Jesus Isai Pinales-Salas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0157n.06
No. 23-3675
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JESUS ISAI PINALES-SALAS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
FROM THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS
OPINION
BEFORE: COLE, CLAY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jesus Pinales-Salas, a native and citizen of Mexico,
seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) Decision, which affirmed an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1229b. In his petition for review, Pinales-Salas challenges the BIA’s determination
that his eldest son, Christian Pinales, was not a qualifying relative under § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Pinales-Salas further argues that the BIA improperly determined that his youngest son, Andrew
Pinales, would not face extreme and unusual hardship if Pinales-Salas were removed from the
United States. For the reasons set forth below, we DENY Pinales-Salas’ petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Pinales-Salas is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without
inspection on or about August 11, 2002. At the time, Pinales-Salas was only 13 or 14 years old.

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From the very beginning of his arrival in the United States, Pinales-Salas worked to support his
family, including his mother who had cancer. After working at a handful of short-term jobs,
Pinales-Salas was hired by Mulholland Farm as a horse groomer in Lexington, Kentucky. With
several years of dedication, Pinales-Salas worked his way up to Farm Manager.
While in Lexington, Pinales-Salas reunited with a former girlfriend, Norma Rodarte-
Martinez. Although they never married, the two have been together for over ten years and have
raised two children—Christian Pinales and Andrew Pinales. Together, the family of four lives on
Mulholland Farm as a benefit of Pinales-Salas’ employment. While Pinales-Salas is not the
biological father of Christian, he raised the boy from infancy to his current teenage years, and the
family has no contact with the biological father. Rodarte-Martinez gave birth to the couple’s
younger son, Andrew, in 2015. Pinales-Salas is Andrew’s biological father.
In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against
Pinales-Salas by serving him with a notice to appear. During his initial hearing on June 6, 2016,
Pinales-Salas conceded the allegations in the charge of removal and indicated that he would be
seeking cancellation of removal through his attorney. Pinales-Salas then appeared at an individual
merits hearing on February 12, 2019 to address his application for cancellation of removal.
B. Procedural History
1. Individual Merits Hearing
During his individual merits hearing, Pinales-Salas described his background and job
history. He also highlighted his long-term relationship with Rodarte-Martinez and their joint roles
in raising their two children. At the time of the hearing, Christian was 12 years old, and Andrew
was 3.

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Pinales-Salas explained that, although he is not Christian’s biological father, he added his
last name to Christian’s birth certificate when Christian began to ask questions about why his last
name did not match Pinales-Salas’. To do so, Pinales-Salas admitted that he signed a declaration
of paternity in accordance with Kentucky law procedures, which required him to affirm that he
was the “natural father” of Christian. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.046. However, the couple
never formally adopted Christian, believing that their declarations were sufficient to legally
establish Pinales-Salas’ status as father.
To describe the hardship that his sons would face if he were removed from the United
States, Pinales-Salas testified about Christian’s recent struggles with his health and demeanor. Due
to the impending removal proceedings, Christian began to suffer from depression, continually
asking questions about whether Pinales-Salas would have to leave the country. Eventually,
Christian started attending therapy sessions. Pinales-Salas testified that Christian also suffers from
severe allergies and asthma. Due to Christian’s heightened need for care, Rodarte-Martinez quit
working to support his demanding doctors’ visit schedule.
Pinales-Salas also testified that his biological son, Andrew, has faced various speech
impediments. Andrew has struggled with his expressive language skills, speaking very few words
compared to similarly-aged children. Due to his delayed speech development, Andrew attends
speech therapy once a week for 45 minutes. Pinales-Salas recalled that the therapist recommended
continuing these sessions for 60-70 months.
Based on his children’s medical and developmental needs, Pinales-Salas testified that he
could not give his children the same future and opportunity in Mexico and therefore wanted them
to remain in the United States. He worried about being able to pay for healthcare in Mexico and
supporting his family financially. Additionally, Pinales-Salas explained that he would be leaving

