United States of America v. Bryce Allen Axline

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 24a0040p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRYCE ALLEN AXLINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 23-5141
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 3:21-cr-00114-1—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: February 27, 2024
Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN
TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Bryce Axline appeals the 65-month sentence imposed
by the district court following his plea to the charges of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault
on federal lands in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-213, 39-13-106 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 13,
7(3). Axline argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by
failing to provide sufficiently compelling reasons for varying upward from the Sentencing
>

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Guidelines advisory range by approximately 40 percent. For the reasons set forth below, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Instant Offense
The facts relevant to the instant case are not disputed. Late at night on June 7, 2021,
Axline and two female passengers, E.P. and S.Y., drove along the Spur, a winding road
connecting Gatlinburg and Pigeon Forge within the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.
After running off the road, Axline lost control of his car and crashed into an embankment at over
90 miles per hour. The three 19-year-olds were immediately rushed to the hospital. Tragically,
E.P. died after arriving at the medical center, and S.Y. sustained life-altering injuries that have
significantly impaired her physical and mental abilities.
During Axline’s treatment at the hospital, a blood sample was collected, revealing a
Blood Alcohol Concentration (“BAC”) level of over 0.02, which exceeded the per se
intoxication level for someone under 21.1 The presentence report indicates that “E.P.’s death and
S.Y.’s serious bodily injuries were the proximate result of [D]efendant’s intoxication.” PSR, R.
43, Page ID #188. Following the accident, an expert analyzed the crashed vehicle’s Airbag
Control Module and determined that the vehicle “was fully accelerated at 100 percent five
seconds before the crash and was traveling 90 mph on the Spur, which has a maximum speed
limit of 45 miles per hour.” Id. On September 15, 2021, a grand jury in Knoxville returned a
five-count indictment against Axline, and he eventually pleaded guilty to Count One (Vehicular
Homicide in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-213) and Count Two (Vehicular Assault in violation of
T.C.A. § 39-13-106).2
1Multiple containers of an alcoholic beverage were located inside of Axline’s vehicle. A toxicologist later
analyzed the blood sample and predicted that, at the time of the accident, Axline’s BAC was between 0.065 and
0.081.
2These counts implicate Tennessee state law. However, as described in Axline’s plea agreement, the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, makes applicable on federal lands—such as the Smoky Mountains—
certain criminal laws of the state in which the federal land is located. Axline’s plea agreement specified that,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13, he would be “subject to a like punishment” under the penalties specified by Tennessee
law. Plea Agreement, R. 39, Page ID #154.

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Axline’s presentence report described the tragic events of June 7, 2021, and detailed the
impact of his actions on the victims. After consulting the most analogous offense Guidelines for
his two convictions in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, the presentence report calculated a
base offense level of 22. The report then added a two-point increase pursuant to the grouping
rules listed in U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a)–(c), which applied to account for the harm to two different
victims. Finally, the offense level was decreased by three points to reflect Axline’s acceptance
of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 21.
Turning to Axline’s criminal history calculation, the presentence report assigned him one
point for a prior possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.3 By combining Axline’s
criminal history category of I with his total offense level of 21, the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended an imprisonment range of 37 to 46 months. The presentence report did not
recommend a variance outside of the Guidelines range, and neither party objected to the findings
of the report. However, the government subsequently filed a motion for an upward variance,
arguing that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warranted a more serious sentence than
recommended by the Guidelines advisory range. The motion highlighted the tragic
circumstances of the case, Axline’s prior drug and alcohol related behavior, and the need to deter
both Axline and the general public from drunk driving. In contrast, Axline requested 37 months’
imprisonment and discussed his troubled childhood, the lack of a need for specific deterrence
due to his post-accident sobriety, and his immense remorse.
B. Sentencing
Axline appeared for sentencing on February 2, 2023. After hearing the victim impact
statement of E.P.’s father, the district court heard arguments from both sides that largely
mirrored their respective sentencing memorandums. The government argued that the district
court should vary upwards from the advisory range because two young lives were completely
changed due to “the result of not just the [D]efendant’s underage drinking, not just the
3The marijuana and paraphernalia were seized during a traffic stop, and Axline was operating the vehicle.
The presentence report also detailed two additional offenses that are related to alcohol and marijuana. These other
two offenses did not result in a point assignment for purposes of calculating Defendant’s criminal history category.

