v. M.q., the student; N.Q. and J.Q., the student’s parents/guardians

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0046p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant (21-5556) / Appellee (22-5268),
v.
M.Q., the student; N.Q. and J.Q., the student’s
parents/guardians,
Defendants-Appellees (21-5556) / Appellants (22-5268).
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Nos. 21-5556/22-5268
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
Nos. 3:20-cv-00125; 3:20-cv-00173—Clifton Leland Corker, District Judge.
Argued: December 6, 2022
Decided and Filed: March 17, 2023
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Amanda Lynn Morse, KNOX COUNTY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Knox County,
Tennessee. Justin S. Gilbert, GILBERT LAW, PLC, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for M.Q., N.Q.,
and J.Q. ON BRIEF: Amanda Lynn Morse, KNOX COUNTY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for
Knox County, Tennessee. Justin S. Gilbert, GILBERT LAW, PLC, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
Jessica F. Salonus, THE SALONUS FIRM, PLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for M.Q., N.Q., and J.Q.
Ellen M. Saideman, LAW OFFICE OF ELLEN MARJORIE SAIDEMAN, Barrington, Rhode
Island, Selene A. Almazan-Altobelli, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND
ADVOCATES, INC., Towson, Maryland, for Amicus Curiae.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
DAVIS, Circuit Judge. M.Q., a student attending public school in Knox County,
Tennessee, and his parents (collectively, “M.Q.”) sued Knox County Schools (“KCS”) for
violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. They allege that KCS
improperly excluded M.Q. from the general education classroom setting and placed him in a self-
contained classroom1 for students with disabilities for nearly all his kindergarten academic
instruction. The district court held that this placement violated the IDEA but rejected M.Q.’s
claims that also it also violated Section 504 and the ADA. For the reasons outlined below, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I.
M.Q. is a child of tender years diagnosed with autism.2 M.Q. has developmental delays
in three key areas: (1) communication skills; (2) social/emotional behavior; and (3) prevocational
skills. He has had an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) in place since his preschool years
tailored to his individual education needs.
Communication. M.Q. is largely nonverbal, but he occasionally utters simple words and
phrases. This verbal limitation significantly curtails his ability to convey ideas, ask and answer
questions, and partake in age-appropriate activities. Dr. Charles Ihrig, a psychologist retained by
M.Q.’s parents, determined that M.Q.’s communication skills at five years old were comparable
to a child under two years old, placing him in the lowest one percentile of his peers. Still, M.Q.
has developed a communication style of his own in which he communicates his needs
1A self-contained classroom is a segregated setting, in that it only serves students with disabilities to the
exclusion of their typically developing or non-disabled peers. A regular education classroom is one in which less
than half of the students enrolled have IEPs.
2The events relevant to this case spanned the years of 2017 to 2020, when M.Q. was between the ages of
about four and six.

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nonverbally—including through physical gestures and purposive eye contact.3 He is also
learning to use an Augmentative and Alternative Communication (“AAC”) device to
communicate.
Social/Emotional. M.Q.’s interactions with others are characterized by his socially
withdrawn demeanor. Dr. Ihrig observed that it was difficult to personally engage M.Q., and that
his interpersonal skills at five years were similar to a ten-month-old’s. Notwithstanding these
obstacles, M.Q. does sometimes play with and work alongside his classmates, and “likes to
follow along with what his peers are doing.” He also more routinely interacts with familiar
adults.
Prevocational.4 M.Q.’s prevocational delays make it difficult for him to participate in
large groups and teacher-directed activities at school. He requires more supports than other
students to successfully engage in these kinds of tasks but demonstrates stronger skills during
self-selected activities and while working in small group settings. Calming sensory resources,
such as fidgets, also help M.Q. stay on task at school.
Despite the described challenges, M.Q. is a well-behaved and bright student by all
accounts. The district court noted that M.Q. is “compliant, cooperative, and responds well to
redirection.” Dr. Ihrig’s evaluation further showed that M.Q. “appears not to be cognitively
impaired”5 and comprehends much of what is communicated to him. Moreover, M.Q.’s
preschool performance showed that he has the capacity to learn and grow with respect to his
communication, social/emotional, and prevocational skills, as demonstrated by progress he made
on his IEP goals throughout preschool.
M.Q. was enrolled in KCS’s preschool program from 2016 to 2019. KCS initially placed
him in self-contained preschool classrooms during Academic Years (“AY”) 2016–17 and 2017–
3For instance, M.Q. uses a three-point shift in gaze to bring an adult’s attention to things of interest. This
involves looking at an adult, then to an object he wants (for example), and then back to the adult.
4Prevocational skills are “learning-to-learn skills . . . that you need to be ready to be in school and learn,”
such as the ability to follow a routine and stay on task.
5Dr. Ihrig couched this finding in the fact that it is not possible to comprehensively evaluate M.Q.’s
cognitive abilities given his delays in communication.

