United States of America v. Sharif Safwat Ezzat

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0295n.06
No. 15-2481
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SHARIF SAFWAT EZZAT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
BEFORE: BOGGS, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Sharif Safwat Ezzat appeals the sentence imposed by the district court
upon the revocation of his supervised release. We affirm.
On January 10, 2014, Ezzat began serving terms of supervised release for two
convictions: (1) a 2006 conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (E.D. Va. Case No. 1:05-CR-336); and (2) a 2012 conviction
for possession of contraband in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (E.D.N.C. Case
No. 5:10-CR-280). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
subsequently accepted jurisdiction over Ezzat’s supervised release. On October 29, 2015, the
probation office filed a petition for summons asserting that Ezzat had violated the conditions of
his supervised release by: (1) committing another crime, as evidenced by his nolo contendere
plea in state court to breaking and entering; and (2) using a controlled substance, as evidenced by

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United States v. Ezzat
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his positive test for cocaine. At the revocation hearing, Ezzat admitted to both violations. The
district court revoked Ezzat’s supervised release and sentenced him to concurrent 18-month
terms of imprisonment, allowing him to surrender voluntarily.
Ezzat appeals his sentence. We review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised
release under the same standard applied to sentences imposed following conviction. United
States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). Under that deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard, we review the district court’s sentencing determination for procedural and substantive
reasonableness. Id.
Ezzat contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court
failed to consider, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), whether the availability of appropriate
substance-abuse treatment programs warranted an exception from the requirement of mandatory
revocation for possessing a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). The district court
did not rely on § 3583(g)’s mandatory-revocation provision to revoke Ezzat’s supervised release,
however, stating, “I’m not even considering the drug test in this.” Instead, the district court
revoked Ezzat’s supervised release based on his breaking-and-entering offense. Even if the
district court had relied on § 3583(g)’s mandatory-revocation provision and Ezzat had requested
substance-abuse treatment, which he did not, there is no requirement that “magic words” appear
in the record indicating that the district court considered substance-abuse treatment in lieu of
imprisonment. United States v. Crace, 207 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 2000).
Ezzat also argues that the district court did not adequately explain why an alternative to
imprisonment, such as continuing his supervision, could not achieve the goals of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “As a reviewing court, our task is to ask whether, based on the entire sentencing
record, ‘we are satisfied that the district court fulfilled [its] obligation’ to ‘conduct a meaningful

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sentencing hearing and truly consider the defendant’s arguments.’” United States v. Taylor,
696 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 620 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir.
2010)). The district court specifically considered Ezzat’s request for continued supervision and
rejected his request based on the seriousness of his breaking-and-entering offense: “And I wish I
could see a path clear to giving you a chance, at least the chance that you want, but this crime is
too serious, and the violation is too serious. I can’t overlook it.”
Finally, Ezzat asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court did not address § 3583(d)’s exception to § 3583(g)’s mandatory-revocation provision and
did not sufficiently address the relevant § 3553(a) factors or explain why the sentence imposed
was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the goals of sentencing,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ezzat’s 18-month sentence fell within the policy-statement range of 18 to
24 months; therefore, we afford his sentence a rebuttable presumption of substantive
reasonableness. See United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2015). Ezzat has not
overcome that presumption. As discussed above, the district court did not rely on § 3583(g)’s
mandatory-revocation provision to revoke Ezzat’s supervised release, but instead based its
decision on his breaking-and-entering offense. The district court addressed the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors, including Ezzat’s characteristics and the seriousness of the offense and
determined that a sentence within the policy-statement range was appropriate.
The district court imposed a procedurally and substantively reasonable sentence.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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