Misty Coleman v. Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners, Charmaine McGuffey

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0051p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MISTY COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
CHARMAINE MCGUFFEY; BETHANIE DREW; COLINA
YATES; MORGAN BOLEN; TIMOTHY SCHOLZ; FRITZ
ELSASSER; NAPHCARE, INC.; MICHAEL J. PEGRAM, JR.;
LAUREN A. SLACK; JENNA N. WARD; DONALD L. HAUN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 24-3453
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:22-cv-00319—Matthew W. McFarland, District Judge.
Argued: December 11, 2024
Decided and Filed: March 7, 2025
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BUSH and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Lydia A. Caylor, CORS & BASSETT, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
James S. Sayre, HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for the Hamilton County Appellees. Michael P. Foley, RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY &
DENNIS, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the NaphCare Appellees. ON BRIEF: Lydia A. Caylor,
CORS & BASSETT, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. James S. Sayre, HAMILTON
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Hamilton
County Appellees. Michael P. Foley, RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS, LLP, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for the NaphCare Appellees.
>

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No. 24-3453 Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, et al. Page 2
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after
slipping on the wet shower floor of a county jail. This accident led Coleman to pursue
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the
county and many corrections officers and medical personnel. The district court dismissed all
claims against all parties. Coleman’s appeal raises a mix of substantive and procedural
questions. As for the substantive: Did Coleman adequately allege that the slippery shower
violated the Due Process Clause? Did she adequately allege that a county policy or custom was
behind her poor medical care? And may the county invoke state-law immunity from her
negligence claim at the pleading stage? As for the procedural: When did Coleman’s claims
accrue and start the running of the statute of limitations? Did her amended complaint (which
named actual corrections officers and medical personnel) “relate back” to the date of her original
complaint (which named “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants) for statute-of-limitations
purposes? And can Coleman rely on equitable tolling to delay the running of the limitations
period? We agree with the district court on the answers to all six questions. We thus affirm its
dismissal of Coleman’s complaint.
I
Coleman’s complaint asserts a mix of factual allegations and legal conclusions. At the
pleading stage, we must accept the truth of the alleged facts but not the legal conclusions about
those facts. See Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 511–12 (6th Cir. 2020).
In June 2020, the authorities took Coleman into custody on unidentified charges and
confined her at the Hamilton County Justice Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. 2d Am. Compl., R.28,
PageID 225. The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office runs this jail. Id. On June 18, corrections
officers escorted Coleman to the jail showers. Id. As Coleman exited, she slipped and fell on
the wet floor. Id. Coleman fractured her left ankle. Id. The jail administrators had provided
Coleman with what she describes as “inappropriate” and “unsafe” flip-flops to take a shower.

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Id., PageID 225–26. Her complaint alleges that this footwear “exacerbated” the “dangerous
condition” of the wet shower floor. Id. It adds that the “slippery and dangerous condition” of
that wet floor was “hidden” from her. Id., PageID 226. And it says that the Hamilton County
Sheriff and the various corrections officers working on the day of her accident knew of this risky
condition. Id. In fact, unknown officers told her that other inmates had also slipped and fallen.
Id.
Coleman requested immediate medical aid after her fall. Id. NaphCare, a private
company, had contracted with Hamilton County to provide medical care to inmates. Id., PageID
222–23. The officers watching Coleman notified NaphCare employees of Coleman’s injuries.
Id., PageID 226–27. These private employees moved her to the “medical area in a wheelchair.”
Id., PageID 227. Coleman had an open cut and “significant swelling and bruising” at this time.
Id. She also complained of “excruciating pain” to the NaphCare medical personnel. Id. But
they only gave her “an ice pack and ibuprofen.” Id. The employees otherwise kept her untreated
in a “holding cell” for about four hours. Id. When another corrections officer discovered a
“visibly distraught” Coleman in this cell, the officer ordered the NaphCare personnel to properly
treat her. Id. Coleman’s broken ankle eventually required surgery. Id., PageID 229.
In May 2022, almost two years after this accident, Coleman sued the following
defendants in state court: the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners, the Hamilton County
Sheriff’s Office, the current sheriff, the former sheriff at the time of her injury, two “John/Jane
Doe” corrections officers, and two “John/Jane Doe” nurses. Compl., R.2, PageID 20–22. After
a defendant removed the suit to federal court, Coleman filed an amended complaint that alleged
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law. 1st Am.
Compl., R.7, PageID 63–64. She asserted that the defendants had violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments and had acted negligently both by allowing the slippery conditions in
the jail showers and by failing to properly treat her injuries after her fall. See id., PageID 59–64.
The district court dismissed most of these claims. Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, 2023 WL 4466855, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2023). It dismissed the claims
against the sheriff’s office because that office lacked the capacity to be sued. See id. at *2. It
dismissed the claims against the former sheriff because Coleman had sued him only in his