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18. In each year, M.Q. had an IEP tailored to his unique needs, and he made good progress
toward his IEP goals in AY 2017–18. When his IEP Team met in advance of AY 2018–19, it
determined that he would not be required to enroll in summer school (referred to as “Extended
School Year” or “ESY”). And his progress showed he could potentially benefit from a
mainstream setting. As a result, the Team decided to place him in an inclusive preschool
classroom beginning in August 2018. The Team established four IEP goals for M.Q. to work
toward in AY 2018–19 (the “2018–19 IEP”), each of which again targeted his communication,
social/emotional, and prevocational abilities.
In accordance with his IEP, M.Q. enrolled in a blended preschool classroom in AY 2018–
19 as planned. Following a general education curriculum designed to prepare students for
kindergarten, one teacher and two teaching assistants led classroom instruction. M.Q. attended
this program for 5.25 hours a day, three days a week. The classroom had many supports built-in
for all students, regardless of ability. KCS also provided M.Q. with a specific set of
accommodations, including: (1) push-in speech-language therapy,6 (2) push-in occupational
therapy, (3) visual supports (e.g., picture boards depicting discrete steps needed to complete a
task), (4) sensory supports (e.g., fidgets, weighted blankets, cube chairs), (5) adult cuing and
prompting (e.g., hand-over-hand physical assistance completing tasks), (6) multimodal
communication supports (e.g., training in the use of an AAC device and pictures as means of
expression), and (7) increased wait time.
The eight progress reports M.Q. received during AY 2018–2019 represent the full
universe of written data on his educational progress that year. He received a score on a scale of 4
to 6 for each of his IEP goals in every reporting period. A 4 meant that he achieved a particular
goal; a 5 meant that he was on track to do so; and a 6 meant that he was not expected to meet the
goal by the end of the IEP period. M.Q. received 5s on all his goals in each of his AY 2018–19
progress reports. In every reporting period, his educators also commented that M.Q. “is making
good progress toward his [IEP] goals,” or that he “continues to make progress toward his goals.”
6A push-in service is one provided within the general education classroom itself. Pull-out services, by
contrast, take students with disabilities into separate, self-contained locations. According to M.Q.’s expert on
inclusion, Dr. Kate MacLeod, best practice is to have student support services—like physical, occupational, and
speech-language therapy—push into the regular education setting.

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The IEP Team then met on May 15, 2019, to craft M.Q.’s kindergarten IEP (the
“Proposed IEP”) for AY 2019–20. A general education preschool teacher attended the meeting,
but no general education kindergarten teacher was present. The Proposed IEP generated during
this meeting contains two key pieces of information: M.Q.’s then present levels of performance
and KCS’s suggested kindergarten placement for M.Q.
M.Q.’s present levels of performance showed that he was still experiencing difficulties
due to his functional deficits—but that he had been improving. One key takeaway was that he
showed he could successfully engage with the general education curriculum when provided with
the appropriate supports. For that reason, the IEP Team again decided M.Q. did not need to
attend summer school leading into the next academic year.
The IEP Team also discussed M.Q.’s kindergarten classroom placement. KCS wanted to
place M.Q. in a general education class primarily for non-academic portions of the school day
and a self-contained special education classroom for the better part of his academic instruction.
KCS’s plan provided that:
(1) M.Q. would remain in his mainstream preschool classroom for the remainder
of AY 2018–19, which, by then was less than one week;
(2) In kindergarten, M.Q. would be mainstreamed for 2.25 hours per day;
specifically, during arrival, departure, lunch, recess, “encore” (music, art,
physical education, and library), and 15 minutes of “CARE” (a kindergarten
phonics program); and
(3) M.Q. would attend a comprehensive development classroom (“CDC-A”) for
4.75 hours each day for all core academic content7 (excluding the 15-minute
phonics lesson mentioned above).
The CDC-A program where M.Q. would spend most of his time is a self-contained setting which
caters to children with disabilities spanning various ages and grade levels. KCS explained that in
view of his significant developmental delays, M.Q. would especially benefit from the small
group explicit instruction, play-based curriculum, and slow pace of the CDC-A program. In
contrast, KCS believed that the general education kindergarten class would be too fast-paced and
academically driven for M.Q.
7Here, core academic instruction includes English/Language Arts, math, science, and social studies.

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M.Q.’s parents objected to the CDC-A placement and instead wanted him to remain in
the regular education classroom full-time with the aids and services he needed. M.Q.’s mother
pointed out that he made great progress during his time in general education preschool and that
he thrived when challenged. His parents ultimately refused to sign off on the Proposed IEP.
After the May 2019 IEP meeting, M.Q.’s parents requested a due process hearing with
the Tennessee Department of Education. They charged that KCS’s proposed placement in the
CDC-A classroom deprived him of the right to be educated in his least restrictive environment
(“LRE”) under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA. An ALJ heard the case in December 2019
and concluded that (1) the CDC-A classroom proposed for M.Q.’s kindergarten year was not his
LRE and thus violated the IDEA; and (2) M.Q.’s claims under Section 504 and the ADA were
pretermitted as duplicative given his success under the IDEA.
KCS petitioned the district court to review the ALJ’s LRE ruling. For his part, M.Q.
objected to the ALJ’s determination on his Section 504 and ADA claims. The district court
affirmed the part of the ALJ’s decision finding an IDEA violation but overturned his conclusion
that M.Q.’s Section 504 and ADA claims were pretermitted. But it ultimately overruled M.Q.’s
objection on the merits, explaining that M.Q. failed to show how KCS discriminated against him
in crafting his IEP. The parties then brought the present appeals, which were consolidated for
our consideration here.
II.
District courts review state administrative IDEA determinations under a “modified de
novo” standard. L.H. v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 900 F.3d 779, 790 (6th Cir. 2018). This
standard of review requires district courts to independently re-examine the record and make
determinations based on a preponderance of the evidence. Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln
Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] court cannot simply adopt the state
administrative findings without an independent re-examination of the evidence.”); see L.H.,
900 F.3d at 790; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (establishing the preponderance of the
evidence standard). That said, district courts must also give “due weight” to ALJs’ findings.
L.H., 900 F.3d at 790. Giving “due weight” entails (1) setting aside those findings only where

