SAMUEL JOHNSON and JILL JOHNSON, in their individual capacities v. Kathy Griffin, in her individual capacity

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0240p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SAMUEL JOHNSON and JILL JOHNSON, in their
individual capacities,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
KATHY GRIFFIN, in her individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 23-5257
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:22-cv-00295—William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: October 17, 2023
Decided and Filed: October 31, 2023
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; COLE and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Todd V. McMurtry, HEMMER DEFRANK WESSELS, PLLC, Fort Mitchell,
Kentucky, for Appellants. Michael J. Grygiel, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Albany, New
York, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Todd V. McMurtry, J. Will Huber, HEMMER DEFRANK
WESSELS, PLLC, Fort Mitchell, Kentucky, Lyndsay C. Smith, SMITH, PLC, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellants. Michael J. Grygiel, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Albany, New
York, Adam Siegler, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Los Angeles, California, Robb S. Harvey,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. Geoffrey M. Pipoly,
BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Curiae.
SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COLE and THAPAR, JJ.,
joined. COLE, J. (pp. 10–13), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Kathy Griffin, a California-based celebrity and social activist,
sent a series of tweets to her two million Twitter followers asserting that Tennessean Samuel
Johnson, the CEO of Tennessee-based VisuWell, had engaged in homophobic conduct. She
encouraged her followers to make him “online famous” and tagged his company. She then asked
his employer to “remove[]” him from the Board of Directors and threatened that the “nation
w[ould] remain vigilant” if it did not. Within a day of her first tweets, the company fired
Johnson and removed him from the Board. Johnson and his wife sued Griffin in federal court in
Tennessee, claiming (among other things) that she tortiously interfered with his employment.
Griffin argued that her tweets did not subject her to the State’s personal jurisdiction, and the
district court dismissed the case. We disagree and reverse.
I.
On April 24, 2021, Samuel Johnson sat down for dinner at a hotel in Franklin, Tennessee.
Shortly after, a group of forty to fifty teenagers began taking prom pictures nearby. The
boisterous teenagers apparently disturbed Johnson and other customers, prompting him to ask the
chaperone to settle them down. One of the teens, who was wearing a red prom dress, overheard
the request and confronted Johnson, all while his boyfriend filmed the interaction. The video is
not a picture (or record) of clarity. But at a minimum, it captures Johnson saying that the student
in the red dress “look[s] like an idiot.” Kathy Griffin (@kathygriffin), Twitter (Apr. 26, 2021,
1:45AM), https://twitter.com/kathygriffin/status/1386556994560020481?s. And at a minimum,
it captures the boyfriend trying to goad Johnson into reacting still more negatively to the
student’s attire. Johnson left the hotel to have dinner somewhere else.
The boyfriend posted the video to his TikTok account. TikTok deleted the clip soon
after. But other users downloaded it and reposted it to social media sites, including Twitter. The
clip came to the attention of VisuWell’s Board chairman, who assured Johnson that the company
would stand by him.

