United States of America v. Floyd T. Adams

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 25a0061n.06
No. 24-5160
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FLOYD T. ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
KENTUCKY
OPINION
Before: MURPHY, DAVIS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Floyd Adams received a within-guidelines sentence of 240
months’ imprisonment for receiving child pornography. On appeal, he challenges this sentence as
substantively unreasonable. But the district court chose a reasonable sentence when measured
against the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We thus affirm.
In December 2021, Adams began to communicate through social media with a person
whom he believed to be an 11-year-old girl. After their conversations turned sexual, Adams and
the girl agreed to meet at a movie theater in Somerset, Kentucky. As it turns out, however, Adams
had been conversing with a fake social-media account set up by a private organization designed to
uncover child predators. Members of this organization confronted Adams at the theater and called
the Kentucky police. After interviewing Adams, the police seized several of his electronic devices.
Those devices contained hundreds of images of child pornography.

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 24-5160, United States v. Adams
2
The federal government brought a four-count indictment against Adams. He pleaded guilty
to a single count of receiving child pornography in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining
counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court calculated Adams’s
guidelines range as 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. But his offense triggered a statutory
maximum of 20 years (or 240 months). See id. § 2252(b)(1). So this statutory maximum became
Adams’s guidelines sentence. After balancing the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the
court imposed this 240-month prison term.
Adams now argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. In other words, he says
that his sentence is “too long” when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). This type of challenge is not easy. Adams must show
that the district court abused its significant discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). We must “give due deference” to that court’s conclusion about the proper balance of the
§ 3553(a) factors. Id. And we must presume that the court acted reasonably given that it chose to
impose a guidelines sentence. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
Adams has not rebutted that presumption. The district court reasonably chose its 240-
month sentence under the § 3553(a) factors. Of most note, the court found it “hard to overstate
the seriousness of the offense.” Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 247; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A).
Adams did not simply possess child pornography. Rather, he had “explicit discussions” with a
person whom he thought was an 11-year-old girl and tried to “ease her” into a sexual relationship.
Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 247–48. The child pornography that the police found on Adams’s devices
also included pictures of a toddler and sexual abuse. Id., PageID 249. Next, when discussing the
need for “just punishment” and to “promote respect for law,” the court highlighted that Adams did

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 24-5160, United States v. Adams
3
not commit a “victimless crime” because the children in these images often suffer severe emotional
harm. Id., PageID 249–50; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). And the court accounted for the need to
“avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities” by identifying statistics suggesting that the “average
sentence” for defendants like Adams was 232 months. Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 250–51; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(A), (6). In the end, though, the court explained that the “need to protect the public”
and to “deter” Adams drove its choice of the proper punishment due to his “predatory” behavior.
Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 250; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).
Adams responds that the court’s sentence is excessive when accounting for his “history
and characteristics[.]” Appellant’s Br. 7; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). He had no criminal history other
than minor traffic infractions. In addition, he lacked any relationship with his father as a child and
now has a good relationship with his wife and mother. Doctors also recently diagnosed him with
Parkinson’s disease. But the district court considered these “mitigating” factors when discussing
Adams’s background. Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 245–47, 251. And appellate review of a district
court’s sentence does not permit us merely to “rebalance the § 3553(a) factors” and pick the
sentence we would prefer. United States v. Holt, 116 F.4th 599, 617 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). We may ensure only that the court acted reasonably. See id. at 616–17. That standard
forecloses relief because the court reasonably found that the mitigating factors did not outweigh
the “extremely aggravating” ones. Sent. Tr., R.78, PageID 251.
We affirm.

-- 3 of 3 --