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“the evidence before the court is more likely than not to preclude the administrative decision
from being justified based on the agency’s presumed educational expertise, a fair estimate of the
worth of the testimony, or both”; and (2) deferring to the ALJ on matters involving educational
expertise. Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 567. In turn, this court reviews the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. L.H., 900 F.3d at 791; Deal v. Hamilton
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 850 (6th Cir. 2004).
III.
The IDEA provides states with funding for special education services in return for their
pledge to provide students with disabilities a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). A FAPE includes “specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique
needs of a child with a disability” along with support services “required to assist a child . . . to
benefit from” that instruction. Id. § 1401(9), (26), (29). The IDEA requires states to deliver
FAPE through individualized educational programs, or IEPs, tailored to the needs of each
eligible student, id. § 1414(d), which are drafted by various stakeholders on an IEP Team, see id.
§ 1414(d)(1)(B) (requiring IEP Teams to include “not less than 1 regular education teacher of
such child,” among other individuals). IEPs must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v.
Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). To maximize the benefits of mainstreaming students, states must also
provide FAPE in the “least restrictive environment” possible. Id. § 1412(a)(1), (5). The IDEA’s
LRE requirement is set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), which reads:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are [to be]
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability
of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. (emphasis added). Determining a student’s LRE requires the school district to consider
several factors, including the student’s instructional needs as well as the extent to which the
student would benefit from a self-contained learning setting. L.H., 900 F.3d at 789. These

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considerations are counterbalanced by the statute’s mandate to integrate students with disabilities
and their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate. As a result, certain classroom
placements that appear to offer superior academic services to students with disabilities may,
nevertheless, be deemed unsuitable learning environments because they unnecessarily remove
those students from general education. Id. (“[I]n some cases, a placement which may be
considered better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide
for mainstreaming.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV.
A.
KCS first challenges the district court’s finding that it violated the IDEA’s procedural
requirements by failing to include a general education kindergarten teacher on M.Q.’s IEP Team.
Courts “strictly review” IEPs for compliance with the IDEA’s procedures, although “technical
deviations will not render an IEP invalid.” Deal, 392 F.3d at 854 (quoting Dong ex rel. Dong v.
Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty. Schs., 197 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 1999)). And we afford
greater deference to school districts’ IEP determinations when the procedures outlined in the
IDEA have been followed. Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 566 (quoting Dong, 197 F.3d at 800). One
such IDEA procedure provides that IEP Teams must include at least one regular education
teacher when the student is to participate in a regular education classroom for any part of the
school day. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii). This regular education teacher “should be a teacher
who is, or may be, responsible for implementing a portion of the IEP, so that the teacher can
participate in discussions about how best to teach the child.” 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,477 (Mar.
12, 1999). If a child has multiple general education teachers, the IEP Team still need only
include one of them. Id.
The May 2019 IEP Team included a general education preschool teacher. M.Q. argues
that the Team should have included his general education kindergarten teacher since the
Proposed IEP was to be implemented in the kindergarten setting. KCS counters that it sufficed
to include any one of M.Q.’s general education teachers on the IEP Team. The district court
reasoned that:

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Although the presence of a kindergarten teacher may have been preferable under
the regulations, a procedural violation only constitutes denial of FAPE when it
results in substantive harm. Deal, 392 F.3d at 854. There is no evidence in the
record to suggest that [the preschool teacher’s] presence resulted in substantive
harm. Therefore, [1] the absence of a general education kindergarten teacher does
not entitle M.Q. to relief under the IDEA. Nonetheless, [2] [KCS’s] failure to
satisfy the procedural requirements reduces the deference afforded to its
placement decision.
(Emphasis added). KCS contends that the court’s conclusion is internally inconsistent because it
held that the composition of the IEP Team did not violate the statute yet proceeded to reduce its
deference to KCS as if it had in some way erred. KCS urges the court to overturn this
conclusion of law.
The district court correctly found that KCS complied with the statutory requirements—
albeit under their most literal interpretation. See Deal, 392 F.3d at 854 (noting we must “strictly
review” for procedural exactness). IEP Teams must include at least one general education
teacher who will be responsible for “implementing a portion of the IEP.” Here, although the IEP
Team ostensibly met to plan for M.Q.’s kindergarten year, the Proposed IEP also included
provisions for the remainder of M.Q.’s preschool year. As a practical matter, barely a week
remained in the school year; the IEP Team met on May 15, 2019, and the last day of school (i.e.,
the end date of the IEP for that academic year) was May 23, 2019. Nonetheless, M.Q. was still
enrolled in preschool at the time and his general education preschool teacher was present at the
IEP meeting—a fact M.Q. does not dispute. As such, KCS satisfied the letter of the law by
having someone “responsible for implementing a portion of the IEP” attend the meeting.
64 Fed. Reg. at 12,477 (emphasis added). While it might have been preferable to have a
kindergarten teacher present at the meeting, there was no procedural violation in failing to do so
here.
Since the composition of the IEP Team did not violate any procedure, KCS’s placement
decision should not have received reduced deference—it in fact should have been afforded more
deference. Dong, 197 F.3d at 800 (“If the procedural requirements of the IDEA are met, greater
deference is to be afforded to the district’s placement decision.”). Even granting KCS greater
deference, however, after independently reviewing the administrative record and the district

