DELMI YULIBETH RAMIREZ-RAMOS and her minor sons, JI and JD v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0356n.06
No. 23-3827
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DELMI YULIBETH RAMIREZ-RAMOS and her
minor sons, JI and JD,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
A FINAL ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS
OPINION
Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GRIFFIN, J., joined in full.
McKEAGUE, J. (pg. 21), delivered a separate opinion concurring only in the result.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Delmi Ramirez-Ramos
(“Ramirez-Ramos”) seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision
upholding an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and withholding of removal for her and
her two minor sons, JI and JD, who are derivative riders to Ramirez-Ramos’s application.
Ramirez-Ramos fled from Honduras to the United States and sought asylum on the basis of her
membership in five different particular social groups: (1) single mothers; (2) landowners;
(3) public merchants; (4) indigenous women; and (5) kinship. The IJ concluded that her proffered
social groups were not cognizable and that, regardless, Ramirez-Ramos had not demonstrated that
she had been persecuted on account of her membership in these groups. The BIA upheld the
decision, focusing its analysis on the lack of a nexus between Ramirez-Ramos’s proffered social

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groups and her alleged persecution. The BIA also concluded that because Ramirez-Ramos had
not demonstrated that she had the requisite nexus to a protected social group, she was ineligible
for both asylum and withholding of removal. We DENY the petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Ramirez-Ramos was born on August 3, 1988, in San Antonio de Cortés, Honduras. A.R.
at 1092 (Asylum Appl.). Ramirez-Ramos is of indigenous (“Indian”) heritage and is a single
mother. A.R. at 143–44, 146 (Hr’g Tr. at 42–43, 45). She left Honduras after being subjected to
numerous acts of violence against her and her family, including being raped when she was fifteen
and being subjected to nearly twenty years of consistent targeting by the mareros, or gang
members, in Honduras.1 A.R. at 214 (Hr’g Tr. at 113); A.R. at 1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589).
On August 13, 2016, Ramirez-Ramos entered the United States with her two young sons, JI and
JD.2 A.R. at 149 (Hr’g Tr. at 48); A.R. at 246–47 (Birth Certificates); A.R. at 1092–93 (Asylum
Appl.). JI is now sixteen, A.R. at 246, and JD is now eleven, A.R. at 247.
Prior to coming to the United States, Ramirez-Ramos lived in Villanueva de Cortés,
Honduras with her mother, younger sister, and two sons. A.R. at 143 (Hr’g Tr. at 42). Her mother
owned their home, which she had “financed like a mortgage,” id., and she operated a convenience
store out of the house, A.R. at 145 (Hr’g Tr. at 44). Ramirez-Ramos worked in the convenience
1A “mara” is a Central American gang. “Mareros” are the gang’s members. See Who are the Maras, the
Gangs that El Salvador and Honduras Are Waging War Against?, BLOOMBERG LÍNEA (Dec. 12, 2022),
https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/who-are-the-maras-the-gangs-that-el-salvador-and-honduras-are-waging-
war-against/ (Dec. 12, 2022).
2JI and JD are Derivative Riders on Ramirez-Ramos’s application. A.R. at 225 (Hr’g Tr. at 124). References
to Ramirez-Ramos’s application for asylum throughout this opinion apply to their applications as well.

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store. Id. She has stated that people of her class and status in Honduras have very little economic
opportunity. A.R. at 146 (Hr’g Tr. at 45). Ramirez-Ramos’s father did not live with the family,
nor did any male family members. A.R. 143–44 (Hr’g Tr. at 42–43). In Honduras, Ramirez-
Ramos “lived in [a] constant state of fear.” A.R. at 1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589).
When she was fifteen years old, Ramirez-Ramos was sexually assaulted while she was on
her way to beauty school in Villanueva. A.R. at 160–62 (Hr’g Tr. at 59–61).3 She was walking
on a “lonely road” when a man, whom she believed to be a “member of a gang,” “grabbed
[Ramirez-Ramos] by the back with a gun,” took her into an empty house, and raped her. A.R. at
161 (Hr’g Tr. at 60). Ramirez-Ramos believes that the man targeted her because she was “poor
and an Indian.” A.R. at 164 (Hr’g Tr. at 63). She testified that he had told her to “[s]top there,
Indian” when he first accosted her on the road, and that “Indian” is considered a “derogatory term”
in Honduras. A.R. at 165 (Hr’g Tr. at 64). Her family did not report the assault to the police “out
of fear,” because they were worried that the police would tell the gang that the family had reported
them and that the gang would retaliate. A.R. at 161–62 (Hr’g Tr. at 60–61).
Ramirez-Ramos has lost numerous family members to violence at the hands of the mareros,
including two of her brothers and her uncle. In 2002, mareros killed her brother, Jose Alvardo
Ramirez, and her uncle, Benjamin. A.R. at 153, 158 (Hr’g Tr. at 52, 57). She does not know why
the gangs targeted her brother and uncle and stated that “[t]hey did it just as a crime.” A.R. at 156
(Hr’g Tr. at 55). Ramirez-Ramos testified that in 2012, the gang also killed one of her other
3In her application for asylum, Ramirez-Ramos stated that she was sixteen when this assault took place. A.R.
1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589). We rely on the testimony she gave at the hearing but note the discrepancy between
the two.

