Maryville Baptist Church; Jack Roberts v. Andy Beshear, in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0067p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARYVILLE BAPTIST CHURCH; JACK ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ANDY BESHEAR, in his official capacity as Governor
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 24-5737
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:20-cv-00278—David J. Hale, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: March 25, 2025
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Mathew D. Staver, Daniel J. Schmid, LIBERTY COUNSEL, Orlando, Florida, for
Appellants. Mitchel T. Denham, MCBRAYER, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, Travis Mayo,
Taylor Payne, Laura Tipton, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for
Appellee.
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OPINION
_________________
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Maryville Baptist Church sought, and obtained, a preliminary
injunction against the Kentucky Governor’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings. As
time passed and the pandemic waned, the case became moot. In view of its early success in the
case under the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Church sought attorney’s fees as a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court
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denied the motion, and the Church appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court recently answered the
question. It held that a party who receives a preliminary injunction, and whose case becomes
moot before the court reaches a final judgment, does not count as a prevailing party under
§ 1988. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025). Consistent with that decision, we affirm
the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.
I.
At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Andy Beshear declared a state of
emergency in Kentucky and entered a series of orders intended to slow the virus’s spread. Two
of those orders bear on this case. The first order, issued on March 19, 2020, prohibited all “mass
gatherings” in the Commonwealth. R.1-5 at 1. That included “faith-based” gatherings, but it
exempted gatherings at “airports, bus and train stations,” and “shopping malls and centers,”
among other places. R.1-5 at 1. The second order, issued on March 25, closed all organizations
that were not “life-sustaining.” R.1-7 at 2. That included religious organizations, except when
they provided “food, shelter, and social services,” but it exempted laundromats, law firms,
hardware stores, and several other businesses. R.1-7 at 2–4.
On April 12, 2020, Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service. Some congregants
sat inside the church for the service, while others sat in their cars and listened over loudspeakers.
Kentucky State Police arrived and notified all of the congregants that their attendance violated
the Governor’s orders.
The Church and its pastor sued the Governor under § 1983, alleging violations of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The district court declined to issue a
preliminary injunction. The Church appealed. We expedited the appeal and issued a partial stay
during its pendency, which barred the Governor from enforcing his orders against the Church’s
outdoor worship. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir.
2020) (per curiam). Six days later, while the underlying appeal remained pending, the district
court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Governor from enforcing his orders against
the Church’s indoor and outdoor worship. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No.
3:20-CV-278-DJH-RSE, 2020 WL 2393359, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. May 8, 2020). After the Church

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obtained its desired preliminary relief, we dismissed its appeal as moot. See Maryville Baptist
Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 977 F.3d 561, 564–65 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
On May 9, 2020, a day after the district court awarded the Church its preliminary
injunction, the Governor allowed places of worship to reopen. Less than a year after that, the
Kentucky General Assembly limited the Governor’s authority to issue similar COVID-19 orders
in the future. See Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 67, 78 (Ky. 2021). With the controversy
at an end due to actions by the state executive and legislative branches, the third branch of the
federal government dismissed the underlying action as moot on October 6, 2021.
The Church moved for attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district court
eventually denied the motion on the ground that the Church did not prevail. The Church appeals.
II.
In the American legal system, each party usually pays its own attorney’s fees. See
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602
(2001). Congress has created some exceptions to that default rule. The most conspicuous one
covers lawsuits that vindicate constitutional and statutory rights under federal law. Under
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), courts may grant “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in a
§ 1983 action.
For today’s purposes, the key language is “prevailing party.” That phrase frames the sole
question on appeal: May we treat a party who receives a preliminary injunction, but never
obtains a final judgment because the case becomes moot, as a prevailing party?
Until now, we “usually” answered no but made an “occasional exception[]” in discrete
circumstances. McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 604 (6th Cir. 2010). “[W]hen a claimant
wins a preliminary injunction and nothing more,” we explained, “that usually will not suffice to
obtain fees under § 1988.” Id. That remained the rule in our court for over a decade.
“Ordinarily,” we said under that line of cases, “a preliminary injunction by itself does not
suffice.” Roberts v. Neace, 65 F.4th 280, 284 (6th Cir. 2023). During that time, we permitted
attorney’s fees in this situation a handful of times because the underlying preliminary injunction

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“mainly turn[ed] on the likelihood-of-success inquiry and change[d] the parties’ relationship in a
material and enduring way.” Id.; see, e.g., Tenn. State Conf. of NAACP v. Hargett, 53 F.4th 406,
411 (6th Cir. 2022); Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2019); Planned Parenthood
Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F.3d 530, 546 (6th Cir. 2019).
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that the “ordinar[y]” rule is the only rule. In
Lackey v. Stinnie, a Virginia statute required state courts to suspend the licenses of drivers who
failed to pay court fines. 145 S. Ct. at 664. A group of drivers challenged the law, and the
district court preliminarily enjoined its enforcement. Id. at 664–65. The Virginia General
Assembly repealed the statute before the district court reached a final judgment, which mooted
the underlying case. Id. at 665. The drivers sought attorney’s fees anyway. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected the drivers’ bid. A plaintiff “prevails,” the Court explained,
“when a court conclusively resolves a claim by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits
that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.” Id. at 669. A plaintiff who
receives a preliminary injunction before the case becomes moot does not fit the bill, it concluded.
Id. at 666–69. A preliminary injunction, the Court explained, reflects only “temporary success at
an intermediary stage of the suit,” not enduring relief based on a conclusive determination that
the plaintiff won, and not relief that changes the relationship between the parties. Id. at 667
(quotation omitted).
Our line of cases that permitted attorney’s fees in the context of a narrow set of
preliminary injunctions cannot be reconciled with Lackey’s bright-line rule that the statute never
authorizes them in that setting. It goes without saying, but we will say it anyway, that in a
“hierarchical system of precedent,” our decisions must yield to the Court’s contrary decisions.
Hawver v. United States, 808 F.3d 693, 694 (6th Cir. 2015). That means that Lackey, not any of
our contrary precedents, determines whether the Church prevails with only a preliminary
injunction to its name.
Gauged by Lackey, the Church does not count as a prevailing party. The Church, like the
drivers in Lackey, enjoyed only a “transient victory” when our court and the district court
preliminarily enjoined the Governor from enforcing his orders against drive-in and in-person

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church services. 145 S. Ct. at 669. When events outside the courthouse, as in Lackey, mooted
the dispute, that mooted any chance of obtaining attorney’s fees. See id. at 665. Any ongoing
relief the Church enjoys at this point comes from the Governor’s revised orders and later
legislation by the General Assembly, not from a federal court’s orders. The same reality in
Lackey leads to the same conclusion here. Because the Church “gained only preliminary
injunctive relief before this action became moot,” it does not qualify as a prevailing party eligible
for attorney’s fees. Id. at 671.
We affirm.

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