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court’s ultimate conclusions, we find that any error on this point was harmless. This is because
greater deference does not mean complete deference and as discussed more fully below, the
district court’s decision was firmly supported by expert testimony credited by the ALJ, the facts
relating to M.Q.’s progress in school, and applicable law. See, e.g., L.H., 900 F.3d at 795
(declining to defer to the school district on an LRE issue where the school’s proposed placement
was one “that the IDEA was designed to remedy, not encourage or protect”); Berger v. Medina
City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2003); Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d
1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting the due weight that must be afforded to state administrative
proceedings).
B.
KCS next argues that the district court failed to independently re-examine the record
which, in its view, led to several erroneous factual conclusions. We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error. E.g., L.H., 900 F.3d at 791; Deal, 392 F.3d at 850.
KCS first takes issue with the district court’s finding that M.Q. made progress on his IEP
goals in the general education preschool setting. It argues that the finding rested on
misconceptions that (1) the sole measures of M.Q.’s IEP progress were his eight progress
reports, and (2) M.Q. received a score of five for all goals in each progress report that school
year. KCS’s arguments on this score are unavailing and we find no clear error. As an initial
observation, the district court never opined that the sole measures of M.Q.’s progress were the
scores in his progress reports, although the ALJ and the court did find that data persuasive. And
regarding those scores, the record shows that M.Q. did receive 5s on all goals in his AY 2018–19
progress reports, with no 4s or 6s appearing anywhere on the progress reports. KCS’s suggestion
of error, therefore, appears off-base on this point. Moreover, the progress report scores are
consequential data points—not only because they represent M.Q.’s ability to make progress
under his IEP, but also because his lead teacher assigned those scores. That is to say, the person
most familiar with M.Q.’s classroom performance consistently found that he was on track to
meet his goals, and consistently awarded him 5s. The court was right to consider this valuable
information and it was within the court’s discretion to weigh this data heavily in its analysis, to
the extent it did so. See e.g., L.H., 900 F.3d at 790, 794 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C))

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(explaining district courts’ role in weighing the preponderance of the evidence contained in the
record as a whole and this court’s subsequent review for clear error); Deal, 392 F.3d at 849–50
(same); Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001)
(same).
Relatedly, KCS broadly maintains that the district court erred by overlooking material
evidence. It argues that the court fixated on the numeric portions of M.Q.’s progress reports
while eliding, for example, his educators’ substantive feedback on his classroom performance in
those same reports. But KCS makes no effort to illuminate how the facts the district court
allegedly disregarded would contribute to a finding of clear error. Nor does it point to any
authority requiring the court to explicitly walk through every material piece of evidence in the
record in its decision. As earlier noted, the modified de novo standard of review required the
court to re-examine the record and make findings of fact based on the preponderance of the
evidence. Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 567. We find that the court fulfilled this obligation, and that
its ruling did not merely rely on the numeric scores in M.Q.’s progress report scores alone.
Indeed, the court gleaned facts from various parts of the administrative record which
demonstrated, among other things, that (a) M.Q.’s developing communication skills (as
described in the Present Levels of Performance sections of his 2018–19 and Proposed IEPs, and
in the 2018–19 IEP’s meeting notes) “show[ed] his capacity to improve” in general education;
(b) M.Q. improved at socializing and interacting with other students (as reflected in his progress
reports and the 2018–19 and Proposed IEPs); (c) M.Q.’s IEP Team, populated mostly by KCS
staff, determined (and documented in the 2018–19 and Proposed IEPs) he did not need to attend
summer school because of his demonstrated progress in preschool; and (d) the IEP Team
intended to enroll M.Q. in a fourth day of preschool if three days of attendance each week was
insufficient for his needs (which it noted in the 2018–19 IEP’s meeting notes), but he never was
enrolled in an additional day of school. These, and other, observations made by the district court
belie KCS’s claim that the district court failed to independently reexamine the administrative
record and instead narrowly focused on M.Q.’s progress report scores. Consequently, we find

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that the court did not clearly err in finding that M.Q. made progress on his IEP goals in the
general education classroom.8
Next, the district court determined that the supports and services M.Q. would receive in
the CDC-A classroom could also be provided in a mainstream setting. KCS argues that the
district court “ignored the fact that all [KCS] staff testified that the services M.Q. needs to make
appropriate progress could not be provided in [the] general education classroom full-time,”
resulting in clear error. (Emphasis in original). KCS submits that, properly considered, the
balance of evidence demonstrates that M.Q. requires too much support to be integrated into
regular education kindergarten due to its (1) fast-paced, academics-oriented curriculum, as well
as its (2) relatively large class sizes, which would lead to (3) uncontrollable environmental
distractions.
KCS’s argument sounds a lot like a claim of impracticality. We have held that a school
district cannot prevail in an LRE case merely on the grounds that it believes mainstreaming is
“impossible, impractical, or counterproductive” because “the situation became challenging.”
L.H., 900 F.3d at 794–95 (adding that “the IDEA was designed to remedy, not encourage or
protect” school districts’ “unwilling[ness] or [inability] to properly engage in the process of
mainstreaming” simply because “they deemed it futile or useless in light of [the student’s]
disability”). In Roncker, we similarly explained that “[t]he perception that a segregated
institution is academically superior for a handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic
disagreement with the mainstreaming concept.” 700 F.2d at 1063.
KCS’s position seems to conflict with these tenets. It posits that mainstreaming M.Q.
would essentially redefine the general education classroom—emphasizing that “the
[k]indergarten classroom itself cannot be modified enough to meet M.Q.’s specific needs.” Yet
KCS concedes that many of the supports M.Q. requires can be provided in general education. Its
own employees’ testimony bears this out. For instance, Elizabeth Taylor (M.Q.’s preschool
teacher) and Jennie Sullivan (occupational therapist) agreed that regular classrooms can cater to
8KCS raises an additional argument that the district court was “under the mistaken impression that progress
reports align with the academic year.” Even if that is true, it does not establish any erroneous findings of fact
relevant to this appeal.

