United States of America v. Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0009p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SHAWN LAMAR PEAKE-WRIGHT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 23-1898
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:22-cr-00173-1—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge.
Argued: December 11, 2024
Decided and Filed: January 16, 2025
Before: GILMAN, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Edward M. Heindel, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen P. Baker, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Edward M. Heindel, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen P. Baker, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr. moved to
suppress evidence that a gun was recovered from one of his jacket pockets during a traffic stop.
The district court denied his motion. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The stop
On a bitterly cold night in December 2022, Peake-Wright was riding in the passenger seat
of a car driven by his friend Kimberly Manney in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Sgt. Timothy Millard
was patrolling downtown Kalamazoo at the time. When Manney’s car passed him, Sgt. Millard
saw the passenger, later identified as Peake-Wright, turn his head away from the officer’s line of
sight.
Sgt. Millard ran a computer check on the license plate of the car and discovered that the
car was registered to Manney, who had a suspended driver’s license and an outstanding warrant
for her arrest. This caused Sgt. Millard to pull over the car into a nearby driveway and ask
Manney for her driver’s license. Manney informed him that she had only a learner’s permit.
At this point, Sgt. Millard recognized Peake-Wright. He knew from prior encounters that
Peake-Wright had an extensive criminal history. Sgt. Millard took identification from both
Peake-Wright and Manney to see if Peake-Wright had a valid driver’s license, which would
allow Manney to legally drive with her learner’s permit. He then stepped away from the car to
run a computer check on Peake-Wright’s driver’s license and to research Manney’s open arrest
warrant.
Several minutes later, Officer Timothy Prichard arrived on the scene and knocked on the
passenger-side window. Peake-Wright did not immediately respond, but instead removed his
jacket, even though the temperature outside was bitterly cold, the car was no longer running, and
the backseat window on the driver’s side was rolled down. He then opened the passenger-side
door, explaining that the passenger-side window did not roll down, and stood up outside. Both
officers asked him to sit back down multiple times. Peake-Wright continued standing, asking:
“[W]hat’s the problem?”, but he eventually got back into the car. The district court characterized
Peake-Wright’s behavior at the time as “amped up” and “freak[ed] out.”
Peake-Wright stood up again despite the officers’ objections, appeared distressed, and
asked why more officers had begun to arrive on the scene. At this point, Officer Prichard
handcuffed him and told him that he was being detained (he was not, at this point, under arrest)

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No. 23-1898 United States v. Peake-Wright Page 3
for obstructing the traffic stop. Peake-Wright continued to protest as Officer Prichard put him in
the backseat of a police car that was parked in the driveway.
Sgt. Millard then walked down the driveway to Manney, who was now waiting in the
street, and asked for permission to search her car. He told her that he “ha[d] a history with
Shawn” and was concerned that Peake-Wright “has something in his jacket that’s sitting in the
front seat[, t]hat’s why he took it off, and I’m worried about what he left in [the] vehicle.”
Manney declined to give consent. Sgt. Millard then returned to his car to continue waiting for
information about Manney’s outstanding arrest warrant. During the next several minutes, Sgt.
Millard received word from the jurisdiction that had issued the warrant that it did not want to
book Manney into jail at that time. Sgt. Millard then informed Manney that she would not be
arrested, but that a narcotics dog, which had already arrived on the scene, would sniff around the
perimeter of her car.
Around this time, Officer Prichard received information over his radio that Peake-Wright
had an outstanding arrest warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Prichard then placed
Peake-Wright under arrest and searched him.
Back at Manney’s car, the dog completed its sniff. It did not give an alert for controlled
substances. When Sgt. Millard learned that the dog did not give an alert, he announced to
Manney that he was going to get Peake-Wright’s jacket from her car, but that he was “not
worried about [Manney’s] purse or anything like that.” Sgt. Millard then lifted the jacket and,
upon noticing its weight, turned it around. It was apparent to him that there was a heavy object
weighing down one of the pockets. He reached inside and discovered a loaded 9mm pistol inside
a sock.
B. Procedural history
A grand jury indicted Peake-Wright for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Peake-Wright moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that the discovery was the
result of an unlawful search and seizure. The district court held a suppression hearing in April
2023. Manney, Sgt. Millard, and Officer Prichard testified. Following argument from the
parties, the court delivered an oral opinion. It held that the automobile exception to an otherwise