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his mother behind in the United States, who suffered from cancer and had a pacemaker. Pinales-
Salas also supported his 18-year-old brother by helping with his car insurance and serving as a
father figure. Finally, Pinales-Salas testified to the role that he plays within his established
community, particularly in his church and his children’s soccer teams. He testified that friends
and co-workers have relied on him, looking to him for mentorship and leadership.
After hearing from Pinales-Salas, the IJ heard testimony from his employer on Mulholland
Farms, Martha Jayne Mulholland. Mulholland described her family’s farm, which cares for
approximately 300 horses and employs 17 people. For the past several years, Mulholland’s son
and Pinales-Salas managed and oversaw the farm. To explain her perception of Pinales-Salas’
character, Mulholland testified that he was a leader, an exemplary partner and father, and a hard,
dependable worker. Specifically, Mulholland described Pinales-Salas as “known in the
community as someone you can depend on and go to,” highlighting his generous mentorship and
care that he provides to people on the farm. Tr. Merits Hr’g, A.R. 000171.
Finally, Pinales-Salas’ partner, Rodarte-Martinez, shed additional light on the potential
hardships that she and her sons would face if Pinales-Salas were ordered removed. She further
explained Christian’s healthcare schedule, which required attending therapy sessions and going to
the doctor’s office several times each week. In addition, Rodarte-Martinez affirmed that Andrew
had a speech impediment, noting that he had been placed in weekly speech therapy sessions.
Rodarte-Martinez testified that, without Pinales-Salas in the United States, she could not
financially support her children. Therefore, contrary to Pinales-Salas’ earlier testimony, she stated
that they would have to move to Mexico with him. She expressed her concerns that the conditions
in Mexico would not parallel those in the United States, as they could not afford healthcare in
Mexico.

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2. Immigration Judge’s Decision
On May 28, 2019, the IJ issued a decision finding Pinales-Salas statutorily ineligible for
the cancellation of removal. Evaluating the four requirements for discretionary removal, the IJ
found that Pinales-Salas met the first three. The IJ found that Pinales-Salas was continuously
present in the United States for ten years preceding the date of his application and was a person of
good moral character throughout his time in the country. Further, the IJ concluded that Pinales-
Salas had no criminal convictions that would statutorily bar relief. Accordingly, the decision
hinged upon Pinales-Salas’ failure to meet the last prong of its analysis: exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to qualifying relatives.
The IJ concluded that he could only consider Andrew as a qualifying relative because
Pinales-Salas was not Christian’s biological father, and Christian was therefore not legitimated
under Kentucky law. As for Andrew, the decision held that the hardship he would face “is not
uncommon with similarly situated children faced with the prospect of a parent’s removal.”
Decision and Orders of IJ, A.R. 000030. Although there will likely be some impact on Andrew’s
standard of living and healthcare, the IJ determined that such an impact is not “substantially
beyond” what would normally be expected. Id. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Pinales-Salas to be
removed and granted him the opportunity to depart the United States voluntarily.
3. Board of Immigration Appeals Decision
Following the IJ’s denial of his application for cancellation, Pinales-Salas appealed to the
BIA. By adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision in its totality, the BIA dismissed his appeal.
Because Christian is not Pinales-Salas’ biological son, the BIA affirmed that he was not a
qualifying relative for purposes of removal. As for Pinales-Salas’ qualifying relative, Andrew, the
BIA concluded that the evidence did not show that Andrew’s speech therapy and educational needs