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M.Q.’s use of an AAC device. Taylor added that a paraprofessional and push-in speech and
language therapist could be integrated into the mainstream setting for M.Q. And according to
Amanda Dye (KCS’s Preschool Program Facilitator), M.Q.’s need for visual and sensory
supports can also be accommodated in the regular education setting. KCS witnesses Taylor,
Sullivan, and Nicki Nye (a KCS special education program supervisor) similarly testified that
educators can adapt kindergarten’s fast-paced and academics-focused curriculum for students
with disabilities by providing them with adult prompting and additional time to complete tasks,
among other things.
Dr. Kate MacLeod, M.Q.’s expert on special education and inclusion, likewise opined
that none of M.Q.’s indicated supports and services (including his AAC device, visual supports,
and fidgets) were only capable of being provided in a separate program like the CDC-A
classroom. She emphasized that educators sometimes must think creatively to provide students
the supports they need. An apt example of this is when Dr. MacLeod addressed KCS’s concerns
about class size (and to some degree, by extension, its other two concerns as well). She
suggested that instead of segregating M.Q. from the regular education setting, KCS could utilize
small group instruction, explaining:
[I]f we are really working from inclusive best practices and really good teaching
practices [in the kindergarten through grade 12 school system], we are thinking
about designing lessons from the start . . . so that students have access to small
groups, access to multiple means of representation of that content, of engaging in
that content, and then showing what they know. And often that lends itself to
small group settings. And small groups can be teacher led. They can be led by
paraprofessionals. They can be student directed. So there’s lots of ways that we
can think about small group [learning] that does not necessarily mean you have
to be in a segregated, self-contained setting [to gain the benefits of a small
learning environment].
(Emphasis added). This recommendation is particularly fitting for M.Q., since his teachers
believe he does best in small groups and one-on-one instruction. Dr. MacLeod also raised the
possibility of placing M.Q. in a co-taught kindergarten classroom led by one special education
teacher and one general education teacher. She highlighted that this arrangement creates
opportunities for small group work led by each teacher. Dr. MacLeod offered still other ideas,
including the option of providing M.Q. a paraprofessional in the regular classroom. She

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envisioned that the paraprofessional could help provide M.Q. redirection, prompts, and AAC
device support.
KCS never quite grapples with these aspects of Dr. MacLeod’s testimony. Instead of
explaining why small group instruction within the regular education classroom would not suffice
for M.Q., for example, KCS doubles down on the notion that it would be impossible to
mainstream M.Q. full-time under any circumstances. Neither the ALJ nor the district court was
persuaded by this position. When juxtaposed with Dr. MacLeod’s testimony (along with Taylor,
Sullivan, Dye, and Nye’s), KCS’s stance hews closer to an unwillingness to mainstream M.Q.
largely because it will be difficult to do so. But KCS’s hesitancy or self-perceived inability to
“properly engage in the process of mainstreaming” M.Q. is not enough. See L.H., 900 F.3d at
795. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the supports M.Q. requires could
adequately be provided in a mainstream setting. Therefore, its factual finding stands.
KCS next challenges the district court’s findings that M.Q. “began interacting with other
students” and that he “built up to mostly parallel play” in preschool. According to KCS, these
statements incorrectly reflect a conclusion that M.Q. grew to regularly engage with his
classmates in AY 2018–19, whereas in reality, he only occasionally welcomed peers into his
space. This argument also misses the mark. The district court did not conclude that M.Q.
regularly interacted with other students. Rather, the court described M.Q.’s progression from
solitary to parallel play (which, it explained, involves playing in the same area as other children
but not directly with them). The IEP Team’s notes from the 2018–19 IEP and Proposed IEP
directly state as much. The court made no error here.
Finally, KCS contends that the district court should have weighed hearing testimony
differently. It argues that the court placed too much weight on the testimony of M.Q.’s expert
witnesses, Dr. MacLeod and Dr. Ihrig. It insists that its own witnesses were more familiar with
M.Q. and his classroom needs, as well as with the resources available within the school district.
Accordingly, their opinions should have carried the day.
This argument lacks merit. To the extent the court (and the ALJ before that) found
M.Q.’s evidence more persuasive than KCS’s, it did not clearly err in so doing. See, e.g., Woods

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v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968, 974 (6th Cir. 2012) (Table) (“Our prior opinions make
clear . . . that deference is due to the [Independent Hearing Officer]. The district court was not in
a position to give deference to the [school district’s] professionals and the [ALJ], whose findings
are in conflict.”). As this court explained in L.H., under similar circumstances:
The crux of this argument is that the district court should have deferred to the
opinions of [the school district’s] teachers and staff because they had spent far
more time with [the student] and were more familiar with his academic record and
individual idiosyncrasies, so they knew best how he should be educated. If the
law were that a court must defer to the opinions of those who spend the most time
with the student and presumably know him best, then there would be no place for
experts. . . . [And t]aking [the school district’s] argument to this ultimate end, the
district court would actually defer to the student’s parents, who surely know the
student the best, regardless of any expertise.
L.H., 900 F.3d at 794. We thus concluded that the school district came “nowhere close to
showing any clear error” in the district court’s findings of fact merely by arguing that the
student’s expert testimony was unpersuasive. Id. This reasoning applies with equal force here.
Finders of fact have wide latitude in making credibility determinations. It was well within the
district court’s discretion to give weight to certain experts’ opinions and not to rely on the
opinions of others. See, e.g., Deal, 392 F.3d at 851–52; Metro. Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Guest, 193
F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir. 1999) (district court did not err where it considered all the testimony and
credited the witnesses it deemed most persuasive). Its decision will not be disturbed on this
ground.
KCS further argues that because Dr. Ihrig is not qualified as an expert on LRE or the
IDEA, the district court should not have given his testimony more weight than KCS employees’
testimony. But LRE is a non-academic restriction on IEPs that does not require educational
expertise, L.H., 900 F.3d at 789—so Dr. Ihrig’s comparatively limited expertise on educational
matters did not necessarily diminish the value of his testimony in this case. Moreover, Dr. Ihrig
has conducted thousands of student evaluations to aid school districts in making placement
decisions. The district court properly considered Dr Ihrig’s input in this case, and it was not
clearly erroneous for it to credit his testimony over that of other witnesses.