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brothers, Isrráel Gomez (“Isrráel”),4 and injured a third brother, Orlando Ramirez-Ramos
(“Orlando”), when the two of them were “hanging outside with . . . a neighbor.” A.R. at 165–69
(Hr’g Tr. at 64–68); A.R. at 250 (Isrráel Gomez Death Certificate). The neighbor “shot up [three
shots] into the air.” A.R. at 168 (Hr’g Tr. at 67). When mareros came by the house to ask who
had fired the shots, Isrráel “said that it was him, even though it was not him, [] because the neighbor
was in a wheelchair.” Id. After Isrráel took responsibility for the shots, the men killed him. Id.
The men also shot Orlando Ramirez-Ramos in the back during the incident. A.R. at 168–69 (Hr’g
Tr. at 67–68). Ramirez-Ramos’s family reported the attack, but the police did not investigate or
conduct any arrests. A.R. at 169 (Hr’g Tr. at 68). Another one of her brothers, Jose Selvin, was
killed by the police after he shot a plainclothes officer during an altercation. A.R. at 159 (Hr’g Tr.
at 58).5 The police officers who killed Jose Selvin were never fired or arrested. A.R. at 160 (Hr’g
Tr. at 59). To Ramirez-Ramos’s knowledge, none of her brothers had “ever joined the gangs[,]”
although she is not sure if any of them had ever been recruited. A.R. at 173 (Hr’g Tr. at 72).
According to Ramirez-Ramos, the gang found out that her family had reported the attack
against her brothers Isrráel and Orlando, and mareros came to her mother’s house in August 2016
and told them that they “had 24 hours to leave the house.” A.R. at 169 (Hr’g Tr. at 68); A.R. at
1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589). Ramirez-Ramos stated that the gang members “needed” the
house because the police had kicked them out of their previous lodgings, which the gang had
4Although the hearing transcript uses the phonetic spelling for Isrráel’s name, the death certificate included
as an exhibit confirms that his name is spelled “Isrráel.” A.R. at 250 (Isrráel Gomez Death Certificate).
5Ramirez-Ramos’s asylum application states that the mareros, not the police, killed Jose Selvin. Ramirez-
Ramos stated during her hearing that she did not know why the application said this but clarified that the police had
killed Jose Selvin. A.R. at 188–89 (Hr’g Tr. at 87–88). Jose Selvin’s death certificate confirms the correct spelling
of his name. A.R. at 249 (Jose Selvin Death Certificate).