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would be unmet in Mexico. The BIA further noted that “since his son is a citizen of the United
States, he may return to this country later to pursue economic and educational opportunities.” BIA
Decision, A.R. 000004. Ultimately, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Pinales-Salas did
“not establish[] exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] qualifying relative.” Id. This
timely petition for review followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Qualifying Relative Determination Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C)
1. Standard of Review
“This Court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal from the BIA pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1252.” Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 2016). Under § 1252(a)(2)(D),
this Court may review constitutional claims or questions of law underlying the BIA’s holding de
novo. Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557
F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). This Court, however, lacks jurisdiction to review facts found in
relation to Pinales-Salas’ cancellation of removal application. See Njai v. Garland, No. 21-3764,
2022 WL 2903443, at *2 (6th Cir. July 22, 2022) (citing Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 331
(2022)). Where, as in this case, the BIA reviews the IJ’s decision and fully adopts its reasoning,
this Court reviews both the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination.
Tantchev v. Garland, 46 F.4th 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d
688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2015)).
2. Analysis
In order to be eligible for the discretionary cancellation of his removal, Pinales-Salas must
meet four requirements delineated in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”): (A) he must
have been “physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10

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years”; (B) he must have been “a person of good moral character during such period”; (C) he must
have no convictions “under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)” of the INA; and (D) he
must establish “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
When an applicant meets these four requirements, the IJ may exercise the discretion
delegated to him by the Attorney General to cancel the alien’s removal, eventually issuing a green
card and establishing lawful permanent residence. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1003.10 (delegating
the duties of the Attorney General under the INA to IJs and the BIA). In this case, the IJ
determined, and the BIA agreed, that Pinales-Salas met the first three requirements. Therefore,
the IJ’s ultimate determination turned upon subsection (D)—whether a qualifying relative would
face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if Pinales-Salas were ordered removed to
Mexico.
Pinales-Salas pointed to two potentially qualifying relatives, his two sons, Christian and
Andrew. His biological son, Andrew, was born in the United States and easily qualified under
subsection (D); however, as discussed, the IJ determined that Andrew would not face extremely
unusual hardship due to his father’s removal to Mexico. In contrast, whether Christian could
validly be considered a qualifying relative under the statute presented a more difficult question.
Because Christian is not biologically related to Pinales-Salas, and because Pinales-Salas and
Rodarte-Martinez never officially married, the IJ had to decide whether Pinales-Salas’ de facto
paternal relationship with Christian qualified under the statute.

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According to the statutory scheme, the immigrant’s “child[ren]” are one possible category
of qualifying relatives. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). And the INA defines “child” as an unmarried
person under twenty-one years of age who is:
(A) a child born in wedlock;
(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not
reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of
stepchild occurred;
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under
the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United
States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of
eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or
parents at the time of such legitimation;
(D) a child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status,
privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its
natural mother or to its natural father if the father has or had a bona fide parent-
child relationship with the person;
(E) (i) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in
the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at
least two years . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)–(E)(i). Pinales-Salas concedes that only subsection (C) could be
applicable to Christian and that the applicable domicile is Kentucky.
The crux of the issue on appeal is therefore whether Pinales-Salas’ identification of himself
as the father on Christian’s Kentucky birth certificate “legitimated” Christian as his child. To
argue that he successfully legitimated Chrisitan, Pinales-Salas points to Christian’s birth certificate
and emphasizes that he served as “the custodian of Christian at the time this occurred.” Pet’r’s
Br., ECF No. 8, 12. During the immigration proceedings, the IJ and the BIA disagreed with
Pinales-Salas, relying on prior BIA interpretations of the term “legitimation” to hold that the
immigrant must be the natural father to legitimate his child. See Decision and Orders of IJ, A.R.
000029 (citing In re Bueno-Almonte, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1029, 1031–32 (BIA 1997)); see also Dorado
v. Gonzales, 202 F. App’x 898, 901 (6th Cir. 2006) (evaluating the term “child” in the INA and

