Najean Lucky v. Landmark Medical of Michigan, P.c.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 24a0131p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
NAJEAN LUCKY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LANDMARK MEDICAL OF MICHIGAN, P.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 23-2030
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:23-cv-11004—Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 12, 2024
Before: KETHLEDGE, LARSEN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Brendan J. Childress, HURWITZ LAW PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
Appellant. Patricia Pryor, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, Elyse K. Culberson,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellee.
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OPINION
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KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Najean Lucky sued Landmark Medical of Michigan, P.C.,
asserting a claim of religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court dismissed her
complaint for failure to state a claim. We reverse.
We take the allegations in Lucky’s complaint as true. Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648,
653 (6th Cir. 2023). Lucky is a non-denominational Christian who believes that she “should not
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No. 23-2030 Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C. Page 2
have any vaccination enter her body such that her body would be defiled, because her body is a
temple.” Compl. ¶12. She also “seeks to make all decisions, especially those regarding
vaccination and other medical decisions, through prayer.” Id. ¶11. As relevant here, Lucky
“prayed to God specifically about the COVID-19 vaccine” and says that God told her “that she
would suffer spiritual harm if she received the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. ¶21. Lucky therefore
has not received the vaccine.
Landmark provides in-home medical care. It recruited Lucky for a management position
in February 2022. During an interview for that position, Landmark’s interviewer, Betrice
Lavender, at first “spoke positively” about Lucky’s potential and “even discussed her starting
salary.” Id. ¶26. But Lavender asked whether Lucky had been vaccinated for Covid-19; Lucky
said she had not, because of her religious beliefs. Lavender then “end[ed] the interview[,]”
saying that she had rejected ten other candidates because they were unvaccinated for Covid, and
that Landmark would not make any accommodations in that regard. Id. ¶¶30-32.
Lucky thereafter brought this suit, claiming that Landmark refused to hire her because of
her religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The district court
dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim, stating that Lucky had not alleged that “her
religion has a specific tenet or principle that does not permit her to be vaccinated.” Lucky v.
Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C., No. 23-cv-11004, 2023 WL 7095085, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26,
2023). Rather, the court said, Lucky had offered “only naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court concluded, Lucky had not
alleged that Landmark discriminated against her based on her religion. We review that decision
de novo. Heyward, 88 F.4th at 653.
Title VII provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . [to] refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . .
religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The word “religion,” in turn, “is defined to ‘include all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that” it cannot reasonably accommodate them. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
575 U.S. 768, 771-72 (2015) (cleaned up and quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

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No. 23-2030 Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C. Page 3
The question here, broadly stated, is whether Lucky pled particular facts supporting an
inference that Landmark refused to hire her because of her “religion,” as defined by the statute.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Hardwick v. 3M Company, 87 F.4th
315, 320 (6th Cir. 2023). That Lucky made several of the requisite allegations is undisputed:
she alleged that Landmark refused to hire her; that it did so because she had not received the
Covid vaccine; and that it refused to provide her any accommodation regarding the vaccine. See
Compl. ¶¶28-32, 39-40.
The remaining question is whether Lucky pled facts supporting an inference that her
refusal to be vaccinated for Covid was an “aspect” of her “religious observance” or “practice” or
“belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Plainly she pled such facts. Lucky pled that she is “a non-
denominational Christian” who believes she “should not have any vaccination enter her body
such that her body would be defiled, because her body is a temple.” Compl. ¶¶10, 12. She also
pled that she “seeks to make all decisions, especially those regarding vaccination and other
medical decisions, through prayer.” Id. ¶11. She pled further that—as to the Covid vaccine in
particular—“God spoke to [her] in her prayers and directed her that it would be wrong to receive
the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. ¶15. And she pled that, as a result of her beliefs, she refused to
receive the vaccine. Id. ¶¶16, 19-21, 29.
Those are allegations of particular facts—she prayed, she received an answer, she acted
accordingly—rather than what the district court called “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Moreover, she alleged that she has a religious objection to vaccines of any kind.
Id. ¶12. No further “enhancement” was necessary: Lucky’s allegations were almost self-
evidently enough to establish, at the pleadings stage, that her refusal to receive the vaccine was
an “aspect” of her religious observance or belief.
Nor did the district court have any basis for its insistence that Lucky explain how “her
religion has a specific tenet or principle that does not permit her to be vaccinated.” Quite the
contrary: “It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”
Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). And the Supreme Court
has warned, “[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts,” that “courts must not presume to

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No. 23-2030 Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C. Page 4
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990). The district court presumed such authority
here. And Lucky’s allegations would support an inference of religious conduct for a person of
any faith.
Landmark, for its part, principally argues that Lucky’s pleadings do not establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII. But “the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard,
not a pleading requirement.” Savel v. MetroHealth System, 96 F.4th 932, 943 (6th Cir. 2024)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Landmark’s argument is inapposite here.
The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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