.R. is
not so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite persecution
rendering her eligible for asylum. See Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). Persecution
is an extreme concept. Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2004). Nothing M.A.R. and
her family experienced qualified as persecution; she was therefore not entitled to a presumption
that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950
(6th Cir. 2004). Therefore, she was required to offer specific information showing a real threat of
persecution if she returns to Uzbekistan. Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007).
M.A.R.’s cousin was detained for one month before being cleared of involvement in the
embezzlement at the bank. M.A.R. should fear nothing worse, as she reported the scheme to the
authorities originally. Her family should fear no further reprisals, as they are now living in this
country, having obtained visas through the lottery. And M.A.R. does not have to return to her
hometown, where she can be connected to the embezzlement incident.
Having failed to establish her eligibility for asylum, M.A.R. cannot meet the higher burden
of establishing eligibility for withholding of removal, see El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 257
(6th Cir. 2009), or for protection under the CAT. Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 641 (6th Cir.
2005).
For all of the above reasons, we deny the petition for review.

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