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noting that the “definition does not include a non-biological, non-adopted boy”). On appeal,
Respondent adds that, even taking Kentucky law into consideration, Christian has not been
legitimated. See J.R.A. v. G.D.A., 314 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that “the
only method by which a step-parent may acquire the legal status of parent with a biological child
of his spouse is through adoption”). Because Kentucky law is dispositive in rejecting Pinales-
Salas’ arguments on appeal, we need not rely upon the BIA’s interpretation of “legitimation” under
§ 1101(b)(1)(C).1
Under Kentucky law, when a birth occurs in a hospital to a woman who is unmarried, no
father is written on the birth certificate. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.046. However, the mother and
the alleged father can fill out notarized declarations to assert the natural father’s paternity, in which
case the father’s name will be added to the birth certificate. Id. After Christian began to wonder
about his mismatched last name, Pinales-Salas and Rodarte-Martinez filled out the appropriate
documents to declare his paternity and changed Christian’s last name to Pinales. This addition of
Pinales-Salas’ name on Christian’s birth certificate created a rebuttable presumption of paternity
under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 406.021(4).
However, Pinales-Salas admitted in his immigration proceedings that he misrepresented
that he was the “natural father” of Christian in his declaration. Therefore, even though Pinales-
1 Some of our sister circuits have analyzed similar issues by employing the Chevron
doctrine and deferring to the BIA’s holding that the term “legitimation” under § 1101(b)(1)(C)
requires the father to be the biological father. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Cuccinelli, 981 F.3d 766,
772–73 (10th Cir. 2020) (relying upon Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984) to hold that the BIA properly ruled that an immigrant’s child was not “legitimated”
because she was not his biological child); id. at 790–94 (Baldock, J., concurring in part). Under
the facts of the instant case, however, we need not analyze whether to defer to the BIA’s
interpretation under Chevron because Kentucky law provides a definitive answer.

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Salas presumptively established his paternity status under § 406.021, the government can point to
his misrepresentation that he was Christian’s “natural” or biological father to rebut this
presumption. See J.R.A, 314 S.W.3d at 768 (finding that although appellant signed a declaration
of paternity, “both parties admitted that appellant was not [the child’s] biological father, [so] the
presumption of paternity was clearly rebutted”). In J.R.A., the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated
that, “the only method by which a step-parent may acquire the legal status of parent with a
biological child of his spouse is through adoption.” Id. Neither party claims that Pinales-Salas
formally adopted Christian.
Accordingly, the presumption of paternity does not apply to Pinales-Salas in this case.
Looking to other potential legitimation methods supported by state law, Kentucky is one of the
few states that has applied the concept of equitable estoppel to custody actions and child support
cases. This doctrine allows a court to declare that a man who is not the biological father of a child
is nonetheless the child’s legal father. See, e.g., S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502, 506–08 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2005). Using this doctrine, Kentucky courts have estopped a purported parent “from
challenging paternity where that person has by his or her conduct accepted a given person as father
of the child.” Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Ky. 2007) (citation omitted). Although
Pinales-Salas may have been able to use this doctrine to establish his paternity in a hypothetical
dispute with Rodarte-Martinez, Kentucky courts have declined to extend the doctrine to estop third
parties (such as, in this case, the BIA) from interfering with the parental relationship.
For example, in Ipock v. Ipock, a father wished to remain the legal father of his child,
despite the Commonwealth’s efforts to exclude him from custodial consideration. 403 S.W.3d
580, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013). Although the father in Ipock was not the natural father of his
daughter, he “ha[d] always held himself out as her father.” Id. Therefore, he argued that the