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[D]efendant’s reckless driving, but both.” Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID #382. Axline’s
attorney argued that a sentence within the Guidelines range was sufficient.
Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that, had Axline been sentenced in state court,
the state law sentencing range for Tennessee’s vehicular homicide by intoxication is 8 to 12
years—a much higher recommendation than the parallel federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Pursuant to Axline’s plea agreement and the Assimilative Crimes Act, state law is applicable to
guide the proper punishment for conduct occurring on lands reserved by the federal government,
such as the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 7(3). Therefore, the
government pointed to State v. Pinhal, in which the defendant received six years’ imprisonment
for vehicular homicide by reckless conduct in similar circumstances. No. 2019-A-155, 2020 WL
3966843, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020). In response, Axline’s attorney emphasized
that the state court system, in contrast to the federal system, allows for parole eligibility, which
accounts for the disparity between the state and federal imprisonment ranges.
Following arguments by both parties and Axline’s statement to the court, the district
court discussed the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, noting that “this is a difficult case and
one to which the [c]ourt has given much thought, both before and during [the] hearing.” Tr.
Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID #404. In ruling upon the government’s motion for upward variance,
the court noted the seriousness of the offense, involving both underage drinking and extremely
reckless driving. Further, although Axline only received one criminal history point, his record
does reflect “previous unlawful alcohol and controlled substance consumption,” including an
offense that occurred less than two months before the car crash. Id. at Page ID #409. The
district court also recognized the need for specific and general deterrence, and explained the
importance of deterring the frequent drunk driving in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.
Finally, after noting that Axline’s attorney submitted no evidence of unwarranted sentence
disparities in his sentencing memorandum, the court nonetheless found that any disparity
analysis would not “alter its own § 3553 analysis in this case.” Id. at Page ID #417. After
balancing these factors against Axline’s difficult childhood and rehabilitation efforts, the district
court found that “the circumstances of this case [] fall outside the heartland of similar cases
before the [c]ourt,” warranting an upward variance. Id. at Page ID #423.

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Based on the above explanation, the district court imposed a sentence of 65 months’
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. After preserving his objection to
the upward variance, Axline appealed in a timely manner.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Under this standard, we
will not disturb a district court’s ruling unless it was “based on an error of law or a clearly
erroneous finding of fact,” or when we are “otherwise left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Kumar, 750 F.3d
563, 566 (6th Cir. 2014). The mere fact that the reviewing court “might have reasonably
concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the
district court.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51).
The parties do not dispute the procedural reasonableness of Axline’s sentence. Instead,
Axline contends that “[t]he district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence when it
varied upward by 40 percent from the advisory guideline range in this tragic drunk driving case.”
Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 26, 23. For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, “it must be
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and ‘sufficient
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of § 3553(a).” United States v.
Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Smith, 505 F.3d 463, 470
(6th Cir. 2007)). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court selects the
sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent
§ 3553(a) factors[,] or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United
States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Where, as in this case, the district court determines that a defendant’s Guidelines range
fails to properly reflect the § 3553(a) factors, it must provide a “sufficiently compelling”
justification for any variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. The district court’s deviation from the

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Guidelines range thus requires an explanation regarding “why the defendant’s unique
circumstances fall outside the ‘heartland’ of cases affected by the relevant guideline.” United
States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85, 109 (2007)). When the court provides a reasonable explanation as to why the
defendant’s case falls outside the heartland, the sentence is afforded significant deference; on the
other hand, a sentence that varies from the advisory range in “a mine-run case” will necessitate a
“closer review.” Id. at 709 (quoting United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 582 (6th
Cir. 2009)).
B. Analysis
Axline argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because: (1) the
Guidelines range already accounts for the serious harm that Axline caused when he drank
illegally and sped recklessly; (2) the Guidelines range already accounts for Axline’s minimal
criminal history, and the district court placed too much weight on his prior offenses that did not
involve driving under the influence; and (3) the above-range sentence is an outlier that creates a
risk of sentencing disparities. However, in this case, the district court offered an extensive
explanation for why it found that the upward variance was warranted. Due to the large degree of
deference that we must afford the district court, each of Axline’s arguments fails for the reasons
contained herein.
1. The Severity of the Crime
The district court justified its upward variance based in part upon the seriousness of the
offense, stating, “[t]o say that the offense conduct and its consequences were of a serious nature
is certainly an understatement of the highest regard.” Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID #411.
Highlighting that Defendant engaged in two perilous acts, both underage drinking and extremely
reckless driving, the district court determined that it “must . . . take into consideration the need to
reflect the extreme seriousness of the offense conduct herein.” Id. at Page ID #412.
Axline argues that the district court placed too much weight upon the nature and
seriousness of the offense because the Guidelines already account for the seriousness of
vehicular homicide. Explaining his argument, Axline notes that the Sentencing Commission