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similarly seized from their owners. A.R. at 173 (Hr’g Tr. at 72). Ramirez-Ramos and her family
left the house, which the gang then moved into, and relocated to a rental property. A.R. at 170–
71 (Hr’g Tr. at 69–70). Ramirez-Ramos stated that the gangs “always target people that don’t
have anyone to defend them, especially single women.” A.R. at 171 (Hr’g Tr. at 70). At the time
the gang forced them out of their home, Ramirez-Ramos and her family did not have her father,
husband, or brothers living with them. Id.; A.R. 143–44 (Hr’g Tr. At 42–43).
Three days after Ramirez-Ramos’s family left the home, “someone called the police and
informed them that the Mareros had taken [the] houses.” A.R. at 1105 (Supplement B, Form I-
589). The family’s neighbors told them that the mareros “were looking for [them] because they
wanted to kill [them]” because the mareros believed that the family had “reported that [the
mareros] took [the] house.”6 A.R. at 176 (Hr’g Tr. at 75). The mareros continued to call and
harass her mother, who was still paying the mortgage on the house that the gang had taken, telling
her that they knew where she was and “asking her for money.” A.R. at 174 (Hr’g Tr. at 73). The
gang demanded that Ramirez-Ramos’s mother pay them “350,000 lempiras,” equivalent to roughly
$14,000. A.R. at 1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589); HNL to USD, CURRENCYRATE,
https://hnl.currencyrate.today/convert/amount-350000-to-usd.html (last visited July 16, 2024).
At this point, her mother “could not afford any more the rent of the house that [they] were
living [in],” and moved in with Ramirez-Ramos’s sister in San Antonio de Cortés, Honduras. A.R.
at 177 (Hr’g Tr. at 76). Ramirez-Ramos reported that she did not also move in with her sister
because “the situation is the same” there, meaning that “there are gangs and threats.” A.R. at 178
6The Ramirez-Ramos family had not reported the house being taken to the police “out of fear.” A.R. at 174,
176 (Hr’g Tr. at 73, 75).

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(Hr’g Tr. at 77). She instead left Honduras for the United States with her two sons and arrived in
Hidalgo, Texas on August 13, 2016. A.R. at 177 (Hr’g Tr. at 76); A.R. at 1092 (Asylum Appl.).
Since she fled, the gang continues to harass her mother and to live in the house that they took from
Ramirez-Ramos’s family. A.R. at 1105 (Supplement B, Form I-589). The mareros’ past targeting
of her family makes Ramirez-Ramos worry that they will “harm or kill” her or her sons if they
return. Id.
Ramirez-Ramos is concerned about her young sons, who are around the recruitment age
for the gangs. A.R. at 149–50 (Hr’g Tr. at 48–49). She has been separated from her husband since
2015, although they are not formally divorced. A.R. at 182 (Hr’g Tr. at 81). Ramirez-Ramos
testified that it is easier for the gangs to target children of single mothers, like her sons, because
they can intimidate the sons and the mothers, and the gangs can provide money and food to the
children when and if the mother cannot. A.R. at 150–51 (Hr’g Tr. at 49–50). Another young boy
in Villanueva tried to leave the gang after he was recruited, and the gang killed both the young boy
for leaving and his father for helping him do so. A.R. 151 (Hr’g Tr. at 50). According to Ramirez-
Ramos, the police will not help, and if someone does report the mareros to the police, the police
will inform the gang about the report against them, which can result in that reporter being killed.
A.R. at 151–52 (Hr’g Tr. at 50–51).
Ramirez-Ramos believes that she has been targeted in Honduras because of her indigenous
“Indian” status and testified that she does not believe that there is anywhere safe in Honduras, that
she does not think that the police in Honduras could protect her, and that she does not trust the
Honduran police. A.R. at 179 (Hr’g Tr. at 78). Ramirez-Ramos also testified that if she were to
return to Honduras, she believes that her sons would be “at risk [of] physical harm from the gangs.”

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A.R. at 212 (Hr’g Tr. at 111). She talks to her mother on the phone often and testified that her
mother has told her that things in Honduras are “dangerous.” A.R. at 180 (Hr’g Tr. at 79).
B. Procedural History
Ramirez-Ramos sought asylum in the United States based on her membership in five
particular social groups: (1) “[h]er family in kinship”; (2) her “being part of the merchant class”;
(3) her status as a landowner; (4) her single motherhood; and (5) her indigenous heritage. A.R. at
214 (Hr’g Tr. at 113).
In 2019, an IJ denied Ramirez-Ramos’s application for asylum for herself and her sons.
The IJ found that Ramirez-Ramos was credible, A.R. at 92 (IJ Dec. at 5), but concluded that
Ramirez-Ramos had not proffered “cognizable” social groups and that regardless of whether they
were cognizable, she had not been “targeted on account of her membership in them,” A.R. at 95
(IJ Dec. at 8).
First, the IJ evaluated Ramirez-Ramos’s claim that she was being targeted because of her
familial status, assuming arguendo that her family “constitute[d] a particular social group” but
finding that the mareros had not targeted Ramirez-Ramos or her family on the basis of “some
unique characteristic of their family unit.” A.R. at 95–96 (IJ Dec. at 8–9). In reaching this
conclusion, the IJ noted the temporal distance between her brothers’ deaths at the hands of the
mareros and the 2016 forced eviction. Id. The IJ also found that Ramirez-Ramos’s proffered
social groups of “[p]ublic [m]erchants in Honduras,” “landowners,” and “Honduran single
mother[s]” were “not cognizable,” A.R. at 96–97 (IJ Dec. at 9–10), and that, regardless, Ramirez-
Ramos had not sufficiently shown that the mareros had targeted her because of her membership in
any of these groups, id. Finally, the IJ found that Ramirez-Ramos’s proffered group of “Honduran