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doctrine should be extended to allow him to retain custody of his child; in other words, “instead
of himself being estopped from disclaiming his paternity,” the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services should be estopped from challenging his paternity. Id. The Kentucky court disagreed—
based on the fundamental differences between cases in which a one parent relied on another’s
parental representations to their detriment, and those in which a purported father seeks to estop a
third party, who has not acted in reliance on any party’s representations, from interference, the
Ipock court declined to extend the doctrine to cases where a non-biological father “is entitled to
estop other parties from excluding him as [the] father.” Id. at 589.
Therefore, Pinales-Salas cannot rely upon Christian’s birth certificate alone, as the
presumption of paternity is “clearly rebutted” when a person claiming paternity is not the natural
father of the child and submitted an inaccurate declaration of paternity. J.R.A., 314 S.W.3d at 768.
Further, under the facts of the instant case, Kentucky law does not support nevertheless affording
Pinales-Salas with legal rights based on his de facto fatherhood status.2 See, e.g., Ipock, 403
2 In addition to the inapplicability of parental estoppel in this case, Kentucky’s “de facto
custodian” statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270, also does not apply to Pinales-Salas’
relationship with Christian. Kentucky has interpreted the law to apply solely to those custodians
that raise the child without the support of one of the biological parents. See, e.g., Kingcade v.
Sherwood, No. 2019-CA-1711-MR, 2020 WL 6818440, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2020) (noting
that “in order to be a de facto custodian, the nonparent must not simply be a primary caregiver,
but must, in fact, be the primary caregiver”); Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky.
2010) (“[P]arenting the child alongside the natural parent does not meet the de facto custodian
standard.”). Because Pinales-Salas raised Christian with Rodarte-Martinez, Christian’s biological
mother, he cannot be considered Christian’s “de facto custodian.” See Boone v. Ballinger, 228
S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (denying de facto custodian status as a matter of law where step-
father parented alongside biological mother). Although there are certain exceptions to this general
rule, meeting an exception merely confers the non-biological parent with standing—not
necessarily parentage rights. See, e.g., Mullins, 317 S.W.3d at 574–77 (holding that non-biological
parent of child conceived through artificial insemination, but who cared for the child from birth,
had standing to seek custody of the child). Therefore, to the extent the status of “de facto

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S.W.3d at 589. Even though Pinales-Salas undoubtedly serves the imperative role of father within
Christian’s life, based on Kentucky law, Christian has not been “legitimated under the law of [his]
residence or domicile.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C). Without meeting one of the definitions
contained in § 1101(b)(1), Christian cannot serve as a qualifying relative for purposes of Pinales-
Salas’ application for cancellation of removal.
B. Hardship Determination Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)
1. Standard of Review
We review the BIA’s ultimate hardship conclusion using a “deferential” standard of
review. Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1154 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
589 U.S. 221, 228 (2020)). The BIA’s determination of whether a qualifying relative would face
extreme and unusual hardship is a “mixed question about whether the facts found by the
immigration judge rise to the level of hardship required by the legal test.” Id. at 1150; see also
Wilkinson v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 780, 2024 WL 1160995, at *5 (2024) (holding that “the
application of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts is
reviewable as a question of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D)”). Although we may review the BIA’s
ultimate hardship conclusion, this Court may not review the factual findings underlying it. Singh,
984 F.3d at 1154; see also Patel, 596 U.S. at 331.
Despite Singh’s guidance, this Court has yet to choose the exact “deferential” standard of
review for the hardship determination. However, like in Singh, regardless of the specific standard
applied in this case, the BIA correctly found that Pinales-Salas failed to establish the unusual
hardship requirement. See Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154; Guzman Herrera v. Garland, No. 22-3985,
custodian” could “legitimate” Christian, this argument nonetheless fails under the facts of this
case.

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2023 WL 3414447, at *3 (6th Cir. May 12, 2023) (“We again decline to decide that question,
because Guzman Herrera’s claim fails regardless of which standard we apply.”). Thus, we
similarly decline to decide the proper standard of review applicable to a hardship determination.
2. Hardship Determination
To demonstrate hardship under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), an applicant is required to “provide
evidence of harm to his spouse, parent, or child substantially beyond that which ordinarily would
be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.” Araujo-Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646,
649 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 59 (BIA 2001)). This
determination requires aggregating the qualifying relatives’ hardship factors, including their “ages,
health, and circumstances.” Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64. For example,
cancellation of removal may be appropriate where a young child has “very serious health issues”
or “compelling special needs in school.” Id. at 63. In the instant case, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s
holding that Pinales-Salas’ younger child, Andrew, was a qualifying relative under
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). However, the IJ determined that “[w]hile there may be an adverse impact to
Andrew’s standard of living and diminished quality of health care and education, the [c]ourt cannot
find that this hardship rises to that ‘substantially beyond’ what would be expected with an alien
parent’s removal.” Decision and Orders of IJ, A.R. 000030 (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. &
N. Dec. at 59).
On appeal, Pinales-Salas contends that the IJ applied an inappropriately high legal standard
by requiring him to show that his deportation would be “unconscionable.” Pet’r’s Br., ECF No.
8, 13. While recognizing that adverse country conditions in Mexico alone will generally be
insufficient to support a finding of hardship, Pinales-Salas argues that Andrew’s speech therapy
needs illustrated the extreme and unusual circumstance necessary to support the cancellation of