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That situation changed starting at 1:45 in the morning of April 26, when Kathy Griffin
retweeted the clip to her two million followers. It came with this comment: “If this is Sam
Johnson in Nashville, Tennessee, the CEO of @VisuWell, healthcare-tech-growth strategist,
married to Jill Johnson where they may reside in Franklin, Tennessee, it seems like he’s dying to
be online famous.” R.1 at 15, ¶ 81. Below the tweet is the video accompanied by this caption
(apparently not supplied by Griffin): “Homophobic POS [piece of s***] in Tennessee harasses a
teenager for wearing a dress to prom.” Id. at 15–16, ¶¶ 77, 81–82. As with other incidents in
which Griffin has “doxed” individuals by accusing them of bad behavior and posting their
addresses and workplaces on the internet, her tweet identified Johnson as a Nashville-based
“healthcare-tech-growth strategist” and the CEO of VisuWell. She also tagged VisuWell, which
meant that the tweet went directly to VisuWell and which enabled her readers to link directly to
the company’s profile if they wanted to add their two cents. When the boyfriend tweeted at
Griffin within the hour to express his thanks for taking his video “viral,” she replied that she was
“grateful” he had filmed it and offered to do “anything” she could do to help. Id. at 17–18, ¶ 83.
Several hours later, Griffin tweeted two pictures of Johnson’s face with the caption: “Who is?
THIS Sam Johnson of Franklin Tennessee.” Id. at 20, ¶ 86.
In response to Griffin’s first tweet, several VisuWell customers condemned Johnson and
threatened to reevaluate their business ties. At the time, VisuWell was a fast-growing tech start-
up, whose “commercial success,” according to the complaint, “was due in large part to the
proprietary software program” Johnson developed. Id. at 3, ¶ 14. During his three years as
CEO, the complaint notes, he “helped increase its sales by 1,200%.” Id. at 3, ¶ 13. Despite its
prior offer of support, VisuWell fired Johnson as the CEO and announced this decision on
Twitter in a reply to Griffin’s original tweet. Griffin responded to VisuWell’s tweet by asking if
it had removed Johnson from the Board as well and demanding to know what “measures”
VisuWell was taking. Id. at 22, ¶ 89. She warned that keeping him on the Board would suggest
that it “intends to rehire” him, adding that “the nation will remain vigilant.” Id. VisuWell
responded that it had fired him, then clarified in a follow-up tweet that it no longer employed
Johnson in any capacity. Still, the Johnsons continued to receive threats and face harassment
while some of Griffin’s followers celebrated by tweeting that they had succeeded.

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The Johnsons sued Griffin in federal court in Tennessee for tortiously interfering with
Johnson’s employment, inflicting emotional distress, invading their privacy, and negligently
injuring them. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Griffin.
II.
Federal courts start with state law in determining whether they have personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in a diversity case. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). At its broadest, Tennessee’s long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction “[o]n any basis not inconsistent with the constitution . . . of the United
States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-225(2). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
limits state courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014). Because the parties have not identified any other section of
Tennessee’s long-arm statute that would determine jurisdiction here, “due process is all we must
address.” Parker v. Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2019).
Due process requires the defendant to possess “certain minimum contacts with” the
forum State “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation
omitted). Contacts with a forum state may generate two potential types of personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant—“specific” jurisdiction arising from the defendant’s “case-related
contacts” and “general” jurisdiction arising from the defendant’s “generic connections” to the
State. Power Invs., LLC v. SL EC, LLC, 927 F.3d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Mallory v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 139 (2023) (plurality opinion). At stake in this case, as the
parties agree, is only the possibility of specific jurisdiction over Griffin.
To possess specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant’s “suit-
related conduct” must show a “substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S.
at 284. Tortious conduct satisfies this requirement when the defendant intentionally cultivates
contacts with the forum State, as opposed to forming “random, fortuitous, or attenuated

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No. 23-5257 Johnson, et al. v. Griffin Page 5
contacts.” Id. at 286 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
(internal marks omitted)).
Two cases “bookend” this application of personal jurisdiction to intentional torts. Power
Invs., 927 F.3d at 918. The first, Calder v. Jones, establishes that the effects of intentional torts
sometimes may establish personal jurisdiction. In that case, a California actress sued Florida
journalists in California for publishing a libelous article. 465 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1984). The
Supreme Court permitted the California court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
journalists, observing that they had engaged in intentional conduct “expressly aimed at
California,” not “untargeted negligence.” Id. at 789. They consulted “California sources” for the
article whose “focal point” concerned California. Id. at 788–89. And they knew that the actress
would experience the brunt of the injury in California, where the magazine had its largest
circulation and where she lived and worked. Id.
The second case, Walden v. Fiore, identifies the other side of the line. In Walden,
professional gamblers from Nevada sued an officer for seizing their cash at a Georgia airport.
517 U.S. at 281. Although the officer had formed “contacts with [the gamblers],” whom he
knew lived in Nevada, he had “no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.” Id. at 289.
The officer had never traveled to the State, let alone conducted activities in or contacted anyone
there. Id. His alleged torts against the Nevada residents occurred in Georgia, not Nevada. Id. at
288. Only Georgia had personal jurisdiction over him. See id.
Griffin’s actions have more parallels to Calder than to Walden. See Power Invs., 927
F.3d at 919. As in Calder, the allegedly tortious “story concerned the [Tennessee] activities of a
[Tennessee] resident. It impugned the professionalism of [an executive] whose [] career was
centered in [Tennessee].” 465 U.S. at 788. And the tweet “was drawn from [Tennessee]
sources.” Id. Griffin intended that the “brunt of the harm” would befall Johnson in Tennessee
when she urged her followers to pressure VisuWell, a Tennessee-based company, to fire him and
urged VisuWell to remove him from the Board. Id. at 789.
Griffin’s repeated emphasis of Johnson’s residence in Franklin and the company’s home
base in Nashville hammers that home. She “undoubtedly knew” that the “focal point” of her