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[i]ndigenous [w]omen [s]ubject to [s]exual [v]iolence and [p]ersecution” was “not cognizable,”
because it consisted “of a generalized swath of the population whose only, arguably, limiting
characteristic [was] the harm suffered.” A.R. at 97 (IJ Dec. at 10). The IJ acknowledged that
Ramirez-Ramos’s rapist had called her a “derogatory term for Indian” when he assaulted her but
concluded that it was “insufficient to indicate that he targeted her specifically because she is
indigenous, instead of because she was young and alone.” Id.
The IJ then found that Ramirez-Ramos and her sons were “ineligible for withholding of
removal and protection under the [Convention against Torture (“CAT”)] because they [had] failed
to meet their burden of proof in demonstrating the required chance of persecution for asylum,” so
“necessarily” had not met “the higher burdens required for withholding and CAT.” Id. The IJ
therefore ordered Ramirez-Ramos’s and her sons’ removal to Honduras. A.R. at 98 (IJ Dec. at
11). Ramirez-Ramos appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. A.R. at 59 (Not. of Appeal at 1).
The BIA dismissed Ramirez-Ramos’s appeal, reviewing the IJ’s factual findings for clear
error and other issues de novo. A.R. at 3 (BIA Dec. at 1). In considering the IJ’s decision, the
BIA considered each of Ramirez-Ramos’s proffered particular social groups. It concluded that
Ramirez-Ramos’s kinship to individuals that the mareros had killed was insufficient, because there
were other motives behind each of the killings other than family membership. A.R. at 3–4 (BIA
Dec. at 1–2). The BIA found that her brother and uncle had been killed in 2002 “simply as part of
a crime” and that the mareros shot Isrráel and Orlando in 2012 because they were with the neighbor
who had shot gunshots in the air and took credit for the shots. A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2). The BIA
also found that the IJ’s conclusion that Ramirez-Ramos’s sexual assault was more likely an
“opportunistic crime” that was unrelated her indigenous status was not clearly erroneous. Id.

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Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s determination that Ramirez-Ramos had not shown that the
mareros’ “eviction of [her] family from their home and [the mareros’] subsequent threats and
extortion demands” were the result of Ramirez-Ramos’s single motherhood, status as a public
merchant, land ownership, or membership in any other particular social group. A.R. at 4–5 (BIA
Dec. at 2–3). The BIA also concluded that the IJ had not clearly erred in finding that there was
“no link” between Ramirez-Ramos’s family’s alleged reporting of Isrráel’s death in 2012 and their
forced eviction in 2016. Id. Ultimately, the BIA found that Ramirez-Ramos had not
“demonstrate[d] the requisite nexus to a protected ground,” and was therefore ineligible for asylum
or withholding of removal under the INA. A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4). Ramirez-Ramos filed a
timely petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In cases like Ramirez-Ramos’s, where the BIA issued a separate opinion, rather than
summarily affirming the IJ’s decision, we “review the BIA’s decision as the final agency
determination.” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 846 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). We review the IJ’s decision “only ‘[t]o the
extent the BIA adopted the [IJ’s] reasoning.’” Id. (quoting Khalili, 557 F.3d at 435). In reviewing
the BIA’s decision, we “review factual findings under the substantial-evidence standard and
review questions of law de novo,” id., and will reverse factual determinations under the substantial-
evidence standard only if we find that “that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion,
but compels it,” id. at 846–47 (quoting Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Because nexus determinations are findings of fact, we review them under the substantial-evidence