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official capacity, but he no longer held the office. See id. at *3. It treated the § 1983 claims
against the Board and the current sheriff as claims against Hamilton County because Coleman
had also sued them in their official capacities. Id. And to state a claim against the county under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Coleman had to allege that an
unconstitutional county policy or practice caused her injuries. See Coleman, 2023 WL 4466855,
at *3. She failed to do so. The court held that her claims challenging the slippery conditions did
not allege a plausible constitutional violation. Id. at *4. It next held that she failed to allege that
Hamilton County had a policy or practice of providing inadequate medical care. Id. Turning to
the negligence claim, the court held that Ohio law would grant immunity to Hamilton County on
the alleged facts. See id. at *4–5. That said, the court did not dismiss the case in its entirety. It
allowed Coleman “to conduct limited discovery” to identify the unnamed officers and nurses.
See id. at *5–6.
Coleman later filed a second amended complaint. During the litigation, she learned of
Hamilton County’s contract with NaphCare. She thus brought NaphCare and four of its medical
staff into the suit. 2d Am. Compl., R.28, PageID 222–23. She also sued five Hamilton County
corrections officers who had worked at the jail on the date of her accident. Id., PageID 221–22.
Hamilton County and the corrections officers moved to dismiss the complaint. NaphCare
and its employees moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted both motions and
dismissed the complaint for good. Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2024 WL
1897559, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2024). It held that the two-year statute of limitations barred
the claims against these new defendants because Coleman filed the complaint adding them over
two years after she suffered her accident in June 2020. See id. at *2–4.
Coleman appealed. We review a decision granting a motion to dismiss and for judgment
on the pleadings de novo. See Rudd, 977 F.3d at 511.
II. Claims Against Hamilton County
Coleman first challenges the dismissal of her constitutional and negligence claims against
the current Hamilton County Sheriff and Board of County Commissioners. Because Coleman
sued these parties in their official capacities, she effectively sued Hamilton County itself under

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No. 24-3453 Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, et al. Page 5
§ 1983 and Ohio law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Lambert v.
Clancy, 927 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ohio 2010). But she has failed to plausibly plead either claim
against the county.
A. Constitutional Claim
Section 1983 allows Coleman to sue any “person” that “subjects” her to the “deprivation”
of a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ever since Monell, the Supreme Court has held that
the word “person” includes municipalities like Hamilton County. 436 U.S. at 690–95. To allege
a Monell claim against the county, Coleman must allege facts that “plausibly suggest” two
things. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009); see Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., 109 F.4th 864, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2024). She must first allege that her injuries arose from an
unconstitutional act. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021). She
must then “connect” that act to a county policy or custom. Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th
391, 408 (6th Cir. 2022); see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61 (2011).
Coleman’s attempt to satisfy the first requirement gets off to a shaky start because she
does not identify the provision of the Constitution on which she relies. Her complaint cited both
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on the deprivation of “liberty” “without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amends. VIII, XIV, § 1. But the Eighth Amendment applies only to prisoners who have been
sentenced for a crime, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees who await
their trial. See Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman County, 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024). In
recent years, we have adopted a more lenient test for pretrial detainees than for convicted
prisoners. See id. at 927. Yet Coleman’s complaint does not allege whether she was a convicted
prisoner or a pretrial detainee at the time of her accident. How should a court resolve a motion to
dismiss when a complaint’s allegations do not state enough facts to reveal the constitutional right
at stake? We can save this question for another day. Coleman’s counsel stated at oral argument
that the jail held her as a pretrial detainee. Because she cannot satisfy the more lenient test that
this outside-the-complaint statement triggers, we will assume that we may rely on the statement
to resolve the uncertainty.