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previously increased the base offense level in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4(a)(2) for reckless involuntary
manslaughter from 14 to 18 in response to concerns regarding the under-punishment of vehicular
homicide. In addition, the Guidelines already incorporate a four-level increase for drunk driving,
totaling a base level of 22 “if the offense involved the reckless operation of a means of
transportation.” Id. § 2A1.4(a)(2)(B). Finally, two levels are already added to counts of equal
seriousness when there is more than one victim. See id. §§ 2A1.4(b), 3D1.2. Therefore, based
on the offense level points that the Guidelines alone attribute to the aggravating circumstances of
this case, Axline argues that a further upward variance constituted an abuse of discretion.
Contrary to Axline’s arguments, the Involuntary Manslaughter Sentencing Guideline
does not necessarily contemplate the lethal combination of Axline’s decision to drink underage
and his decision to fully accelerate his car at over 90 miles an hour on a winding mountain road.
Although U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 notes that a homicide based upon driving under the influence should
normally be treated as reckless, a charge of driving under the influence is not a prerequisite for
recklessness under this Guideline. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 238 F.3d 822, 826 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“[Defendant’s argument] is based on the faulty premise that § 2A1.4 denominates
homicides caused by driving as ‘reckless’ only when they involve a charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.”); United States v. Singer, 825 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“Although the base offense level of 22 that was applied by the district court in this case took
into account the fact that the offense of conviction (involuntary manslaughter) ‘involved the
reckless operation of a means of transportation,’ U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4, it most certainly did not take
into account [defendant’s] blood alcohol level. . . .”). Accordingly, Axline’s reckless driving
alone could subject him to the base offense level of 22, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of
Axline’s two deliberate choices that permanently altered multiple lives. Even further, the
Guidelines also did not contemplate the fact that the vehicle was accelerated to its full capacity
on a winding road in the Smoky Mountains, which validly contributed to the district court’s
judgment that the degree of recklessness exhibited by Axline was outside of the heartland of
similar convictions.

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Likewise, the grouping rules contained in Chapter Three of the Sentencing Guidelines do
not necessarily contemplate the degree of severity attributable to multiple deaths or multiple
injuries. In fact, the general grouping rules in Chapter Three cover an array of less serious
conduct. As the Tenth Circuit recognized in United States v. Lente,
[A] defendant convicted of several counts of minor assault, burglary, or
possessing contraband in prison would face the same incremental increase per
count as an involuntary manslaughter defendant who kills several people. See
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) (listing §§ 2A2.3 (Minor Assault), 2B2.1 (Burglary), and
2P1.2 (Possessing Contraband in Prison) as offenses that are also separately
grouped).
759 F.3d 1149, 1162 (10th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the district court could fairly recognize that
the grouping rules resulting in a mere two-point increase insufficiently accounted for the severity
of E.P.’s death and S.Y.’s permanent injuries.
Relying upon United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, Axline further argues that his crime—
conceding it was certainly a severe offense—nonetheless constituted a “mine-run” case, or a
“normal case under the governing Guidelines range.” 960 F.3d 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2020). In
Perez-Rodriguez, this Court held that the defendant committed a mine-run case of illegal reentry,
as there were no special circumstances surrounding the crime, and he only had one prior
conviction for illegal reentry and one prior DUI conviction. Id. at 758. Because
Perez-Rodriguez involved typical circumstances, this Court applied a closer review and
determined that an upward variance of 200% from the low end of the Guidelines range was not
substantively reasonable. Id. Based on Perez-Rodriguez, Axline argues that extreme speeding,
driving under the influence, and serious injuries are “not unusual” characteristics of reckless
involuntary manslaughter. Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 26, 35.
However, important distinctions between the instant case and Perez-Rodriguez illustrate
that Axline’s case is not a typical, mine-run case. First, as explained above, the Guidelines do
not necessarily account for the confluence of his underage drinking and extremely reckless
driving, nor do they necessarily adequately account for the effect of Axline’s actions on multiple
victims. Second, the district court in this case relied on significantly more than one sentencing
factor in making its determination. Distinguishably, the principal error in Perez-Rodriguez was