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standard. Id. at 847. We uphold BIA decisions if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). If the IJ found that an individual was credible, we “accept their factual
statements as true.” Id. (quoting Mandebvu v. Holder, 755 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2014)).
B. Ramirez-Ramos’s Asylum Claim
On petition for review, Ramirez-Ramos focuses on whether the BIA erred in finding that
no nexus existed between her proffered particular social groups and her alleged persecution. The
United States claims that, by not raising them in her appellate brief, Ramirez-Ramos waived any
challenges to the BIA’s determinations that the mareros’ killing her brothers and her sexual assault
were not motivated “to any degree” by Ramirez-Ramos’s family membership, indigenous status,
or “any other proposed particular social group,” Resp. Br. at 25, and that the record does not
provide evidence that compels a reversal of the BIA’s determinations, id. at 25–31.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) grants the Attorney General “discretion to
grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of a ‘refugee.’” Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724
F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). “A ‘refugee’ is ‘a person who is unable
or unwilling to return to her home country because of past persecution or a “well-founded fear” of
future persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”’” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 847 (quoting Bonilla-Morales v.
Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010)). “Persecution is ‘the infliction of harm or suffering
by the government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a
characteristic of the victim.’” Id. (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 997 (6th Cir.
2009)).

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For an individual to establish the requisite nexus under the INA between their membership
in a particular social group and their persecution, they must show “that a statutorily protected
ground is ‘at least one central reason’ for their persecution.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Membership in a particular social group is a statutorily protected ground. Id.
We define “particular social group” as “a group of individuals who share a common, immutable
characteristic that is one that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Id. (quoting
Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 2016)). Claimed social groups are “both particular
and socially visible.” Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137. We do not focus on how “populous”
these groups are, but on whether they have shared “immutable or fundamental” characteristics. Bi
Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hong Ying Gao v. Gonzales, 440
F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2006)). In order to determine whether a central reason for persecution “is a
protected ground,” we focus on “the nature of the conduct on which an application for asylum is
based, [and] [] look[] to the overall context of the applicant’s situation.” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87
F.4th at 847 (quoting Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). If an
applicant “fears retribution solely over personal matters,” they are ineligible for asylum. Zoarab
v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2008).
In her petition for review, Ramirez-Ramos argues that the BIA erred when, assuming that
her five proffered characteristics all constituted cognizable particular social groups, it held that she
failed to establish the requisite nexus between those groups and Ramirez-Ramos’s claimed
persecution. Pet. Br. at 19. The United States asserts that the evidence does not compel a reversal

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of the BIA’s conclusion that there exists an insufficient nexus between each of the groups and
Ramirez-Ramos’s persecution in Honduras.7 Resp. Br. at 24–25.
1. Single Motherhood
First, Ramirez-Ramos argues that the record “compels” a different result than the BIA
reached regarding her status as a single mother. Pet. Br. at 20–21.8 She argues that “mareros
targeted her because ‘they always target people that don’t have anyone to defend them, especially
single women.’” Id. at 20. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding in a terse paragraph, concluding that
just because single mothers may be “more vulnerable to harm from gang members because they
are single mothers,” that did not mean that Ramirez-Ramos’s status as a single mother was why
she was targeted. A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3).
We have held, and the BIA appeared to assume, that Honduran “single mothers living
without male protection” are a cognizable social group. See Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th
347, 356–57 (6th Cir. 2023).9 We likewise view this as a sufficiently cognizable social group and
focus our attention on the BIA’s nexus decision.
7The government claims that Ramirez-Ramos waived any challenge to the BIA’s determinations regarding
the murders of her family members and her sexual assault being motivated by her membership in any of her proffered
social groups. Resp. Br. at 25. Although it is not particularly specific, we view her references to her persecution as a
whole in her briefing as sufficient to encompass these earlier events, even though her primary focus in her petition for
review is on the eviction and extortion that happened immediately prior to her leaving Honduras. See Pet. Reply Br.
at 12–13.
8In her petition for review, Ramirez-Ramos appears to combine her single motherhood and indigenous status
into one group. Because the BIA considered these two groups separately, we discuss each of them in turn.
9The Turcios-Flores decision came out after the IJ’s initial review of Ramirez-Ramos’s application in 2019,
in which the IJ did not view Honduran single mothers as a cognizable social group, but before the BIA’s decision on
September 13, 2023. A.R. at 3 (BIA Dec. at 1). After stating that “this social group is not cognizable,” the IJ concluded
that Ramirez-Ramos had also “not established that one central reason the gang targeted her was on account of her
membership in this proffered group.” A.R. at 97 (IJ Dec. at 10).