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C.
KCS next asserts that the district court failed to consider whether the Proposed IEP would
have satisfied the IDEA’s substantive FAPE requirement. But this argument is not well-taken as
it seems to conflate or confuse the issues. M.Q. does not contest that the Proposed IEP would
have provided him a substantive FAPE. The question here is whether a substantive FAPE could
have been furnished to him in a less restrictive setting than the one proposed by KCS. Cf. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (setting forth students’ right to be mainstreamed to the maximum extent
appropriate). This is a separate and independent ground on which a court may invalidate an IEP.
Cf. L.H., 900 F.3d at 789 (“[I]n some cases, a placement which may be considered better for
academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide for mainstreaming.”)
(quoting Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063). Thus, we deny KCS’s appeal on this ground.
D.
Finally, we turn to the issue of M.Q.’s LRE. The ALJ and district court both found that
KCS violated the IDEA’s mandate to educate M.Q. in the LRE—meaning, “alongside non-
disabled children to the maximum extent appropriate.” McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 671–72 (6th Cir. 2003); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.114(a)(2)(ii). LRE determinations present mixed questions of law and fact which this
court reviews de novo. Knable, 238 F.3d at 764.
A school may remove a disabled student from the regular class only when one of the
following factors applies: (1) the student would not benefit from regular education; (2) any
regular-class benefits would be far outweighed by the benefits of special education; or (3) the
student would be a disruptive force in the regular class. L.H., 900 F.3d at 789 (citing Roncker,
700 F.2d at 1063). Additionally, where a segregated setting is considered “superior” to the
regular classroom, the court must ask whether “the services which make that placement superior
could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting”; if they can, then “placement in the
segregated [environment] would be inappropriate under the [IDEA].” Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063
(further noting that this framing “accords the proper respect for the strong preference in favor of
mainstreaming”). We recently reaffirmed this tenet in L.H., explaining that a classroom likely to

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deliver great academic benefits to a student might nonetheless be unsuitable if it unnecessarily
removes him from the mainstream setting. 900 F.3d at 789.
The parties agree that only the second factor is at issue here: whether the educational
benefits M.Q. would gain from being mainstreamed would be “far outweighed” by the benefits
of the CDC-A classroom.9 We first consider why KCS believes that the CDC-A classroom is
superior to general education for implementing virtually all of M.Q.’s academic instruction.
Here, KCS treads old ground. It reiterates that the reality of M.Q.’s needs—e.g., his need for
repetition, limited distractions, slow instructional pace, and small group settings—would prevent
him from making appropriate progress in the regular kindergarten classroom. It posits that the
CDC-A classroom is ideal because it has fewer students, moves at a slower pace, and builds in
time for students to develop adaptive skills like toileting.
Undoubtedly, certain aspects of the CDC-A classroom are promising for M.Q. No one
disputes that he does best in small group settings, for instance, and all agree that he has
significant needs. But our inquiry must go further, asking whether the services “which make [the
CDC-A] placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting.” Roncker,
700 F.2d at 1063. The answer emerges from our earlier discussion of findings based on the
administrative record. The record demonstrates that M.Q. succeeded in a blended classroom
environment with the use of supplementary aids and services. Dr. MacLeod also found that the
Proposed IEP contains no goals that necessarily require M.Q. to pursue them in a self-contained
classroom. And KCS’s Preschool Program Facilitator, Dye, concurred that “every one of
[M.Q.’s IEP goals] could be worked on” in the general education setting. The district court
therefore permissibly determined that a regular kindergarten class could be modified to provide
M.Q. the resources he needs—even if it could not fully mimic the preschool environment in
which M.Q. succeeded. This conclusion survives even if it requires KCS to exercise some
creativity (e.g., by implementing co-teaching or introducing a paraprofessional to the classroom).
9There is no dispute that M.Q. could benefit from some form of mainstreaming; this is partly evidenced by
the fact that the Proposed IEP places M.Q. in general education for about a third of the school day. And KCS
concedes that M.Q. presents no disruptive behavioral issues.

