United States of America v. Roy Edward Brownlee

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0234n.06
No. 22-2166
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROY EDWARD BROWNLEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
O R D E R
Before: GIBBONS, ROGERS, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
Roy Edward Brownlee, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) and § 401 of the First Step Act
of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Brownlee moves the court for leave to file a
supplemental brief. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination,
unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the reasons
that follow, we deny Brownlee’s motion to file a supplemental brief and affirm the district court’s
order.
In September 2016, a federal jury convicted Brownlee of conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846, distributing controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), three counts of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), two counts of dealing in firearms without a license, in
violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(a)(1)(A), and two counts of attempted distribution of controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court determined that Brownlee was an
armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1 based
on prior convictions in Michigan for assault with intent to cause bodily harm less than murder,

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No. 22-2166, United States v. Brownlee
delivery of marijuana, and delivery of cocaine. In February 2017, the district court sentenced
Brownlee to a total term of 360 months of imprisonment. We affirmed. United States v. Brownlee,
716 F. App’x 472, 474 (6th Cir. 2017).
In May 2022, Brownlee moved the district court to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(1),
arguing that § 401 of the First Step Act invalidated his prior convictions as § 924(e) and
career-offender predicates. The district court concluded that Brownlee was ineligible for a
reduction in his sentence because he was sentenced before the effective date of the First Step Act,
December 21, 2018. Further, the court found that § 401 did not affect Brownlee’s designation as
an armed career criminal. The court therefore denied Brownlee’s motion.1 This timely appeal
followed.
On de novo review, see United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 778 (6th Cir. 2020), we
conclude that the district court correctly determined that Brownlee was ineligible for a reduction
in his sentence. Section 401 of the First Step Act amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B) so that
now a drug offender must have a prior conviction for a “serious drug felony or serious violent
felony” rather than a “felony drug offense” to receive an enhanced sentence. United States v.
Brown, No. 20-6409, 2022 WL 2135265, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 2022); United States v. Wiseman,
932 F.3d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 2019). But § 401 does not apply retroactively to defendants, like
Brownlee, who were sentenced before the effective date of the Act. United States v. Tomes, 990
F.3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 780 (2022); Wiseman, 932 F.3d at 417.
1 In the same order, the district court denied an earlier compassionate-release motion that
Brownlee had filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in which he sought a sentence reduction based on the
COVID-19 virus and his underlying medical risk factors. Brownlee has not briefed this issue,
however, so we conclude that he has abandoned it. See Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738, 751
(6th Cir. 2020). In his motion to file a supplemental brief, Brownlee states that he addressed his
compassionate-release issues in a separate brief, which he believes was lost in the prison mailroom.
Brownlee does not explain why he was prevented from presenting all of his issues in a single brief,
however. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(a), Brownlee was limited to a single
appellate brief. See United States v. Fontana, 869 F.3d 464, 473 (6th Cir. 2017). We do not excuse
pro se litigants from complying with such straightforward procedural rules. In re Edwards, 748
F. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we deny Brownlee leave to file a supplemental
brief.

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No. 22-2166, United States v. Brownlee
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order and DENY Brownlee’s motion
to file a supplemental brief.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

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