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Corrections officers must protect convicted prisoners from harm under the Eighth
Amendment, and they must protect pretrial detainees from harm under the Due Process Clause.
See id. at 926. An inmate can suffer harm in varying ways. See Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th
524, 534 (6th Cir. 2021). Other detainees might assault the inmate. See id. The inmate might
encounter a health problem that needs medical care. See id. Or a dangerous condition in the jail
might injure the inmate. See id. To establish an officer’s liability for this harm, our traditional
Eighth Amendment test requires inmates to prove that an officer acted with “deliberate
indifference” to the risk that the harm would come about. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1991). That test contains both objective and
subjective elements. See Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534. The risk of harm must rise to a “sufficiently
serious” level as an objective matter. Id.; see Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. And the officer must act
with a “sufficiently culpable” mental state as a subjective matter. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(citation omitted). Our recent due-process test (the one applicable in Coleman’s case) follows
the same framework, except it adopts a less demanding subjective element. See Lawler, 93 F.4th
at 927.
Turning to the other Monell requirement, Coleman must do more than show a due-
process violation because § 1983 does not permit her to hold Hamilton County vicariously liable
for its employees’ conduct. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. She must instead prove that the
violation arose from one of Hamilton County’s policies or customs. An inmate can allege this
type of policy or custom in different ways. Perhaps the county adopted “official policies” that
sanctioned the unconstitutional risk of harm. Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 408. Or perhaps the county’s
training policies failed to adequately teach corrections officers about how to avoid the
unconstitutional failure to protect inmates. See id.; see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. Or maybe
the county had a custom of ratifying prior unconstitutional failures to protect and thereby
encouraged officers to commit future violations. See Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483,
494–95 (6th Cir. 2020).
Coleman’s complaint attempts to meet these Monell standards by alleging two distinct
constitutional violations. She first alleges that Hamilton County disregarded the risk of harm
from the slippery shower. She next alleges that the medical personnel provided constitutionally

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inadequate medical care after she slipped and broke her ankle. But her first argument fails to
allege a constitutional violation, and her second one fails to connect any alleged violation to the
county.
Slippery Floor. Coleman’s complaint does not “plausibly suggest” that the conditions of
the jail shower violated the Due Process Clause. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. We need not discuss
the subjective element of this claim (the one relaxed by our recent precedent) because she cannot
satisfy the objective element. That element requires Coleman to allege more than the
unreasonable risk of harm that might establish a negligence claim. See Lamb v. Howe, 677
F. App’x 204, 208–09 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535. Rather, Coleman must
allege facts showing that the risk of harm deprived her of “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities[.]” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)). But she has not made that showing because the risk that shower floors will be slippery
exists for all showers—whether located inside or outside a jail’s walls. See Lamb, 677 F. App’x
at 209; see also Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 2014); Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d
756, 764–65 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (10th
Cir. 2004); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). An ordinary risk that every
member of the public faces everyday falls well below what is required to show an
unconstitutional risk for inmates.
To be sure, we have suggested in dicta that slippery shower floors when combined with
“exacerbating factors” (such as the fact that a “disabled” inmate “had to use crutches”) can
establish an objectively intolerable risk of harm. Lamb, 677 F. App’x at 209. But Coleman’s
proposed exacerbating factors—that she had to wear “inappropriate” and “unsafe” flip flops and
that other inmates had fallen in the past—do not resemble the types of factors that we have
opined might suffice. 2d Am. Compl., R.28, PageID 225–26. Jails provide shower footwear to
(among other things) reduce the risk of slipping, and Coleman offers no factual details to support
her “legal conclusions” that her flip flops were either inappropriate or unsafe. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Further, the unknown number of prior accidents, at most, might suggest that the jail had
negligently maintained the shower facilities. See Coleman, 745 F.3d at 759, 764–65. These
factors do not establish that a non-slippery shower floor qualifies as one of the “minimal