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tweets concerned Tennessee. Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544,
553 (6th Cir. 2007). Confirming the point, Griffin’s initial tweet “cop[ied] VisuWell directly” at
the same time that she threatened Johnson and identified him as based in Tennessee—indeed
more specific than that, as she told people his wife’s name and that they lived in Franklin, a
suburb of Nashville. Following VisuWell’s tweet that it had fired Johnson, Griffin inquired
whether it had removed Johnson from its Board, cautioning that “the nation will remain vigilant”
if it had not. R.1 at 22, ¶ 89. These intentional threats to VisuWell’s Tennessee-based business
plainly affected Tennessee. See MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894, 902 (6th
Cir. 2017); cf. Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00656, 2023 WL 5538980,
at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2023) (declining to dismiss Johnson’s tortious interference claim
against a disgruntled Ohio-based VisuWell customer). And they had real world consequences
for Tennessee: Johnson not only lost his livelihood, but VisuWell also lost its leader and likely
customers.
Griffin counters that Blessing v. Chandrasekhar leads to a different conclusion. 988 F.3d
889 (6th Cir. 2021). The case has many parallels to this one, most notably a lawsuit arising from
the Twitter activity of Kathy Griffin. But to us, Blessing captures the other side of the line. In
that instance, Griffin posted about an “incident” involving Kentucky students on a trip to
Washington, D.C. Id. at 892–93. Her tweets encouraged followers to “[n]ame these kids,”
“[s]hame them,” and “let [their school] know how you feel about their students[’] behavior.” Id.
at 893. We concluded that Griffin’s actions did not satisfy Kentucky’s long-arm statute, then
added that personal jurisdiction would not have satisfied due process even if they had. Id. at
903–07. We reasoned that these tweets, all targeting actions in Washington, D.C., resembled
Walden more than Calder because Griffin never took any “affirmative steps” to communicate
with individuals in Kentucky when she tweeted about the student’s conduct. Id. at 906. And the
students felt the tweets’ harm “wherever [they] happened to be located,” not just in Kentucky.
Id. at 906 n.17.
Missing in Blessing were allegations that Griffin had intentionally targeted Kentucky
when provoking efforts to harass the students. See id. at 906. The Johnsons’ complaint, in
marked contrast, focuses on Griffin’s conduct that targeted Tennessee. See Peters Broad. Eng’g,