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his removal. Without providing any citation to the record, Pinales-Salas states that “Andrew would
not be able to continue with his speech therapy in Mexico[,] and this would result in Andrew not
being able to function in basic society . . . [or] function as a normal adult in human society.” Id.
at 14.
Unfortunately, Pinales-Salas did not present any testimony or evidence supporting this
averment to the IJ. Indeed, as the BIA noted, “[t]he Immigration Judge appropriately considered
the respondent’s son’s speech issues, but the record evidence does not show that any necessary
treatment would be unavailable to him in Mexico.” BIA Decision, A.R. 000004. Although
Pinales-Salas and Rodarte-Martinez testified about Andrew’s need for speech therapy, neither
represented that continued speech therapy would be unavailable in Mexico. See Tr. Merits Hr’g,
A.R. 000190 (explaining that healthcare for Christian and Andrew in Mexico would be more
expensive and likely one to two hours from the town in which they would live); cf. Seepaul v. Att’y
Gen., 592 F. App’x 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[Petitioner] failed to offer evidence with his motion
to reopen . . . to show that [his child’s] hearing and speech needs cannot be met in Trinidad.”);
Ramirez v. Garland, No. 22-2039, 2023 WL 4418227, at *2 (4th Cir. July 10, 2023) (“[Petitioner]
failed to show that adequate medical care would not be reasonably available in Mexico.”).
Additionally, the record does not conclusively establish whether Pinales-Salas’ family
would remain in the United States or move to Mexico with him. To the extent that Andrew
remained in Lexington, he would remain under Rodarte-Martinez’s care and “may remain eligible
for Passport health benefits.” Decision and Orders of IJ, A.R. 000030; see also In re J-J-G, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 808, 813 (BIA 2020) (finding no unusual hardship where, if children stayed in the
United States, they could continue medical treatment, and if they moved to Guatemala, treatment
may be available there).

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Contrary to Pinales-Salas’ arguments, the IJ did not require him to prove that his removal
would be unconscionable—instead, the judge carefully weighed each potential hardship that
Andrew would face and held that, in the aggregate, these hardships were not “substantially beyond
that which would ordinarily result from an alien’s removal.” Decision and Orders of IJ, A.R.
000030. Therefore, the BIA did not err in finding that Pinales-Salas did not meet the “onerous”
burden of showing that Andrew would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due
to Pinales-Salas’ removal from the United States. Valdez-Arriaga v. Barr, 778 F. App’x 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2019). Further underscoring this conclusion, Pinales-Salas fails to cite to any case in
which the Sixth Circuit or the BIA has found extremely unusual hardship in similar circumstances.
Cf. Seepaul, 592 F. App’x at 100 (affirming IJ where no evidence showed there would be a lack
of speech therapy in removal county); In re Cruz Castellanos, 2004 WL 2375119, at *1 (BIA Sept.
23, 2004) (“The new evidence showing that the respondent’s child receives speech therapy does
not create a likelihood that the respondent would be able to establish the necessary degree of
hardship; there is no evidence to prove that speech services are unavailable in Mexico.”); In re
Francisco Valencia Chavez, 2004 WL 2374781, at *2 (BIA Aug. 6, 2004) (finding no extremely
unusual hardship where young child had a speech impediment). Affording the IJ and the BIA the
proper discretion in accordance with Singh, we cannot set aside the IJ’s decision that Pinales-Salas
is ineligible for cancellation of removal. 984 F.3d at 1154.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the BIA’s
decision.

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