United States of America v. Spencer Troy Ward

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0097n.06
No. 17-2487
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SPENCER TROY WARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: KETHLEDGE, WHITE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In April 2016, Spencer Ward was indicted for several drug
crimes. As part of the indictment, the government sought a money judgment and forfeiture of real
property. A few months later, Ward was indicted again for dealing drugs while he was on pretrial
release. Ward ultimately pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or possess with
intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants and 100 or more kilograms of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). The government then moved for
preliminary orders of forfeiture, seeking a money judgment of about $475,000 and forfeiture of a
lot in Bruce Crossing, Michigan. Ward opposed both motions.
After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the
government’s forfeiture motions. The magistrate judge’s report told the parties that they had
fourteen days to file objections to the report and that failure to file timely objections would waive
the right to appeal to this court. Neither party objected during the fourteen-day window. The

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No. 17-2487, United States v. Ward
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district court then adopted the report and recommendation, and granted the government’s forfeiture
motions. The next month, the district court sentenced Ward to 150 months’ imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Ward challenges both the district court’s money judgment and the forfeiture of
the lot in Bruce Crossing. Ward concedes that he waived his right to appeal to this court when he
failed to object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Reply Br. at 2. He asks
this court to excuse his waiver, however, because his counsel allegedly provided ineffective
assistance. See United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 173 (6th Cir. 2011).
We usually hear ineffective-assistance claims through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
rather than through a direct appeal, because the district court is “the forum best suited to developing
the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation[.]” Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). Thus, a defendant generally “may not raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims for the first time on direct appeal[.]” United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756, 762
(6th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Ward offers no good reason to
depart from that rule here. Indeed, he concedes that he will be able to litigate his claim on collateral
review. And given “the limited record on direct appeal, ‘we have no way of knowing whether a
seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken
because the counsel’s alternatives were even worse.’” Id. at 763 (quoting Massaro, 538 U.S. at
505). We therefore decline to excuse the waiver here.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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