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Inc. v. 24 Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2022). In Blessing, Griffin never
communicated with the Kentucky school. Here, Griffin directly communicated with VisuWell in
her first tweet and, after that tweet prompted his firing, she followed up directly with VisuWell
to urge it to dismiss Johnson from its Board of Directors, all while promising more harassment if
the Tennessee company did not bow to her wishes. Unlike Griffin’s tweets that affected
Kentucky after its students returned home, her contacts with VisuWell went beyond targeting the
Johnsons to affecting “the state” and indeed its “economy,” “more broadly.” Schmückle, 854
F.3d at 902. While Griffin’s tweets in Blessing arose from conduct in Washington, these tweets
drew on a Tennessee source—the boyfriend’s video—to attack a Tennessee resident for his
conduct in Tennessee. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.
Had Griffin done in Blessing what she did here, the case would have come out
differently. Imagine if she had written to the students’ Kentucky school and urged it to dismiss
them. Imagine if she had committed an intentional tort by lying about, or recklessly describing,
what had happened in a message to their principal. And imagine if the school had dismissed the
students as a result. This intentional tort would have sufficiently targeted the Commonwealth,
and we have little doubt that the case would have permitted personal jurisdiction over her. Just
as one cannot avoid personal jurisdiction by putting the tortious missive in a private letter to a
school or company, see Schneider v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2012), one cannot
do the same by telling the world about it in a public letter, Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693,
706 (7th Cir. 2010); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1075–77
(10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.). Due process provides no refuge for lies or reckless conduct
directly sent to a decisionmaker in a forum, see Schneider, 669 F.3d at 696–97, 703–04, and it
does not shield someone who intentionally incites third parties against that decisionmaker, see
Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 707.
In the context of this employment dispute, the resolution is even more straightforward.
We have not hesitated to hold that personal jurisdiction satisfies due process when a defendant’s
communications to decisionmakers in the forum state led to the plaintiff’s firing. See Koch v.
Loc. 438, United Autoworkers Union, 54 F. App’x 807, 811–12 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(finding due process satisfied when a union official convinced the executive board to draft a

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letter that prevented the plaintiff from obtaining new employment out of state); Onderik v.
Morgan, No. 88-1904, 1989 WL 118728, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1989) (per curiam)
(establishing personal jurisdiction in a wrongful discharge case based partly on out-of-
jurisdiction telephone calls and letters). That is especially so when the allegedly untrue
statements tortiously interfered with an employment contract. See Dorn v. Dominique, Nos. 22-
5620/5682, 2023 WL 2543714, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2023) (per curiam) (order) (holding
that out-of-state phone calls defaming Kentucky musician’s agent sufficed to establish personal
jurisdiction in Kentucky over the agent’s tortious interference claim); see also Burri Law PA v.
Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1210–11, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2022) (basing personal jurisdiction on calls
and correspondence attacking plaintiff’s competence). We see no reason why tweets sent
directly to the decisionmaker do not suffice as well. See also Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332
(6th Cir. 2001) (“The acts of making phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing
alone, may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant[.]”).
Griffin responds that she disseminated these tweets generally to her two million
followers, and mere knowledge that some Tennessee residents would read them does not suffice
to establish personal jurisdiction. See Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110,
1120 (6th Cir. 1994). But she cannot deny that, by tagging VisuWell, she sent these
communications directly to the company. And she cannot deny that her follow-up tweets about
removing Johnson from the Board amounted to direct communications with the Tennessee
company. By also sending these tweets to every state in the country through her two million
followers, she does not inoculate herself from personal jurisdiction in a targeted state. Targeting
Johnson and VisuWell in Tennessee, based exclusively on conduct in Tennessee, and urging
action in response in Tennessee, “tether[ed]” those effects to the forum. Blessing, 988 F.3d at
906; see Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 707 (finding personal jurisdiction where posts had “the express
goal of inflicting commercial and reputational harm” on a man and his business). That
conclusion would hold even if she had called only on non-Tennesseans to engage in her
campaign. See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1076.
What of the reality that, by tagging VisuWell, she also facilitated her broader
communication efforts? The tagging, in other words, did two things: It directly communicated

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No. 23-5257 Johnson, et al. v. Griffin Page 9
with the company’s decisionmakers about firing Johnson, and it facilitated her speech by
simplifying the process of allowing her followers to chime in about Johnson’s conduct. Calder
tells us not to factor in First Amendment defenses in resolving a personal jurisdiction defense.
465 U.S. at 790–71. That means that when the same act has two consequences—one creating
jurisdiction, the other facilitating speech—the First Amendment has nothing to do with the
jurisdictional inquiry.
Griffin, last of all, asks us to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. But the
district court should evaluate those arguments in the first instance. See Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g
Grp., Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 2015).
We reverse and remand.