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that the district court placed entirely too much weight on one instance of illegal reentry (when
the average offender has 3.2 prior deportations) and one instance of driving under the influence
(which occurred several years prior), both of which were already reflected in the advisory
sentencing range. 960 F.3d at 755 (noting that the district court’s reasoning was “primarily
framed by Perez-Rodriguez’s ‘pattern of continuing to violate our laws, and come back to the
country for whatever reason’”). In contrast, the district court noted that Axline’s case was
unusual not only due to his criminal history involving repeat substance abuse offenses, but also
the lethal combination of his underage drinking and reckless driving, as well as the victims’
statements and the lasting impact of Axline’s crimes. With significantly more reasoning than the
district court in Perez-Rodriguez provided, the district court in this case did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the circumstances of the tragic incident were not typical and
accordingly warranted an upward variance.
Finally, as Axline concedes, this Court has consistently “rejected the argument that a
sentence is substantively unreasonable because the § 3553(a) factors on which the district court
relied to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range were already reflected in
the Guidelines calculation.” United States v. Rossi, 422 F. App’x 425, 436 (6th Cir. 2011); see
also United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Therefore,
even if certain aspects of the seriousness of the instant offense are reflected in the Guidelines
calculation, this argument alone cannot defeat the district court’s determination that an above-
Guidelines sentence was necessary.
2. The Defendant’s Criminal History
Axline also argues that the district court overemphasized his minimal criminal history by
crediting misdemeanor convictions and other instances of conduct that resulted in no criminal
history points. During sentencing, the district court noted that Axline’s criminal history
“display[ed] a pattern of intentional and reckless conduct leading up to the extremely serious
felony offenses for which [D]efendant now faces sentencing.” Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID
#422. In challenging the district court’s conclusion, Axline argues that the Guidelines’ criminal
history score already accounts for repeated or serious conduct. Further, Axline contends that his

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prior misdemeanors were not sufficiently similar to the instant offense, as they lacked a
meaningful connection to the instant offenses of vehicular assault and vehicular homicide.
Axline is correct that the district court relied upon his criminal history in imposing its
upward variance, among several other factors. Specifically, the court noted that Axline had been
arrested or cited on four separate occasions between the ages of 18 and 19, all of which involved
drugs and/or alcohol. The district court expressed particular concern with Axline’s most recent
conviction in April 2021, noting that “the [D]efendant committed the instant offense only two
months after the underage alcohol offense in which he was apparently found intoxicated and in
possession of alcohol containers at the scene of a fight.” Id. at Page ID #421–22. Further
underscoring these tendencies, the district court noted Defendant’s admission to the daily use of
marijuana and regular consumption of alcohol.
A sentencing court can consider a defendant’s personal history and characteristics,
including his criminal history, in its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, “even when the
defendant’s [G]uidelines range already reflects it.” United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 677 (6th
Cir. 2020). However, particularly with regard to upward variances, there should be a meaningful
relationship between the instant offense and the prior convictions, such that the similarities
“demonstrate[] a need for deterrence beyond that already captured by the [G]uidelines.” Id. at
678. By this standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Axline’s prior
underage substance abuse is sufficiently related to the instant conviction, because the instant
offense was likely caused—or, at the very least, exacerbated—by Axline’s drinking. And merely
two months prior to the instant offense, Axline was charged with an underage alcohol offense.
Cf. United States v. Johnson, 934 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2019) (highlighting that the instant
firearms offense was committed just two days after his release for the fourth firearm offense).
Nonetheless, the link between Axline’s prior criminal history and the instant offense is
weaker than cases that have affirmed an upward variance based principally on the defendant’s
pattern of criminal history. Although this Court is generally wary of upward variances based
primarily on criminal history without a strong showing of similarity, the instant case does not
hang its hat on Axline’s criminal history alone. Instead, “the district court considered [Axline’s]
criminal history as one of many factors in its decision to vary upward, including the nature and

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circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, [the] need to
provide just punishment, [and] adequate determent.” United States v. Tucker, 838 F. App’x 989,
992 (6th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[A]
sentence is not necessarily substantively unreasonable because a court places greater weight on
some factors than others.”) (citing Dunnican, 961 F.3d at 881).
In particular, Axline omits the fact that the district court considered his criminal
convictions against the backdrop of his history and characteristics. See United States v. Cechini,
834 F. App’x 201, 207 (6th Cir. 2020) (approving of the district court taking note of the
defendant’s unrelated criminal history when properly balanced against other § 3553(a) factors).
Beyond the district court’s concern with Axline’s prior offenses generally, the court specifically
noted the temporal proximity of Axline’s illegal conduct in the instant case with his most recent
alcohol-related conviction. Merely two months had passed since Axline’s prior underage alcohol
offense; less than one month had passed since he was convicted for this prior offense. Axline
also admitted to daily use of marijuana and regular consumption of alcohol, despite his young
age, further underscoring the district court’s concerns. Therefore, the combination of his
criminal history with his characteristics fairly paints a picture of a young man “display[ing] a
pattern of intentional and reckless conduct leading up to the [instant] extremely serious felony
offenses,” further warranting an upward variance. Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID #422.
3. The Avoidance of Unwarranted Sentence Disparities
Finally, Axline argues that the sentence creates “an acute risk of unwarranted disparities.”
Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 26, 46. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), sentencing courts must
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” This factor considers national
disparities between similarly-situated defendants. See United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508,
521 (6th Cir. 2008). Although Axline did not raise the issue at sentencing, he points to
Sentencing Commission statistics on appeal, arguing that none of the nine defendants with a
criminal history category of I who were sentenced using comparable Guidelines received an
above-range sentence within the past five years. Additionally, Axline points to a purportedly
similar case of reckless, drunk driving in the Smoky Mountains in which the defendant received