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No. 24-3453 Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, et al. Page 8
civilized measure[s] of life’s necessities” that inmates cannot go without. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
347.
Medical Care. Coleman’s complaint next fails to tie the purportedly inadequate medical
care that she received after her fall to a Hamilton County policy or custom. See Connick, 563
U.S. at 60–61. Her complaint does not allege that Hamilton County had an official policy of
mistreating injured inmates. And the complaint identified only her “single instance” of neglect,
which alone does not plausibly allege a continuous custom of tolerating inadequate care.
Franklin v. Franklin County, 115 F.4th 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Indeed,
Coleman’s opening brief did not even identify this additional element of a Monell claim—let
alone describe the theory on which she relied to hold the county liable. She thus forfeited any
potentially applicable Monell theories. See Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 105 F.4th 868,
881–82 (6th Cir. 2024).
B. Negligence Claim
Coleman’s negligence claim against Hamilton County fares no better. Ohio grants its
political subdivisions immunity from damages claims arising out of a “governmental or
proprietary function.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(A)(1); see Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of
Child. & Fam. Servs., 889 N.E.2d 521, 523–25 (Ohio 2008). But this state law contains
exceptions. It does not grant immunity if a plaintiff’s claim arises from negligent driving, the
negligent maintenance of public roads, the negligent performance of a proprietary function, or a
physical defect in a public building. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B)(1)–(4). That said, the
exception for physical defects in public buildings expressly excludes jails from its reach. Id.
§ 2744.02(B)(4). And the operation of a jail qualifies as a “government” function, so it falls
outside the exception for negligently performing a proprietary function. Id. § 2744.01(C)(2)(h).
Coleman thus does not argue that her negligence claim could plausibly fall within any exception
to immunity.
Then how does she seek to salvage this claim? She suggests that Ohio state courts would
not permit Hamilton County to invoke its immunity defense at this stage under Ohio’s pleading
rules. She likely misconstrues Ohio law. Cf. Carelli v. Canfield Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

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126 N.E.3d 1232, 1238 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). Regardless, state pleading rules are beside the
point in federal court. We must follow the pleading standards in Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) even for state claims. See Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, LLC,
114 F.4th 605, 613–14 (6th Cir. 2024); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.,
559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010). And these Civil Rules permit courts to invoke an immunity defense at
the pleading stage if a complaint’s allegations show the defendant’s entitlement to immunity.
See Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 763–66 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Carmichael v. City of
Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2014). This federal pleading principle dooms
Coleman’s negligence claim because, again, she has not even tried to fit that claim within any
immunity exception.
III. Claims Against NaphCare and Individual Defendants
Coleman next challenges the statute-of-limitations dismissal of her constitutional and
negligence claims against NaphCare, the four NaphCare employees, and the five Hamilton
County corrections officers. She added these defendants when she filed her second amended
complaint in September 2023. But Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury
suits applies to her § 1983 and negligence claims against these parties. See Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2305.10(A); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Because
Coleman’s complaint alleges that her slip-and-fall accident occurred in June 2020, her own
allegations suggest that she filed the claims outside this limitations period. See Cataldo v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012). Coleman nevertheless offers three reasons why
she timely filed the claims. Her arguments require us to consider three questions: When did the
claims accrue? Did the claims “relate back” to her original complaint? And should we equitably
toll the limitations period?
A. When Did Coleman’s Claims Accrue?
The statute of limitations did not begin to run until Coleman’s claims accrued. See
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 370 (2017). Coleman argues that her claims against
NaphCare and its employees accrued not on the date that she slipped and fell (in June 2020) but
on the date that she discovered their identities (in October 2022). The latter date would render