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Ramirez-Ramos argues in her petition for review that she was targeted for eviction and
extortion because of her status as a single mother. She points to several articles in the
administrative record to support her claim that there is a sufficient nexus between her status as a
single mother and her persecution in Honduras, because single mothers are “particularly vulnerable
to gang threats and violence.” Pet. Br. at 21; see A.R. at 329–30 (ESME Article); A.R. at 377–78
(Left in the Dark Article at 3–4); A.R. at 385 (Honduras 2017 Human Rights Report). Ramirez-
Ramos also points to her credible testimony as compelling a different outcome than the BIA
reached. Pet. Br. at 21.
The articles that Ramirez-Ramos highlights all state that single mothers are a distinct group
of individuals within Honduran society, although none of them discuss eviction and extortion
specifically in the context of this group. Rather, they focus on the enhanced risk of gang violence
directed at single mothers. See A.R. at 329–30 (ESME Article); A.R. at 377–78 (Left in the Dark
Article at 3–4). The Honduras 2017 Human Rights Report does not distinguish single mothers
from the “women and other members of vulnerable populations” that it discusses. A.R. at 385
(Honduras 2017 Human Rights Report). Although credible, Ramirez-Ramos’s testimony also
does not identify any particular statements or actions by the mareros that would indicate that the
reason they had targeted her family for eviction and extortion was because of their status as single
mothers. Given the stringent standard of review that we are bound to follow at this point in the
proceedings, we uphold the BIA’s conclusion that Ramirez-Ramos had not sufficiently established
a nexus between her protected social group of Honduran single mothers and the persecution she
faced in Honduras.

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2. Indigenous Woman
Ramirez-Ramos also seeks review of the BIA’s determination that she did not sufficiently
demonstrate a nexus between her status as an indigenous woman and the persecution that she faced
in Honduras. Pet. Br. at 20–21. The BIA concluded that the IJ did not clearly err when it “found
it more likely that she was the victim of an opportunistic crime, as she was young and alone,”
walking “on a lonely road.” A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2).
In her petition for review, Ramirez-Ramos does not point to any particular reports
regarding indigenous women in Honduras, although the 2017 Honduras Human Rights Report
discusses in brief “threats and violence against indigenous . . . communities.” A.R. at 385
(Honduras 2017 Human Rights Report). Ramirez-Ramos also testified that her rapist referenced
her indigenous status when he assaulted her, A.R. at 165 (Hr’g Tr. at 64), which the IJ and the BIA
both acknowledged. The evidence in the record, however, does not include any other indication
that Ramirez-Ramos had been singled out and targeted because of her indigenous status. Because
we are bound by the substantial-evidence standard at this point in the proceedings, we conclude
that the evidence does not compel a determination that the BIA erred in finding that Ramirez-
Ramos had not sufficiently demonstrated a nexus between her status as an indigenous woman and
her persecution in Honduras.
3. Landowner and Merchant
Next, Ramirez-Ramos argues that she sufficiently established a nexus between her and her
family’s status as both landowners and merchants and the persecution that she faced in Honduras.
Pet. Br. at 22. The BIA found that she had “not shown that the gang wanted to overcome [her
family’s] characteristic of being landowners,” and upheld the IJ’s finding that the home ownership

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was not why the mareros had targeted Ramirez-Ramos’s family. A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3). It also
concluded that there was “no indication that the gang took over the store, had any interest in the
operation of the store, wanted [Ramirez-Ramos’s family] to cease operation of the store, or had
animosity toward business owners as a group.” Id.
We have held, and the BIA appeared to assume, that “Honduran landownership”
constitutes a “fundamental characteristic” shared by a particular social group. Turcios-Flores, 67
F.4th at 354–55; A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3).10 In addition to her credible testimony, including about
the mareros’ extortion of lempiras from her mother, Ramirez-Ramos points to reports “explaining
precisely why gang members in Honduras single out landowners and merchants for persecution.”
Pet. Br. at 23. For example, the 2016 Human Rights Report on Honduras stated that “[v]iolence
and land-rights disputes involving . . . landowners . . . continued in rural areas.” A.R. at 1192
(Honduras 2016 Human Rights Report). However, there is not much evidence in the record that
specifically ties Ramirez-Ramos’s persecution to her status as either a landowner or a merchant.
The closest that Ramirez-Ramos gets to demonstrating that there is a nexus between her
membership in these groups and her persecution is her credible testimony that she believed at least
part of the reason that she and her family were targeted for eviction by the mareros was because
they owned the house, whereas “almost everyone” else in the area rents. A.R. at 203 (Hr’g Tr. at
102). Nonetheless, Ramirez-Ramos has not pointed to anything in the record that would compel
a reversal of the BIA’s decision regarding this particular social group.
10The BIA also noted that Ramirez-Ramos’s mother, rather than Ramirez-Ramos herself, owned the home,
and therefore concluded that Ramirez-Ramos did not belong to the group of landowners. A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3).
However, we need not address that alternative reason set forth by the BIA.