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a 36-month sentence. See United States v. Sizemore, No. 3:15cr146 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2015).
First, it is important to note that Axline’s plea agreement in this case stipulated that he
would be subject to a punishment similar to what he would receive under Tennessee law. See 18
U.S.C. § 13. As described above, Axline would have faced 8 to 12 years’ imprisonment for
Count One and 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment for Count Two, which could run consecutively or
concurrently. The district court noted that “at first glance,” the Guidelines range does not seem
to impose a like punishment on Axline. Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 68, Page ID #419. However,
acknowledging that a state sentence would include the possibility of parole, the district court
recognized that this backdrop was merely helpful and still used Axline’s federal guidelines as a
starting point. Cf. United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 688 (4th Cir. 2006) (Motz, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 13 is an example of a case “in which
consideration of state sentences will not conflict with § 3553(a)(6) . . . and may in fact help
courts to apply correctly the other factors”); United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469, 476 (5th Cir.
2010) (affirming above-guidelines sentence in a case brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13, where
“[a]ny disparity vanishes . . . when [defendant’s] sentence is compared to others imposed for
Intoxication Manslaughter under Texas law”).
In addition to the consideration of the higher punishment required by state law, the
district court stated that Axline did not provide it with any facts related to the creation of a
potential sentencing disparity, and, even if he did, the disparity would not alter the court’s § 3553
analysis in this case. Cf. United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that only “unwarranted” sentencing disparities should be avoided, “not those that are
warranted”). Without specific arguments before it, the district court was not required to provide
expansive explanation for this factor alone, particularly considering its detailed explanation
related to other § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Begley, No. 21-5760, 2023 WL
2991868, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2023) (“Though [defendant] may have preferred that the
district court weigh [§ 3553(a)(6)] more heavily, the district court explained why the § 3553(a)
factors supported his original sentence, and it was not required to provide more expansive
explanation for this factor alone.”); Rossi, 422 F. App’x at 434–35 (noting that the defendant did

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not raise any disparity arguments before the district court and holding that sentence was
substantively reasonable).
Notably, although similarly tragic, the comparator case that Axline relies upon is
distinguishable from the instant case, highlighting the individualized nature of sentencing. Cf.
United States v. Tanner, 382 F. App’x 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that a single instance of a
sentencing disparity is unpersuasive in the evaluation of the district court’s analysis of
§ 3553(a)(6)). For example, Sizemore had a criminal history score of zero, and the main dispute
during Sizemore’s sentencing hearing involved the amount of restitution payable to the victims.
Additionally, unlike Axline, Sizemore could legally drink, and his BAC was not over the legal
limit. Finally, the government in the Sizemore case asked for a sentence within the Guidelines
range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.
Even crediting Axline’s presented statistics, where the district court based its upward
variance on several other factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it is not required to consider
national sentencing statistics, regardless of whether it enters a within-Guidelines sentence or one
that falls outside of the Guidelines range. United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 936 (6th Cir.
2021) (expressly rejecting imposing a requirement of consulting Sentencing Commission data
before imposing a sentence). As illustrated by the above evaluation of the Sizemore case, the
Sentencing Commission data provided on appeal does not necessarily illuminate the differences
among offenders within the same criminal history category. See United States v. Cole, No.
22-1163, 2023 WL 3001571, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 19, 2023). Further, this factor is one among
many, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on other factors to impose a
higher sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Sanderson, No. 21-5900, 2022 WL 1133114, at *6
(6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022); Gates, 48 F.4th at 478.
III. CONCLUSION
While the district court imposed a lengthy sentence of 65 months in prison—19 months
over the top of the recommended Guidelines range—the sentence was substantively reasonable.
The district court thoroughly assessed the seriousness of Axline’s offense, his history with
underage substance abuse, and the importance of specific and general deterrence. Given the

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No. 23-5141 United States v. Axline Page 14
deference that this Court affords the district court on its balancing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, the district court acted within its discretion in varying Axline’s sentence above the
Guidelines range. For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

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