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Coleman’s federal and state claims timely. But she misunderstands the accrual rules that govern
those claims.
Federal Claims. Although § 1983 incorporates the most analogous state statute of
limitations, courts determine the accrual date of § 1983 claims using federal standards. See
Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). And although the Supreme
Court has presumptively followed what has been called an “occurrence” rule for § 1983 claims,
our cases have presumptively followed a “discovery” rule for those claims. See id. (citations
omitted). The occurrence rule starts the limitations period on the first day that a plaintiff has a
complete cause of action; the discovery rule delays this start date until the plaintiff discovers
basic facts about the claim. See id. As we have done in past cases, we can assume that the more
plaintiff-friendly discovery rule applies here because the difference does not matter to the
outcome. See id. at 883.
Even still, our § 1983 cases leave unclear what this discovery rule requires plaintiffs to
have “discovered” to trigger the limitations period. Many of those cases suggest that the
limitations period starts when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of his action.” Id. at 882 (quoting Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)). In
another § 1983 case, though, we suggested that the limitations period does not start until a
plaintiff knows or should know of “both his injury and the cause of that injury.” Id. (quoting
Bishop v. Child.’s Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Which one of these discovery-rule tests adopts the right approach (assuming the discovery rule
applies at all)? On this issue too, we need not reconcile our conflicting caselaw to decide this
case. See id. at 883.
Even if the discovery rule requires knowledge of both the injury and its cause, Coleman’s
complaint shows that her § 1983 claims accrued on the date of her accident. Start with her
injuries. She knew of her physical harm immediately after she fell because she “had plainly
visible injuries including an open wound on her left ankle and significant swelling and bruising.”
2d Am. Compl., R.28, PageID 227. She also knew that she received little medical care “for
approximately four (4) hours” after this accident despite “her complaints of excruciating pain
and requests for medical help” from the four NaphCare employees. Id. Turn to the causes of

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these injuries. Immediately after she hurt her ankle, she knew that “the slippery and dangerous
condition of the shower caused” her fall. Id., PageID 225. And she knew that the four NaphCare
employees had failed to treat her during the four hours that she suffered through the pain. Id.,
PageID 227.
In response, Coleman counters with a single argument: that she could not have known of
the “cause” of her injuries to trigger the statute of limitations until she learned the identities of
the medical personnel who failed to treat her and their affiliation with NaphCare rather than
Hamilton County. She is mistaken. To start, our § 1983 caselaw has already rejected claims that
plaintiffs must know the “identity” of the defendants who harmed them to start the statute of
limitations under the discovery rule. Miller v. Cocke County, 2022 WL 103143, at *2 (6th Cir.
Jan. 11, 2022); see Ruiz-Bueno v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 659 F. App’x 830, 834 (6th
Cir. 2016); Dowdy v. Prison Health Servs., 21 F. App’x 433, 434–35 (6th Cir. 2001) (order).
The injury itself should put plaintiffs on notice of the need to investigate the identities of the
culprits to “protect” their rights. Miller, 2022 WL 103143, at *2. And if those culprits attempt
to hide, courts can fix that “problem” on the backend through tolling doctrines like fraudulent
concealment. See id. at *3.
To be sure, these cases applied the version of the discovery rule that asks only about a
plaintiff’s injury, not its cause. See id. at *2. Might it make a difference if we look to the
alternative version of the rule that considers both an injury and its cause? See Bishop, 618 F.3d
at 536; see also Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 701–04 (6th Cir. 2022). Not at
all. These cases adopt this more forgiving discovery rule based on a Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act. In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), the
Court held that a medical-malpractice claim accrued once a plaintiff had learned of his injury
(hearing loss) and its cause (the use of a certain antibiotic after surgery)—even if the plaintiff
had not learned that the use of the antibiotic was likely negligent. See id. at 118–24. When it
used the “cause” language, then, the Court meant the physical force that produced the hearing
loss: the antibiotic (rather than some other agent). See id. Nothing in Kubrick suggested that the
plaintiff could have avoided the statute of limitations by claiming “that he did not know which
physician had prescribed or administered” that antibiotic. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension