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4. Family Membership
Finally, Ramirez-Ramos argues that the BIA erred in finding that her membership in her
family was not sufficiently connected to her persecution, because there was “no indication that the
family was targeted on account of their familial relation,” or that “the gang [had] expressed any
particular animosity toward the family.” A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3). The BIA relied on the “passage
of time” and the “lack of interest from the gang in the interim” between the 2012 shooting of Isrráel
and Orlando and Ramirez-Ramos’s family’s forced eviction in 2016. Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the BIA also noted that “retaliatory motive[s]” here do not “create a nexus to”
Ramirez-Ramos’s membership in any proffered particular social group. Id.
Ramirez-Ramos points to testimony that supports her claim that the gang has targeted her
family before, most notably the “general extortionate activities against the family as a whole.” Pet.
Br. at 24–25. The BIA concluded that a retaliatory motive based on the gang’s belief that her
family had reported the gang to the police did “not create a nexus to [her] membership in any of
her proffered particular social groups.” A.R. 5 (BIA Dec. at 3). “[I]f [an] applicant ‘fears
retribution solely over personal matters,” asylum is not available to them. Sebastian-Sebastian,
87 F.4th at 847 (quoting Zoarab, 524 F.3d at 781). However, “the simultaneous existence of”
personal matters does not negate a nexus if one otherwise exists. Id. (quoting Bi Xia Qu, 618 F.3d
at 608). As we stated recently, if an applicant for asylum was persecuted “based on mixed
motives,” they may still qualify for asylum, as long as “at least one central reason” for their
persecution was a statutorily protected ground. Id. at 848.
Family membership “is widely recognized by the caselaw” as a particular social group. Al-
Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 995. Individuals who claim family membership as their particular social

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group must show that their alleged persecutors held a “particular animus” toward that individual’s
family that caused them to “single[] [the family] out for [] persecution.” Turcios-Flores, 67 F.4th
at 357. In her petition for review, Ramirez-Ramos argues that she was persecuted on account of
her family membership, because “the mareros who had taken over the family home mistakenly
believed that it was [] Ramirez-Ramos’s family that had reported them to police.” Pet. Br. at 24.
She asserts that she “was therefore exposed to persecution because she was a member in a family
that the gang had decided to pursue and that the gang believed had reported their actions to
authorities.” Id. at 25.
In this case, Ramirez-Ramos does not point to sufficient evidence in the record that would
compel our finding that the BIA had failed to consider that her family membership was “one central
reason” for Ramirez-Ramos’s persecution. The shooting of her brothers Isrráel and Orlando
appears to have been instigated by the neighbor shooting into the air, based on Ramirez-Ramos’s
testimony, and she does not point to any other evidence that would tend to indicate her family had
been targeted for this act of violence based on factors that are specific to them. Her focus in her
petition for review, the eviction and extortion of her family, began after Ramirez-Ramos’s
neighbor warned them that the mareros were looking for her family because they believed that the
family had reported the 2012 shooting to the police. Asylum is not available for fears of
“retribution solely over personal matters,” Zoarab, 524 F.3d at 781, though, and Ramirez-Ramos
does not advance evidence that would compel us to conclude that the gang was specifically
targeting her family because of a particular animus against them. In fact, Ramirez-Ramos testified
that the gang came to target her family and force them to evacuate their house only after the police