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unlawful warrantless search applied because Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and criminal
history gave rise to probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.
Peake-Wright subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to
challenge the district court’s suppression decision on appeal. This timely appeal followed.
Peake-Wright argues on appeal that the police unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop during
which the search occurred and that they lacked probable cause to search his jacket.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
“When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the
district court’s findings of fact under the clear-error standard[,] and we review its conclusions of
law de novo.” United States v. Ickes, 922 F.3d 708, 710 (6th Cir. 2019). Because the court
denied Peake-Wright’s motion, “we review all evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2009); see also United States
v. Huff, 630 F. App’x 471, 476, 498 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the clear-error standard to factual
findings based on video evidence).
B. The stop was reasonable in duration
Peake-Wright challenges the legality of not only the search, but also the duration of the
stop during which it occurred. We therefore first analyze the reasonableness of the stop. Peake-
Wright argues that the stop became unlawful when it “lasted well past any original reason for the
stop.” We find this argument unpersuasive because Peake-Wright’s strange behavior during the
stop gave rise to an independent reasonable suspicion that justified prolonging the stop. That
reasonable suspicion did not dissipate prior to the search of his jacket.
Peake-Wright does not dispute that the police were justified in initially stopping the car
because they had reason to believe that Manney was driving with a suspended license. Rather,
he challenges only the duration of the stop. “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the
traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.

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348, 354 (2015) (citation omitted). “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop,
[the stop] may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to
the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id.; see also United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting that, in determining the reasonable duration of
a stop, “it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation”).
During a lawful traffic stop, the Fourth Amendment allows “certain unrelated
investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; see
also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 –28, 333 (2009) (police questioning); Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406–08 (2005) (dog sniff). But a stop “becomes unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” its original “mission.” Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 350–51 (cleaned up). “An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop . . . . But . . . he may not do so in a way that
prolongs the stop.” Id. at 355.
The police may continue a traffic stop “beyond what was reasonably necessary to
investigate the original cause for the stop” only if the continued stop is “grounded in independent
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304, 309 (6th Cir. 2023). That is, the
police may prolong a stop based on a reasonable suspicion that arises from unrelated checks
conducted during the initial stop. See id. at 309–10 (holding that “the district court’s opinion
properly sanctioned a traffic stop . . . ‘fairly responsive to the emerging tableau’” (quoting
United States v. Dion, 859 F.3d 114, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2017))). “A reasonable suspicion exists
when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a police officer has ‘a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” United States
v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Baldwin, 114 F. App’x 675,
679 (6th Cir. 2004)). The totality of the circumstances “includes the officer’s own observations
as well as information the officer receives from police reports, dispatch, and fellow officers,”
plus “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” and “inferences the officer
may draw based on his experience and specialized training.” United States v. McCallister, 39
F.4th 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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The stop in the present case was not unreasonably prolonged. Upon stopping the car, the
police “diligently pursued,” see Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, the investigation of Manney’s open
arrest warrant by radioing for more information. The officers then conducted lawful “unrelated
checks,” see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, while awaiting the results of that inquiry, by asking
Manney and Peake-Wright questions and by checking for warrants on Peake-Wright. Peake-
Wright does not dispute that the police were diligent in their investigation of Manney’s warrant,
nor does he argue that any of the actions they took during that investigation improperly
prolonged the stop.
The police completed their investigation of Manney’s open arrest warrant after
approximately 14 minutes. By this time, the totality of the circumstances—including
Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and his criminal history—gave the officers the “independent
reasonable suspicion,” see Williams, 68 F.4th at 309, required to continue detaining him.
Peake-Wright does not contest this conclusion. Rather he argues that any independent
reasonable suspicion dissipated upon the drug-sniffing dog’s failure to alert to the presence of
drugs. He contends that by the time Sgt. Millard searched his jacket, the stop had transformed
into an unlawful seizure, rendering the search unlawful. True enough, this court has held that
“[t]he failure of a drug dog to alert . . . dispels mere reasonable suspicion absent some reason to
question the reliability of the drug dog.” Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 2018). And
there is no evidence in the record here that the officers had any reason to question the reliability
of the dog. “The failure of a drug dog to alert,” however, “may not always dispel probable
cause.” Id. For the reasons set forth below, the officers in the present case had probable cause to
pursue the search of Peake-Wright’s jacket. The dog’s failure to alert did not destroy that
probable cause because the factors contributing to that determination did not point specifically to
drug possession as opposed to the possession of other types of contraband, such as a weapon.
C. The search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
Having determined that the duration of the stop was lawful, we now turn to the legality of
the search, which we analyze under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The
owner of a car has a “reduced expectation[] of privacy” in his car due to its “ready mobility.”