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Fund v. Navco, 3 F.3d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.), overruled on other grounds by
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192
(1997). And many decisions since Kubrick have rejected the argument that plaintiffs did not
know the “cause” of an injury simply because they did not know that the responsible parties
worked for the federal government. See Garza v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930, 935 (8th
Cir. 2002); Gould v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 743 & n.2 (4th Cir.
1990) (en banc); Zeleznik v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1985). Even under
Coleman’s favored version of the discovery rule, then, she did not need to know the names of the
NaphCare employees or their affiliation with that company. It was enough that she knew that
they had caused her delayed care.
We end with a disclaimer: § 1983 plaintiffs cannot hold private companies like NaphCare
vicariously liable for the acts of their employees. See Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 494 (6th
Cir. 2012). Instead, plaintiffs must show that their injuries arose out of a private company’s
policy or custom (such as its failure to train its employees). See id. Perhaps Coleman could have
argued that she did not know of this distinct failure-to-train “cause” even if she immediately
knew of the NaphCare employees’ failure to treat her. Cf. Snyder-Hill, 48 F.4th at 703–04. But
we need not resolve this issue now because Coleman did not make this argument or even allege
any NaphCare custom or policy. She has thus forfeited the issue. See Blick, 105 F.4th at 881–
82.
State Claims. A simpler analysis shows that Coleman’s negligence claims accrued on the
same date of her accident. State law (not federal law) determines the accrual date of state claims
in federal court. See Modern Holdings, LLC v. Corning, Inc., 2024 WL 4287900, at *3 (6th Cir.
Sept. 25, 2024) (citing cases). And Ohio’s legislature has presumptively set an occurrence rule
for most personal-injury claims: “a cause of action accrues [for those claims] when the injury or
loss to person or property occurs.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10(A). The legislature has also
adopted a few exceptions to this presumptive rule that delay the accrual date for certain injuries
that take time to manifest themselves. See id. § 2305.10(B)(1)(5). But Coleman does not try to
invoke any of these statutory exceptions. So her negligence claim accrued on the day of her
accident and injury under the plain text of Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A).

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Coleman responds that the Ohio Supreme Court has imposed a judge-made discovery
rule for personal-injury claims on top of the text of Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A). See
Schmitz v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 122 N.E.3d 80, 85–86 (Ohio 2018); O’Stricker v. Jim
Walter Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727, 732 (Ohio 1983). But this judge-made exception to the statute’s
text also does Coleman no good. It triggers the limitations period when plaintiffs know or
should know that they have “suffered a cognizable injury.” Schmitz, 122 N.E.3d at 86. Coleman
should have known of such an injury on the day of her accident. On that date, she both had a
“known injury” and believed “that her treating medical professional[s] [had] done something
wrong” by failing to care for her. Id. at 87–88. This knowledge and belief triggered the
limitations period under Ohio law. See id.
B. Did Coleman’s Claims “Relate Back” To Her Original Complaint?
Because Coleman’s claims accrued in June 2020, she timely filed her original complaint
in May 2022. So Coleman next argues that her second amended complaint “relates back” to this
original one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. If so, she could use the initial
complaint’s filing date for her later pleading. And Coleman points out that the earlier date would
render her claims timely even against the parties (NaphCare, its employees, and the five
corrections officers) that she sued later. Yet this theory misapplies Rule 15’s relation-back
doctrine.
Rule 15(c) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading” in several circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). As relevant here, an
amended complaint that “changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is
asserted” will relate back to the date of the original complaint if the amendment satisfies four
criteria. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986). The
amended complaint must pursue a claim that arose out of the same “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” as the claim in the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C). The party
added by the amended complaint must have “received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i). And this party must
have learned (or should have learned) “that the action would have been brought against it, but for
a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Lastly, the