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And it is no argument to say that mainstreaming is “impossible, impractical, or
counterproductive” simply because “the situation [is] challenging.” L.H., 900 F.3d at 794–95.
Portions of Dr. MacLeod’s opinion also warrant further attention here.10 She underscores
the non-academic benefits M.Q. stands to gain in regular education—a relevant consideration,
given M.Q.’s IEP goals concerning his interpersonal and self-regulation skills. See L.B. ex rel.
K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 978 (10th Cir. 2004) (ruling that a special education
classroom was not the LRE for a student whose “primary needs involved improving her social
skills,” because the mainstream setting would “provide[] [her] with appropriate role models” and
“was generally better suited to meet [her] behavioral and social needs”). For example, Dr.
MacLeod calls attention to the fact that integration exposes students with disabilities to non-
disabled students as a matter of course. In turn, non-disabled students serve as role models of
age-appropriate communication, social/emotional, and prevocational skills for children like M.Q.
who have delays in these areas. By contrast, she opined that the CDC-A setting proposed by
KCS would potentially include children who are not suitable peer models for M.Q., such as older
students (up to fifth grade) who may exhibit more mature language and advanced behavioral
issues than students of kindergarten age.
Dr. MacLeod elaborated on how the Proposed IEP could stifle M.Q.’s development in
other ways. She explained that children who move in and out of the mainstream setting—or who
are only present at times like lunch and recess—are often perceived by other students as
“visitors.” This hampers their ability to “develop meaningful and authentic relationships” with
their classmates. Such a scenario might pose a challenge to M.Q.’s communication goals since
children generally socialize with the peers they see the most throughout the day. Compounding
this issue is the fact that M.Q.’s classmates may have trouble communicating with M.Q. via his
AAC device without sufficient time to practice at it. These considerations point up the many
benefits that M.Q. would gain from regular education.
10Dr. MacLeod is the only expert in this case characterized by the ALJ as “steeped in the field of inclusion
of students with disabilities in the regular education setting.”

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As to the question of whether the CDC-A program’s purported benefits “far outweigh”
those of the regular classroom, for all the reasons discussed, we find they do not.
An independent review of the record demonstrates that KCS placed M.Q. in a more restrictive
educational setting than his disability required. The Proposed IEP therefore cannot stand. The
district court correctly reached this conclusion, and we affirm its judgment.
V.
In his appeal, M.Q. argues that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to his
Section 504 and ADA claims. Having reviewed the issue de novo, L.H., 900 F.3d at 791, we
conclude that the court properly applied the law.
While the IDEA guarantees individually tailored special education services to students
with disabilities, Section 504 and the ADA prohibit discrimination against individuals with
disabilities more broadly. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 170–71 (2017)
(noting that there is “some overlap in coverage” among these laws). As relevant here, however,
both Section 504 and the ADA contain provisions that echo IDEA’s LRE requirement.
Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This prohibition applies to public schools that receive
federal financial assistance. Id. § 794(b)(2)(B). The Attorney General promulgated
implementing regulations requiring states to educate students with disabilities alongside their
non-disabled peers “to the maximum extent appropriate.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (adding that
students with disabilities must remain in the general education environment absent a showing
that they cannot be satisfactorily educated there despite provision of supplementary aids and
services). Section 504 further requires states to assure “meaningful access” to their programs by
making reasonable accommodations as may be necessary. See Doe ex rel. K.M. v. Knox Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 56 F.4th 1076, 1087–88 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
301 (1985)).

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Subsequently, Congress enacted the ADA partly to combat discriminatory segregation of
individuals with disabilities from the rest of society. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). In service of this
goal, Title II of the ADA—which was modeled after Section 504, McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist.
4J, 976 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2020)—provides that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also id. § 12131(1) (defining “public entity” as any State or
local government and its agencies). Its implementing regulations provide that public entities
“shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to
the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). “The ‘most
integrated setting’ is one ‘that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled
persons to the fullest extent possible.’” Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health,
979 F.3d 426, 459 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592
(1999)). Moreover, the ADA requires public entities to make reasonable modifications to their
policies, practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i); see also Doe, 56 F.4th at 1087 (“The key word in this regulation
(modification) ‘connotes moderate’ (not significant) change.”) (citing Sandison v. Mich. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)).
“Claims brought under the ADA and Section 504 generally are evaluated together.”
M.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs., 720 F. App’x 280, 287 (6th Cir. 2018); see also S.S.
v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2008) (adding that they are considered in tandem
because “the reach and requirements of both statutes are precisely the same”) (quoting Weixel v.
Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 n.6 (2d Cir. 2002)); Waskul, 979 F.3d at 459–60 (same).
Plaintiffs must establish each of the following elements to prevail under either law:
(1) The plaintiff is a “handicapped person” under the [law]; (2) The plaintiff is
“otherwise qualified” for participation in the program; (3) The plaintiff is being
excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits of, or being subjected
to discrimination under the program solely by reason of his handicap; and (4) The
relevant program or activity is receiving Federal financial assistance.

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G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. Bd. of
Educ. of Centerline Sch. Dist., 58 F. App’x 162, 165 (6th Cir. 2003)).
The parties dispute only the third element. As the district court correctly noted, this
prong asks whether a public entity discriminated against an individual on the basis of his
disability. See G.C., 711 F.3d at 635. In the education context, a showing of discrimination
requires evidence of something more than a school district’s failure to provide a FAPE. S.S., 532
F.3d at 453. A plaintiff may allege disability discrimination under two available theories:
intentional discrimination and failure to reasonably accommodate. Wilson v. Gregory, 3 F.4th
844, 859–60 (6th Cir. 2021); Marble v. Tennessee, 767 F. App’x 647, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2019);
Roell v. Hamilton Cnty., 870 F.3d 471, 488 (6th Cir. 2017); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City
of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2004). An intentional discrimination claim lies where
the defendant treated someone less favorably on account of his disability; “[p]roof of
discriminatory motive is critical.” Brooklyn Ctr. for Psychotherapy, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins.
Co., 955 F.3d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609
(1993)); see also Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 818 (6th Cir. 2020). To
prevail in a failure-to-accommodate claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant reasonably
could have accommodated his disability but refused to do so, Keller v. Chippewa Cnty., Mich.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 860 F. App’x 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2021), and that this failure to accommodate
“imped[ed] [his] ability to participate in, or benefit from, the subject program,” Campbell, 58 F.
App’x at 166. The plaintiff must establish both that his preferred accommodation was
reasonable, and that the accommodation provided to him was unreasonable. Doe, 56 F.4th at
1088 (citing Campbell, 58 F. App’x at 166). Courts are mindful of school administrators’
educational expertise in reviewing the reasonableness of their selected accommodations. Id.
(citing Campbell, 58 F. App’x at 166–67).
M.Q. argued before the district court that he suffered discriminatory segregation in
violation of Section 504’s LRE provision, 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a), and the ADA’s integration
mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The court denied M.Q.’s claims, finding no evidence of
discrimination. Specifically, it determined that KCS did not engage in intentional discrimination