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California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). “[T]his diminished expectation of privacy is
what justifie[s] the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Taylor v. City of Saginaw,
922 F.3d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2019). The automobile exception permits officers to search a vehicle
without a warrant if they “have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a
crime.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “[W]here
police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, they may search the
entire vehicle and any containers located within it.” United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 969
(6th Cir. 1993). Moreover, “the Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an
automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.” California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991) (holding that probable cause to believe a paper bag in a car contained
marijuana permitted a warrantless search of that paper bag, even though probable cause did not
extend to other areas of the car). The police in the present case could therefore lawfully search
Peake-Wright’s jacket if they had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband.
“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57
(2018) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). It consists of “reasonable
grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”
Smith, 510 F.3d at 647–48 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th
Cir. 1998)). Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 585 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 586).
“The court’s determination of whether probable cause existed at the time of the search is
a ‘commonsense, practical question to be judged from the totality-of-the-circumstances.’” Smith,
510 F.3d at 648 (cleaned up). “In determining whether there was probable cause, the court does
not look to events that occurred after the search or to the subjective intent of the officers; rather,
the court looks at the ‘objective facts known to the officers at the time of the search.’” Id. at 648
(quoting Thornburg, 136 F.3d at 1075).
The district court reasonably concluded that the following factual circumstances gave rise
to probable cause to believe that Peake-Wright’s jacket contained contraband: the fact that
Peake-Wright turned away from Sgt. Millard when the officer first spotted the car; Peake-

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Wright’s abrupt removal of his jacket, despite the freezing temperature, when Officer Prichard
approached the passenger window; Peake-Wright’s repeated disobedience of the officers’
instructions to remain seated, which ended only when the officers detained him for obstructing
the traffic stop; and the officers’ familiarity with Peake-Wright’s criminal history, which included
the unlawful possession of firearms. Video footage in the record further supports the district
court’s finding that Peake-Wright “freaked out” when the officers approached him. The video
shows that he was agitated and argumentative throughout the stop and that he appeared to be
trying to distance himself from his jacket.
None of these factors gives rise to probable cause on its own, but each is relevant to the
probable-cause inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 770 (6th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that “evasive behavior and nervousness may be considered as part of the probable
cause analysis”); United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that
although a person’s criminal history is “not dispositive,” it is “relevant to the probable cause
inquiry”). Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err
in holding that there was probable cause to search Peake-Wright’s jacket.
We emphasize that our holding is specific to the facts of this case. Erratic or combative
behavior plus a criminal history will not always add up to probable cause for a search. The
probable-cause inquiry is based on the totality of the-circumstances, and “there is no specific
formula” for probable cause. United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1988). But
here we place significant weight on the fact that much of Peake-Wright’s unusual behavior
revolved around his jacket. That gave the police probable cause to search the jacket, and the
jacket alone.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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