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new party must have received the required notice and learned the required information within the
period for serving the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(m)).
We can resolve this case under the third requirement: that a newly named party “knew or
should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
Coleman asserts that her original complaint made a “mistake” because it used “John Doe” and
“Jane Doe” placeholders for the Hamilton County corrections officers and NaphCare employees
that her amended complaint added. But what was her “mistake”? The Supreme Court has read
that word to convey what any ordinary person would understand it to mean: “[a]n error,
misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.,
560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1092 (9th ed. 2009)). And, as we
have held for decades, plaintiffs do not commit an “error” or have a “misconception” when they
recognize that they do not know the name of a defendant and use a “John Doe” placeholder
instead. Id.; see Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 481–82 (6th Cir. 2022); Smith v. City of
Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012); Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996).
These types of “known unknowns, in the happy phrase coined by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld,” do not qualify as mistakes because an “absence of knowledge” is different from an
error in knowledge. Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 860 (2009); Zakora, 44 F.4th at
482. Coleman thus cannot rely on the relation-back doctrine because she cannot show the
required error for any of the newly added defendants.
Coleman’s responses fall short. As for the newly added corrections officers, she can
muster only the conclusory claim that “issues of fact” exist over whether she made a mistake.
Reply Br. 5. But she does not identify those issues. And we have said as a matter of law that the
use of a placeholder name does not qualify as a valid mistake. See Zakora, 44 F.4th at 481–82.
As for the newly added medical personnel, Coleman points out that her original
complaint referred to each of the two “John/Jane Doe” nurses “as a Hamilton County Sheriff’s
Office Employee” rather than a NaphCare employee. Compl., R.2, PageID 21. Because she
misidentified the employer of the unnamed defendants, this argument goes, she made a

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cognizable mistake. Not so. Rule 15 requires Coleman to show that she would have originally
sued the new parties “but for” the mistake about their identities. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
In other words, the mistake must have been a but-for cause of the failure to sue those parties.
See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–12 (2014). Here, though, Coleman’s original
complaint failed to name the medical personnel not because she wrongly believed that they
worked for Hamilton County but because she rightly recognized she did not know their
identities. That is, even if she had known their employer from the outset, she still would not
have sued them. See id. That her original complaint also failed to name the proper corrections
officers (even though she accurately identified their employer as Hamilton County) proves this
point. So this mistake cannot take Coleman’s case outside our general rule that plaintiffs who
use “John Doe” placeholders because they do “not know whom to sue” do not commit a mistake
under Rule 15. Smith, 476 F. App’x at 69.
Admittedly, Coleman might have argued for a different theory of “mistake”: that she
erroneously sued Hamilton County (the government) rather than NaphCare (the private
company) for her Monell “claim” challenging the alleged lack of medical care. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(C). That theory might resemble the type of mistake that the Supreme Court said sufficed
in Krupski: a mistake about which of two affiliated companies operated the cruise ship on which
the plaintiff had been injured. 560 U.S. at 554–55. At the same time, we have indicated that
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does not apply if the plaintiff adds a new defendant (on top of an existing one)
and does not simply substitute one defendant for another. See Zakora, 44 F.4th at 480. And
here, Coleman’s amended complaint left Hamilton County in the suit. At day’s end, though, we
merely flag (and need not resolve) this potential theory because Coleman failed to raise it. See
Blick, 105 F.4th at 881–82.
One last point. Coleman alternatively argues that Ohio Civil Rule 15(D)—not Federal
Rule 15(c)—should govern this relation-back question because she originally sued in state court.
The allegedly more forgiving state rule permits a plaintiff who does not know the name of a
defendant to use “any name and description” for the defendant and to file an amendment once
the plaintiff learns the defendant’s name. Ohio Civil Rule 15(D). But the plaintiff’s original
complaint must still allege that “he could not discover” the defendant’s name, and the defendant