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_________________
CONCURRENCE
_________________
COLE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I would also reverse the district court’s decision
because I agree that Kathy Griffin’s direct communications with VisuWell about Samuel
Johnson’s employment, albeit via Twitter, subject her to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee.
I write separately to discuss the applicable legal framework and how it applies in the social
media context.
The facts of this case center around “Griffin’s tweets concern[ing] the Video Clip of the
April 24 Incident, which occurred at the Harpeth Hotel in Tennessee.” (Compl., R. 1, Page ID
8, ¶ 38; Compl. Ex. B, R.1-2, Page ID 111.) The fifty-nine second video, which does not capture
the entire incident, first shows the teenager wearing a red prom dress speaking with Johnson in
the hotel’s courtyard. The teenager says, seemingly in continuance of an ongoing conversation,
“I chose what I want to wear so you can f*** off.” To which Johnson smiles and responds, “is
that right . . . is that right?”. The teenager then walks toward the hotel lobby to get away from
Johnson, but Johnson follows him and says, “you look like an idiot.” The teenager’s boyfriend
continues to film while the teenager in the dress tells Johnson to get away from him. Johnson
then reaches across the teenager in the dress and apparently attempts to smack the boyfriend’s
phone out of the way. Other adults in the courtyard appear to intervene by repeatedly asking
Johnson to “please stop,” while also telling him that “it’s a bunch of kids,” “it’s a special night
for them,” and “just don’t let one thing bother you.” The clip ends shortly thereafter as the
situation deescalates.
Griffin did not know the Johnsons or prom-goers before this incident, but she has a
history of online advocacy. (See Compl., R. 32, Page ID 7, ¶ 32.) Indicated by the complaint,
Griffin “has stated that she is an advocate for LGBTQIA+ rights and has organized various
rallies and published various statements to that effect.” (Id. at ¶ 33.) Griffin also noted in her
tweets to the boyfriend who first posted the clip that she was “proud to be an ally” and to “[l]et
[her] know if there’s anything [she] can do to help.” (Compl., R. 1−3, Page ID 55.)

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Our court’s three-part test appropriately governs this case. Exercising jurisdiction over
Griffin accords with due process if we find (1) Griffin purposefully availed herself of the
privilege of acting or causing a consequence in Tennessee, (2) the cause of action arose from her
Tennessee activities, and (3) Griffin’s actions, or the consequences she caused, have a
sufficiently substantial connection with Tennessee to make the exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable. MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894, 899 (6th Cir. 2017); Schneider
v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2012).
Purposeful availment is the touchstone of the inquiry,1 and given Griffin’s direct
communications with VisuWell, our precedent makes clear that this prong is met here. In
Schneider, we found purposeful availment was satisfied where the defendant allegedly sent two
letters with fraudulent information to investors in Ohio with the intent that those investors would
rely on that information to their detriment. 669 F.3d at 702−03 (“[P]urposeful availment may
exist when a defendant makes telephone calls and sends [faxes] into the forum state and such
communications form the bases for the action.”) (quoting Intera Corp, 428 F.3d at 616) (internal
quotation omitted). Like Schneider, Griffin’s conduct consisted of two direct communications
aimed at the forum state with an alleged intent to cause a consequence there. 669 F.3d at
702−03. Specifically, Johnson alleges that VisuWell “terminated [his] employment contract as a
result of [] Griffin’s conduct.” (Compl., R. 1, Page ID 31, ¶ 132.) Thus, the “two [tweets] that
[VisuWell] received in [Tennessee] form the basis for the action at issue,” here, loss of
employment, and Griffin sending communications into Tennessee with the alleged intent to
cause this “consequence” satisfies purposeful availment. Schneider, 669 F.3d at 701−702 (marks
and citation omitted); cf. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]here, as
1We have held that the second “[a]rising from” prong “is subject to a lenient standard,” Schneider, 669
F.3d at 703 (internal quotation omitted), and it is satisfied when “the operative facts of the controversy arise from
the defendant’s contacts with the state.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 617 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation omitted). Given this lenient standard, the second prong is satisfied here. Id. (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction may
exist over a defendant although [s]he is not physically present in the forum if [s]he purposefully directs
communications into the forum [and] those communications form the heart of the cause of action.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Further, if the first two prongs of the test are met, then “an inference of reasonableness arises and only the
unusual case will not meet [the substantial connection] criteria.” Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc.,
503 F.3d 544, 554 (6th Cir. 2007) (marks and citation omitted). Considering the typical factors we assess for the
third prong, Griffin has not put forward sufficient considerations to “overcome or contradict” the inference of
reasonableness here. Id. at 555.