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had kicked the gang out of the previous house they had taken, and the gang members “didn’t have
[any]where to live” and “needed” her family’s house. A.R. 173 (Hr’g Tr. at 72).
Family membership is a recognized particular social group, and demonstrating persecution
because of membership in a family toward whom individuals or groups have specific animus can
serve as the basis for asylum. Here, however, Ramirez-Ramos does not put forth evidence that
would compel us to conclude that her family was targeted by the gang members on behalf of their
unique and shared characteristics, rather than for personal retaliation or personal gain purposes.
Given the standard by which we are bound at this stage in the proceedings, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Ramirez-Ramos did not demonstrate
the required nexus between the harmful events she suffered and her membership in her family
group.
C. Ramirez-Ramos’s Withholding of Removal Claim
Ramirez-Ramos also claims that the BIA committed a legal error in finding that she had
not carried her burden on her application for withholding of removal. Pet. Br. at 36–37. The
United States contends that Ramirez-Ramos has not exhausted her argument that the BIA
“incorrectly applied the ‘one central reason’ legal nexus standard for asylum” to her withholding
of removal claim and that, regardless, the legal distinction is irrelevant here because the BIA found
that Ramirez-Ramos’s protected grounds were “not a motive at all for [her] alleged persecution.”
Resp. Br. at 21–23. In her reply brief, Ramirez-Ramos argues that the BIA “ha[d] the duty to
apply the new precedent.” Pet. Reply Br. at 11.
As a preliminary matter, we hold that Ramirez-Ramos did not waive her argument that the
BIA applied the wrong standard to her withholding of removal claims. Whether Ramirez-Ramos

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had raised the difference in standards in her appeal to the BIA or not, the BIA had a duty to apply
the appropriate legal standard to her claim. See Abdulahad v. Garland, 99 F.4th 275, 286 (6th Cir.
2024).
In Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, we explained that the nexus showing required to justify
withholding of removal is less than what is required to justify granting asylum. 959 F.3d 253, 274
(6th Cir. 2020). Instead of having to demonstrate that a statutorily protected ground was “at least
one central reason” for their persecution, as required for asylum claims, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), applicants for withholding of removal must show that their social group was
“at least one reason for their persecution[,]” Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at 274 (applying 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)). As a result of the statutory language, we apply a lower standard of proof of nexus
in withholding of removal claims than we do for asylum claims. See id.; see also Vasquez-Rivera
v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 910 (6th Cir. 2024).
“[W]ithholding of removal is mandatory if the applicant can establish a clear probability
of future persecution.” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 851 (quoting Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487
F.3d 396, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2007)). “[C]lear probability” is “more than a 50 percent likelihood of
persecution.” Id. (quoting Mapouya, 487 F.3d at 414). When the BIA evaluates an applicant’s
asylum and withholding of withdrawal in tandem, without “‘examin[ing] the evidence and
mak[ing] specific findings regarding the probability’ of persecution with respect to the withholding
of removal claim,” then we lack “sufficient grounds to review the [BIA’s] decision under the
substantial evidence standard.” Id. (quoting Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 797 (6th Cir.
2020)).

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Here, the BIA did not announce what standard it was applying to Ramirez-Ramos’s asylum
and withholding of removal claims but concluded that because Ramirez-Ramos had not shown the
“requisite nexus to a protected ground,” she was ineligible for both asylum and withholding of
removal. A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4). We emphasize that asylum and withholding of removal claims
have different nexus standards that the BIA must apply, and that withholding of removal claims
require only a showing that membership in a social group was at least one reason for persecution.
Here, however, the BIA’s language throughout the opinion indicates that it found “no link” or “no
indication” between Ramirez-Ramos’s membership in her various particular social groups and her
persecution. A.R. at 4–5 (BIA Dec. at 2–3). The language that the BIA used throughout its opinion
in referencing its nexus findings demonstrates that even though the withholding of removal claim
is subject to a lesser nexus standard, Ramirez-Ramos still failed to meet that standard here.
III. CONCLUSION
We DENY the petition for review.

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McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the result of the majority opinion.
I write separately because I am skeptical of the different nexus standards for asylum and
withholding of removal claims introduced in Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, which the majority
reiterates here. 959 F.3d 253, 270–74 (6th Cir. 2020). My reluctance to fully embrace these
standards is shared by several of my colleagues on this court. See id. at 286–90 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting); Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 909–10 (6th Cir. 2024) (stating that a lower
nexus requirement for withholding of removal “is hard to square with the traditional understanding
that ‘asylum requires a lower standard of proof’ than does withholding of removal.”).

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