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must receive personal service. Id. Setting aside whether Coleman complied with this state
pleading rule, she offers no reasoning why it should apply in federal court other than a bare
citation to Smith. But Smith found her theory “doubtful” on its way to avoiding the issue
altogether because the plaintiff could not satisfy the state rule. 476 F. App’x at 70.
We can think of one potential way she might have been able to rely on the state rule:
Federal Rule 15 separately allows an amendment to relate back to the original complaint if “the
law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(A). Because Ohio law provided the statute of limitations for Coleman’s § 1983 and
negligence claims, might Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allow her to invoke the state relation-back
rule? Cf. 6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1503 (3d ed. 2010);
Pac. Emps. Ins. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 400–01 (6th Cir. 2002). The parties
did not brief this question. Besides, Coleman did not raise this state-law pleading theory at all in
the district court. She has thus forfeited the argument on appeal as well. See Bannister v. Knox
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1011–13 (6th Cir. 2022). Like Smith, we can save this issue
for another day.
C. Should We Equitably Toll the Limitations Period?
Coleman lastly seeks to save her claims through equitable tolling. That doctrine
sometimes delays the running of the limitations period if a plaintiff can identify a sufficiently
good excuse for failing to sue on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010).
Coleman claims that this tolling rule applies here because she diligently tried to identify the
responsible parties.
Her argument suffers from two problems: She relies on the wrong procedural standards
and the wrong substantive law. To start, Coleman overlooks this case’s procedural posture. She
argues that the district court had discretion over whether to apply equitable tolling, and she
supports her tolling request with outside-the-complaint evidence. Yet this appeal arises from a
decision granting a motion to dismiss (or for judgment on the pleadings). So we review the
district court’s decision de novo and consider only the allegations in the complaint. See Reguli,
109 F.4th at 879; see also Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir.

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2020). This procedural posture helps Coleman in a few ways. Because a statute of limitations
raises an affirmative defense that a defendant bears the burden of proving, a complaint need not
plead facts showing a claim’s timeliness. See Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d
459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013); Cataldo, 676 F.3d at 547. And because the sufficiency of a complaint
raises a legal issue, we review the denial of equitable tolling at this pleading stage with fresh
eyes rather than through a deferential lens. See Wershe v. City of Detroit, 112 F.4th 357, 365–66
(6th Cir. 2024).
But the procedural posture undermines Coleman’s argument in a more significant way.
Although plaintiffs need not plead a claim’s timeliness, defendants can still move to dismiss a
complaint based on the statute of limitations if the complaint affirmatively alleges “facts
showing that [the plaintiffs] did not sue in time.” Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879. And here, Coleman’s
alleged facts establish that she did not sue within the facially applicable limitations period. See
id. When plaintiffs “plead themselves out of court” in this way, id., the burden switches to them
to allege facts that plausibly “establish an exception to the statute of limitations” (such as
equitable tolling). Lutz, 717 F.3d at 464 (quoting Campbell v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 238
F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001)); Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008).
But Coleman’s equitable-tolling arguments on appeal did not contain a single citation to the
document that matters: her complaint. See Gordon v. England, 354 F. App’x 975, 981 (6th Cir.
2009); Bishop, 520 F.3d at 520. She instead cited other materials (or just alleged facts in her
appellate brief). If she sought to add more facts to bolster her equitable-tolling argument, she
should have moved to amend her complaint. See Bates, 958 F.3d at 483–84. We must limit
ourselves to that document.
Next, Coleman overlooks the substantive law that applies to her equitable-tolling
argument. She invokes the five-part test that we have often used when deciding whether
equitable tolling should apply to a federal statute of limitations. See Truitt v. County of Wayne,
148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Wershe, 112 F.4th at 366. Yet Ohio law governs
whether to toll the state limitations period governing Coleman’s negligence claim. See Saalim v.
Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995, 1012 (6th Cir. 2024); Lutz, 717 F.3d at 474. And because § 1983
incorporates the statute-of-limitations from the State where the events occurred, federal courts

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have also generally looked to state equitable-tolling rules for § 1983 claims. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394–95 (2007); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538–44 (1989); Wershe,
112 F.4th at 370–71. Coleman, though, cited no Ohio cases that have equitably tolled the
limitations period on her requested grounds. To the contrary, those courts invoke this doctrine
“sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.” Roach v. Vapor Station Columbus, Inc.,
2022 WL 2211529, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022). Plaintiffs typically must allege that a defendant
“intentionally misled or tricked” them into missing the deadline. Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1012
(quoting Roach, 2022 WL 2211529, at *2).
In sum, Coleman identifies nothing in the relevant factual and legal sources—her
complaint and Ohio law—that justifies her equitable-tolling request. She thus has not met her
burden to show that she qualifies for this doctrine. See Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1012; Roach, 2022
WL 2211529, at *2.
We affirm.

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