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here, the plaintiff’s claims are for intentional torts, the inquiry focuses on whether the conduct
underlying the claims was purpose[fully] directed at the forum state.”). The majority cites to
employment cases that confirm this point. (Maj. Op. at 8−9.)
Future cases involving communication via social media, including Twitter, may not be as
straightforward. As we noted in Blessing, “[o]ur sister circuits have routinely held that ‘posting
allegedly [tortious] comments or information on an internet site does not, without more, subject
the poster to personal jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read (and the subject of the
posting may reside).’” (emphasis added). See Blessing v. Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 905
n.15 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011)). In
the social media context, our precedent and other circuits illustrate that “something more” most
likely means a sufficient showing of intent. Id. at 906 (finding no personal jurisdiction where
“[t]here [was] no evidence that the defendants posted the[ir] tweets hoping to reach [the forum
state] specifically as opposed to their Twitter followers generally”); see also Shrader, 633 F.3d at
1240−41 (“[I]t is necessary to adapt the analysis of personal jurisdiction to this unique
circumstance by placing emphasis on the internet user or site intentionally directing [their]
activity or operation at the forum state . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v.
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712−14 (4th Cir. 2002)).
I previously emphasized two points in the record—Johnson’s behavior in the video clip
and Griffin’s history of LGBTQIA+ advocacy online—because both facts would play a more
significant role in the purposeful availment inquiry if Griffin’s communications into Tennessee
were less apparent. To be clear, purposeful availment is satisfied here because of Griffin’s direct
communications with VisuWell about Johnson’s employment, but the ever-changing mechanics
of social media platforms might make this inquiry in other cases more difficult.
Imagine, for example, if Griffin’s first retweet of the video clip were the exact same but
for tagging or referencing VisuWell by name, instead reading: “If this is Sam Johnson in
Nashville, Tennessee, the CEO of [a] healthcare-tech-growth [company] . . . it seems like he’s
dying to be online famous.” (See Compl. Ex. B, R.1-2, Page ID 111) (shrugging and rainbow
flag emojis omitted). Excluding the VisuWell tag is only a minor, nine-character deviation from
the original tweet, but—without the tag—the tweet would no longer be a direct communication

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with VisuWell by Twitter’s specifications. Indeed, some other user would most likely have to
bring the tweet to VisuWell’s attention, and this “third party[’s]” contact with VisuWell may not
satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. See Blessing, 988 F.3d at 906 (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that defendants’ tweets “caused third parties to ‘dox’ the plaintiffs in [the forum]”
because “‘it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the
forum state’”) (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)).
Whether Griffin intended to create contacts with the forum state would be much less clear
when analyzing the edited tweet. To solve this problem, we would need to further scrutinize the
record as to whether Griffin’s post was (a) “passive” activity on the internet meant to facilitate
her broader advocacy efforts by condemning problematic behavior, or instead, (b) deliberately
directed into Tennessee with the intent to cause consequence there. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at
1241 (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002)
(drawing a line between (a) “[p]assive [i]nternet activity” and (b) “directing electronic activity
into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions in the State”)).
It can certainly be the case that in furtherance of her advocacy efforts, Griffin also intended to
establish sufficient contacts with Tennessee. Due process does not allow us to find specific
jurisdiction, however, without the latter finding of intent.
Finally, I agree with the majority that it is for the district court to evaluate the merits of
this case in the first instance. (Maj. Op. at 9.) Our opinion also does not comment on the
veracity of Johnson’s allegations in making our personal jurisdiction determination. Instead,
when making this determination on written submission, we determine if Johnson has made a
“prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” See Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l.
Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). Because Johnson has met his burden here, I concur.

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