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and that the CDC-A classroom represented a reasonable accommodation for M.Q.’s special
education needs.
On appeal, M.Q. asserts that the district court confused the law. However, he does not
argue that KCS intentionally discriminated against him. And he makes only a conclusory
statement in his reply brief that KCS’s failure to place him in his LRE was an inherently
unreasonable accommodation. Critically, there is no precedent for this proposition. In framing
the issue as he has, M.Q. fails to grapple with existing law establishing that KCS must provide
reasonable accommodations for his learning deficits—not the best accommodations or his
preferred accommodations. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (“[W]hile a grantee need not be required
to make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be
required to make ‘reasonable’ ones.”); Keller, 860 F. App’x at 386–87 (finding that plaintiff
received a reasonable modification, albeit not the one he preferred); Campbell, 58 F. App’x at
166–67 (explaining that whether parents’ preferred placement would have been “superior” to the
school district’s chosen placement had no bearing on whether the latter reasonably
accommodated the student’s needs) (citing Dong, 197 F.3d at 800). There are certainly case-by-
case arguments to be made that unduly restrictive classroom placements fail to reasonably
accommodate students’ needs—and this decision is not meant to close that door. Cf. Anderson v.
City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 356 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that reasonable accommodation
claims demand a highly fact-specific inquiry). But M.Q. has not adequately developed any such
argument here.
Instead, M.Q. takes a different approach. He argues that KCS’s failure to appropriately
mainstream him constitutes a distinct form of discrimination under Section 504 and the ADA
because both laws impose affirmative duties to integrate students with disabilities. In other
words, M.Q. maintains that LRE violations are a distinctly cognizable form of discrimination
under Section 504 and the ADA, that exists in addition to traditional intentional discrimination
and failure-to-accommodate theories of liability. This novel argument cannot withstand scrutiny.
For one thing, M.Q. adduces no legal support for his proposition. And we have previously held
that it is not enough for students to allege that their schools failed particular duties imposed by
Section 504 and ADA to successfully state a claim. G.C., 711 F.3d at 635 (“[M]erely asserting

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that the defendants failed to meet certain obligations under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
various regulations is insufficient to succeed on a Rehabilitation Act claim.”). Rather, it remains
the plaintiff’s burden to satisfy each element in the multi-prong standard for such actions as set
forth above. Id. It was therefore M.Q.’s responsibility to demonstrate how KCS intentionally
discriminated or failed to reasonably accommodate him through the Proposed IEP. E.g., id.;
Roell, 870 F.3d at 488. M.Q. provides no legal basis for us to depart from this well-established
legal framework.
Finally, the parties’ briefing raised a question of whether plaintiffs in the education rights
context must show that a school district exercised bad faith or gross misjudgment to establish
liability under Section 504 or the ADA. This additional element for education-related claims has
percolated over the years, stemming from the Eighth Circuit’s pre-ADA decision in Monahan v.
State of Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982). The Monahan court opined that Section 504
does not create general tort liability for educational malpractice, adding that “[w]e think . . . that
either bad faith or gross misjudgment should be shown before a [Section] 504 violation can be
made out, at least in the context of education of handicapped children.” Id. at 1170–71. At least
one panel of this court has echoed that requirement. See Campbell, 58 F. App’x at 167. And the
district court in this case approached its analysis with Monahan and its progeny in mind. M.Q.
argues that no such showing of bad faith or gross misjudgment is required, and there is support
for this position. Among other things, outside of the education context, the ADA unequivocally
does not limit its protection to instances of intentional discrimination, but instead extends to
cases involving decision making that unintentionally results in exclusion as well. See Ability Ctr.
of Greater Toledo, 385 F.3d at 904–13 (explaining that the ADA “prohibits public entities from
denying, even unintentionally, qualified disabled individuals meaningful access to the services
and benefits they provide”). It is thus hard to square a standard requiring bad faith or gross
misjudgment, in all cases involving students’ educational rights, with statutory protection that
reaches even the unintentional denial of services. Additionally, requiring students with
disabilities to prove bad faith or gross misjudgment—including for mere injunctive relief in the
form of reasonable accommodations, for example—would impose an impossibly high bar for
many plaintiffs. Moreover, Monahan considered the notion of a bad faith element in the context
of deciding plaintiffs’ claims for damages. And its dicta reflected that court’s concern with not

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judicially expanding school districts’ tort liability under Section 504. Monahan, 687 F.2d at
1169–70. Thus, to the extent that students must plead bad faith or gross misjudgment to state a
Section 504 or ADA claim, Monahan appears to suggest that this heightened requirement applies
only where money damages are sought—and not necessarily to claims seeking only injunctive
relief, as was the case here. Ultimately, however, we need not reach the issue of bad faith or
gross misjudgment because M.Q.’s claims fail at an earlier point; he fails to show he suffered
any form of discrimination.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of M.Q.’s claims under Section 504 and
the ADA. Because M.Q. fails at this threshold inquiry, we decline to reach the separate question
of whether expert fees are available under these statutes at the remedies stage.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s rulings as to M.Q.’s claims
under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA.

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