Valerie D. Mason-Colwell v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0335n.06
No. 16-4312
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
VALERIE D. MASON-COLWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO
BEFORE: COOK, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Valerie D. Mason-Colwell appeals the district court’s judgment
affirming the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits.
In 2013, Mason-Colwell filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits, alleging that she became disabled on July 15, 2005.
After the Social Security Administration denied the applications, Mason-Colwell requested a
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ conducted a hearing and denied
Mason-Colwell relief. The Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district court
affirmed the denial of Mason-Colwell’s applications.

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On appeal, Mason-Colwell raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by giving
significant weight to the opinion of an examining psychologist but ignoring critical portions of
the opinion; (2) the ALJ erred by failing to include certain restrictions in her residual functional
capacity; and (3) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination concerning her
ability to walk, climb ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance.
“Our review of the ALJ's decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence exists if a
reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.
at 406. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions on each issue. Id.
Mason-Colwell first argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion of
examining psychologist Brithany Pawloski. In her narrative evaluation, Dr. Pawloski concluded
that Mason-Colwell’s self-reported data and presentation appeared to be reliable and that she
would have some limitation in her ability to understand and carry out instructions, complete
complicated tasks, and engage with coworkers and supervisors. Dr. Pawloski further concluded
that Mason-Colwell “would have difficulties appropriately coping with exposure to work and
would be at risk for further mental deterioration.” In her functional assessment, Dr. Pawloski
concluded that Mason-Colwell has marked limitation in her ability to carry out complex
instructions and make judgments on complex work-related decisions, but that she is otherwise
able to function satisfactorily, including in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work
situations and changes in a routine work setting, despite having some impairments. Mason-
Colwell contends that the ALJ erred by giving significant weight to Dr. Pawloski’s opinion while

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ignoring her conclusions that Mason-Colwell’s self-reports were reliable and that exposure to
work could damage Mason-Colwell’s mental health.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Pawloski’s opinion. The ALJ
was not required to accept Dr. Pawloski’s determination that Mason-Colwell is credible; that
issue is reserved to the Commissioner, see Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th
Cir. 2009), and the ALJ could reasonably credit Dr. Pawloski’s conclusions concerning Mason-
Colwell’s functional limitations without accepting as credible all of Mason-Colwell’s reports
concerning her impairments. In addition, the ALJ reasonably accounted for all of the significant
work-related functional limitations specifically identified by Dr. Pawloski by restricting Mason-
Colwell to routine work involving only simple work-related decisions and only occasional
changes in the work routine.
Mason-Colwell next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to include in her residual
functional capacity the need to take additional breaks, limitations on her ability to be exposed to
noise, and additional limitations regarding her ability to sit and stand. Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s declining to include the additional restrictions because: (1) no medical
opinions of record conclude that such restrictions are warranted; (2) the objective medical
evidence does not compel a conclusion that the additional limitations are necessary; and (3) the
ALJ discounted Mason-Colwell’s subjective complaints on the basis that she both inconsistently
reported her symptoms, and alleged functional limitations unsupported by the record medical
evidence.
Finally, Mason-Colwell argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
determination that she could walk three hours in an eight-hour workday and occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance. Substantial evidence does support the limitations at

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issue, given the uncontradicted opinions of examining physician Dr. Babatunde Onamusi, who
assessed the same limitations, and reviewing physicians Dr. Dimitri Teague and Dr. Rannie
Amiri, who assessed less restrictive walking and postural limitations, and the lack of objective
medical evidence supporting additional, necessary restrictions.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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